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IPSO MEMBER ENCOURAGES ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STANCE

Amsterdam POLITIEK EN CULTUUR in Dutch No 10, Dec 79  
pp 445-452

[Article by Hans Akkermans, physicist and IPSO [Institute for Political and Social Research] staff member: "The New Nuclear Weapons in Europe"]

[Text] The period lying before us will be very decisive for the problem of international peace and security. Moreover, interest centers on three questions.

The struggle in the United States for the ratification of the SALT II Agreement and the discussions connected with it about new strategic nuclear weapons;

The effort to introduce a new generation of nuclear weapons in Europe, both tactical, as well as the so-called "Euro-strategic";

The continuance of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki meeting) in Madrid in 1980, where the question of overall European detente is on the agenda.

These are all very controversial problems, about which a decision is still far from being taken.

The main issue of this struggle is the efforts of aggressive forces in the United States and Western Europe to gain a new military superiority. If these efforts succeed--which is not impossible, although the forces favoring further detente are especially strong--that would lead to a dangerous alienation, if not a crisis in international relations. At the same time, this would create increased pressure on progressive and peace-loving forces, especially in Europe, who are striving for fundamental political and social changes. In other words,

symptoms which clearly resemble those of the cold war, would again appear very emphatically in international political life. Preventing that is one of the urgent tasks of the moment.

### The Danger of the New Nuclear Weapons

NATO is preparing a dual nuclear weapons race in Europe. It is doing it first in the effort to introduce new tactical nuclear weapons, that is short range nuclear weapons. The neutron bomb is certainly the best known example of this. These weapons are not so much intended for "intimidating the adversary" (as the saying goes), but, according to NATO circles, must create the opportunity for a more direct use of nuclear weapons on the field of combat. Therefore these weapons are designated in publications as tactical nuclear combat weapons. In the second place, NATO is preparing the introduction of Eurostrategic weapons. These are middle range nuclear weapons, so that they can directly hit targets in the Soviet Union from the continent of Europe (for example, the Netherlands or the FRG).

In spite of NATO assertions to the contrary, both of these developments are of a completely new type. Because the dangers of tactical weapons such as the neutron bomb were already documented in detail in the mass movement against them, we will discuss in the following especially the question of the Eurostrategic weapons and what they involve. What are the dangers connected with the introduction of Eurostrategic nuclear weapons?

These are, first of all, inherent in their strategic nature themselves. You do not need to be a polemicist to understand their introduction will immediately lead to tensions with the Soviet Union and to counter measures by the Soviet side. It would be oil on the already furiously burning fire of the nuclear weapons race in Europe. The introduction of Eurostrategic weapons would have an additional destabilizing effect (in fact, even for relations with the United States) because these weapons increase the prospects of fighting an even strategic--atomic war with American atomic weapons from European territory. And this encourages, in its turn, belligerent ideas about "dealing the first atomic blow." In addition, the Eurostrategic weapons create new barriers and obstacles for disarmament talks. This has already been the case both in the SALT I as well as SALT II discussions. The problems and the delays which, for example, the cruise missile has created are well known enough. The Eurostrategic nuclear



weapons bring up for discussion in a completely new way the FRG question and the problem of the right to have atomic weapons. If they should be set up in the FRG, then the FRG would get strategic nuclear weapons for the first time on its territory. The danger of delegation of powers regarding nuclear weapons to subordinate commanders, which was already brought up a great deal in the discussion about the neutron bomb, would attain a strategic dimension in it. In general, we can say that it would be an encouragement for the policy of Strauss and his supporters.

The threatening "tactical" and "Eurostrategic" nuclear weapons race are detached from each other least of all. The technical principles of the neutron bomb (increased radiation) can, for example, also be adapted to the Eurostrategic weapons. In connection with the cruise missile, the American press has already alluded to this several times. That means that the special dangers of the neutron bomb, as it came to light in the mass action against it and which now are generally recognized, are multiplied, as it were, by raising them again from the tactical level to a strategic question.

#### **Eurostrategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons**

Consequently, it is a matter here, least of all of a "replacement of obsolete weapons systems," as NATO wants to make it appear. On the contrary, it involves qualitatively new steps in the weapons race. But, it is not even that alone. The main issue is a political change in the nuclear strategy of the United States and NATO. It involves not only new Eurostrategic weapons, but also a new "Eurostrategy."

Paramount in this new nuclear policy is the most dangerous idea that the new nuclear weapons could make it possible to conduct a "limited atomic war." In this view, Europe acts as a potential atomic battlefield, in which American foreign interests could be protected, without the United States itself having to suffer directly from a possible military conflict. It is a striking proof of the "ally nature" of the relationships between the capitalist countries in Western Europe and the United States. It is all the more inexcusable that these new developments in armament are taking place in the so-called gray zones of armaments control. With this, it is intended that they not be subjected to a single treaty for armaments limitation, or even merely be a subject of discussion in any negotiation. Consequently the nuclear weapons race is, so to say, as free here as a hawk in the air. Both the tactical

(neutron bomb, Lance, F-16) as well as the Eurostrategic nuclear weapons (Pershing II, cruise missile) belong to the gray zone weapons.

A concomitant symptom in all this are various forms of cold war propaganda. Here discussion about the SS-20 missile is especially used. Here the public is provided with false information in many ways. It is kept secret that in the years before the installation of the SS-20, the French and British strategic nuclear force was established, and NATO, in addition, was provided with American Poseidon submarines with strategic missiles on board. No mention is made of the fact that the pressure, for example, to introduce the cruise missile (now proposed to neutralize the SS-20) dates from long before the existence of the SS-20 was even discussed. It was carefully avoided pointing out that the Soviet Union had already proposed in the SALT I discussions including the established strategic systems in Europe in the negotiations; this was rejected by the United States with the agreement of the European NATO countries. How artificial the discussion is about the SS-20 is obvious from the manipulation of the "hard facts about it." Thus Lubbers mentioned several months ago in the NRC [expansion unknown] (presumably in Luns' footsteps) a present figure of 600 SS-20 missiles; other western sources (for example, the same NRC on 25 April 1979) do not exceed a tenth of this figure. Consequently the SS-20s act, as Mient-Jan Faber of the IKV [International Peace Council] rightly expressed it, as a sales trick. An attempt was made to create an image of a serious NATO inferiority, similar to the prescription of the "bomber gap" in the fifties and the "missile gap" at the beginning of the sixties, which later turned out to be fictitious. The creation of an imaginary gap serves a dual purpose. First, it justifies the introduction of new weapons, and is able to block negotiations at the same time. Secondly, it gains acceptance for the idea of Europe as a potential atomic battlefield.

#### Realists and Hawks

The European continent will undoubtedly be the stage for violent disturbances and far reaching changes in the coming years. The round of talks undertaken in the nuclear weapons race is clearly a threat to the socialist countries. However this is directed just as much against the struggle of the labor movement and other democratic forces in Western Europe. At the same time new divisions are visible in the traditional relations between the western European countries and the

United States. The developments in Europe in the period of international detente lying before us are of fundamental importance; and the European countries themselves are able to influence future developments in their favor more decisively than ever before. However, the actual realization of this opportunity depends on the active assertion of the working class and its communist party.

It is not surprising that the intentions of Rightist forces in the United States and NATO have caused serious alarm in Europe, even in ruling circles. In the field of strategic nuclear weapons (by this is usually meant the nuclear weapons which can hit the Soviet Union directly from the United States and vice versa) a generally recognized equality now exists. The recognition of this, even by the United States, also made the conclusion of the SALT agreements possible. The hard line US politicians are now trying in various ways to convert this equality into superiority. First by opposing the ratification of the SALT II Agreement, or at least by demanding in exchange for that ratification the introduction of a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons (such as the MX missile; a new version of the Trident missile). Secondly besides the present strategic armaments race between the United States and the USSR, they support a second nuclear race in Euro-strategic weapons, which is centered in Europe and exploits the dim twilight of the gray zone. The creation of artificial crises, such as those about Cuba and (mark well) about Soviet Russian ballet dancers, must contribute to carrying out such a confrontation policy. In addition to this, we must still include the efforts of the same type of politicians to suggest an atomic war on European territory as "conceivable" and "acceptable." In other words, in case of a conflict, Europe would have to be ready "to pull the chestnuts out of the fire," while in so doing it even exposes itself to atomic annihilation.

The concern about such a suicidal policy for Europe is obvious. For Europe with its history of two world wars is the continent which benefits most directly from continuing detente. Especially, therefore, the failure to ratify SALT II would lead in Europe to a "credibility crisis" for the United States, perhaps comparable with that which arose because of the American aggressive war against the Vietnamese people. In this connection, it is important to mention that all European NATO countries have clearly expressed themselves in favor of the SALT II agreement (including, for example, the conservative Thatcher British government). This meets the

interests and desires of the European peoples. At the same time it is plain as day that a division of minds is appearing in the ruling circles here. On the one side are the politicians, both in Europe as well as the United States, who understand the fact that the policy of "peace through strength" does not lead to superiority (not for nothing is little left of the former western atomic monopoly!), but only greater danger of war. On the other side are stirring the hawks, who are represented by sensational figures such as Strauss, who intend to use a new armaments wave for their own purposes. But even this group of politicians comes in conflict with the American hawks, where the latter are concerned about insuring the dominating position of the United States in Western Europe by increasing armament.

### Europe's Position

The peace movement deserves credit that it has succeeded in making problems of peace and security, where these usually are handled in countries like ours in diplomatic circles, a subject of discussion and action among broad strata of the Dutch people. At the same time it was able to cleverly exploit the contradictions in leading circles about these questions, and this was one of the factors in the great success of the campaign against the neutron bomb. However, we also run up here against the remarkable fact that the new NATO policy regarding nuclear weapons also contributes to undermining itself. As distinguished from the case with the strategic nuclear weapons, the express agreement of the European NATO countries is required for the introduction of Euro-strategic and tactical weapons. For each of these countries can individually prohibit the introduction and setting up of these weapons in the NATO arsenal in its own territory. And this unsettles the often heard views about the United States as the power determining everything in NATO and about the so-called "superpowers."

The communists have always sharply combated the superpowers theory. This theory mainly has two assumptions:

Lumping together the United States and the Soviet Union, who jointly as superpowers, would provide the motive force behind the international armaments race;

The opinion, that other countries only play a subordinate role and especially the assumption that the Netherlands, as a small country, should not attempt to question American leadership.



The first opinion treats socialist and capitalist countries alike and ignores the historical fact that each step in the nuclear weapons race came from the United States in an effort to preserve its atomic monopoly and its great sphere of influence, based on American military power. It overlooks the fact that the socialist system is peace-loving by its nature, which was again confirmed in Brezhnev's startling speech on the occasion of the celebration of the GDR's thirtieth anniversary. The second assertion misjudges very recent history which has shown what small peoples and countries can do against big powers. We only need to mention small peoples and countries such as Vietnam, Cuba, Angola or Nicaragua. And as regards the Netherlands, it is cleverly ignored that the Netherlands itself is an imperialist country, a substantial armaments exporter and a power with considerable neo-colonial influence.

In spite of this, we must recognize that for many people the theory of superpowers has had a certain real basis. This is due to the fact that the main element in the armaments competition since 1945 has been the strategic nuclear armaments race between the United States and the Soviet Union. But exactly this apparent basis is undermined by NATO itself, now when it wants to start a Eurostrategic nuclear weapons race. The European countries have the opportunity to prevent this. This emphasizes Europe's increased importance. This changed position is stressed even more by the development of the SALT conversations. In SALT I and SALT II only the weapons systems in the United States and the Soviet Union were involved, in the coming SALT III, the Eurostrategic weapons will almost unavoidably be a subject of discussion. An independent and constructive action by European countries can be decisive for a final positive result.

The present developments also put in another light the shopworn reasoning of an American "atomic umbrella" over Western Europe. This is the idea, that the long range nuclear weapons in the United States also would be used in a European armed conflict, if considered necessary. These strategic weapons are, as the NATO terminology goes, coupled with European security. But it is clear that the introduction of Eurostrategic missiles brings about an actual uncoupling. That cannot be explained away without any further ado, even if you are the director of the Netherlands Institute of Problems of Peace. The atomic umbrella is beginning to leak, because of NATO's action itself. This emphatically tells the European countries that they themselves must guarantee European security. And the only way to that, even in a

military sense, is to give practical form to detente. The great importance of the Helsinki meeting and its continuance in Madrid in 1980 is based on that.

The need for further detente is all the greater because Europe has to deal with very great social and political problems, such as mass unemployment. There is a definite connection between the struggle for detente and the class struggle. It is very difficult to find democratic solutions for great social problems in a climate of international tension. The experiences of the cold war and the present talk about the organization of American intervention armies speak volumes. The armaments race supports authoritarian movements in Europe. Consequently anti-democratic "solutions" must be forced, which hinder social conflict and thwart the forming of progressive governments (with, as is now the order of the day in Europe, direct participation of communists), against the very general desire for social change. Here we see how important the action of communist parties is in Europe in all fields.

#### What the Netherlands Can and Must Do

The Netherlands plays a key role in the decision about new nuclear weapons in Europe. First, because of the international reputation, which the Netherlands peace movement has acquired in recent years. Secondly, because of the unequivocal statements which the Netherlands Parliament has made about the neutron bomb. Thirdly, because the FRG (as a result of the great international movement) does not dare to station new missiles on its territory alone, but wants to make other western European countries co-responsible for this. Therefore the Netherlands can do a great deal.

What the Netherlands must do is to oppose to the utmost the introduction of new nuclear weapons in Europe and resolutely reject in advance the installation of them on national territory. A broad agreement can be reached over the fact that Europe cannot be regarded, under any conditions, as a possible stage for nuclear wars, and that before further armament can even be considered, it must first be discussed.

Everyone knows the story of the Netherlands lad who, all alone, prevented a great flood disaster. As one may assume, this story is somewhat exaggerated. However, why should not millions of peaceloving people not be able to prevent Europe from being flooded with new nuclear weapons, new aggressive ideas, new dangers of war?

8490  
CS0: 3105

## LIBERALS OPPOSE NORWEGIAN SUPPORT FOR TNF MODERNIZATION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 5 Nov 79 p 19

[Text] The Liberal Party will not accept concurrence by Norway with NATO's plans to modernize nuclear weapons in Europe, according to a statement by the national committee in which the committee regrets that a majority in parliament seems to support the plans. In addition, the Liberal Party's national committee advocates better working opportunities for small and medium businesses by way of tax and depreciation laws. Otherwise, the committee is satisfied that the government will present a new report to parliament on the Alta matter.

The Liberals' national committee, which met in Oslo last weekend, believes that the position taken by the NATO alliance on the installation of new nuclear missiles can have a decisive effect on the arms race during the 1980's.

It has not been proven necessary on the basis of defense considerations to carry out this type of nuclear buildup at present. Thus, the Liberal Party cannot accept concurrence with these plans on the part of Norway. The possibility of avoiding nuclear rearmament should be tried at the negotiations, according to the statement.

In a statement on development of the Alta-Kautokeino watercourse, the Liberals say they are satisfied that the government chose to accommodate the request for a new report to parliament. The report must make a thorough study of the Lapps' situation and their legal rights with regard to the use of various resources in Finnmarksvidda, the statement said.

Among the concrete measures the party advocates for meeting Finnmark's energy needs are more efficient coordination, making it possible to have greater transmission from Nordland and Sweden, development of the Stor-Glomfjord and Melfjord plants in Nordland to secure Finnmark's energy needs after 1985, a comprehensive plan to modernize old power plants in northern Norway, and a special plan for energy in northern Norway with special emphasis on using waste energy at the larger industrial plants.

The government should also prepare changes in the tax and depreciation regulations so that small and medium-sized businesses can have better operating conditions, according to another statement approved at a meeting of the Liberal Party's national committee Saturday.

The Liberals are proposing a number of measures to improve conditions for small and medium-sized businesses in the trade and in industry.

These measures include reducing the fee paid by employers to the national insurance by one percent for these businesses in 1980, increasing the scope of loans from the Trades and Small Industry Fund by 50 million kroner for 1980, supplying businesses with more money through the District Development Fund and the Industry Bank, and earmarking a larger portion of research funds to projects of special interest to small and medium-sized businesses.

In another statement on the government's budget proposal, the Liberal Party opposes increased fares for collective transportation.

9336

CSO: 3108



## NATO TNF-MODERNIZATION PLAN ENCOUNTERS OPPOSITION AMONG LABOR LEADERS

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 29 Nov 79 p 6

[Article by Thor Viksveen]

[Text] The Executive Council of the Labor Party did not come to a conclusive decision at its meeting as to what position the government should take regarding NATO's plans to modernize its atomic weapons. A debate in the council yesterday, in which clear differences were expressed, took cognizance of the question without reaching any decision.

Prime Minister Odvar Nordli indicated at a press conference after yesterday's meeting that the government wanted to hold the matter in abeyance until the meeting of NATO's prime ministers on 12 December. The situation in the near future both in Europe and at home will determine the view which the government will ultimately take, Nordli said.

The meeting of the Executive Council yesterday left no doubt but that the government believes a "yes" to the modernization of atomic weapons in Europe is at present a prerequisite for a positive position in negotiating with the Eastern bloc for arms control and disarmament. A majority of those who spoke at the meeting did not share this view but expressed the opinion that negotiations should be first initiated, and then if they do not lead to satisfactory results, steps to modernize the equipment should be considered. The meeting of the Executive Council clearly demonstrated that the desire for disarmament is the primary consideration, regardless of what position one might take in regard to the question whether negotiations or modernization should come first.

Arvid Johanson, chairman of the Storting's (Parliament) Foreign Affairs Committee and vice-chairman of the Labor Party's delegation among the speakers aroused the greatest attention when he expressed his opinion that the correct course would be to postpone for the time being a resolution regarding modernization in the hope that such a course would provide a satisfactory basis for negotiating with the Eastern bloc. Johanson is the first

individual in such a high position in the Labor Party to oppose NATO's plans. Many people are wondering if this will influence the attitude of the Labor Party's parliamentary group. It will consider the question on 5 December, and what happens there will be significant for the formulation of final position by the government.

Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund and Defense Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, in addition to Prime Minister Odvar Nordli, made introductory remarks. The views expressed were largely those which had been made known previously, primarily in Frydenlund's foreign policy statement to the Storting earlier this fall. The need for disarmament negotiations following a decision for modernization was, however, emphasized more strongly than previously. A new factor, not previously known, was also disclosed in the prime minister's statement. The government supports the idea of a special group with members from the political level of the member states in NATO monitoring the disarmament negotiations which hopefully will follow in the wake of a modernization decision, so that the NATO countries can on a current basis evaluate developments and their consequences.

The chairman of the Labor Party Youth Organization, Thorbjørn Jagland, was among those who most strongly argued that negotiations should precede a decision regarding modernization. Jagland told ARBEIDERBLADET that in his opinion the debate yesterday is representative of the discussions which are going on in the various organizations.

In reply to a question regarding what he hopes and believes will be the final decision, Jagland says that it will be nothing but support for the so-called modernization position. He believes that a "Danish solution"--a postponement for a half a year or a year--will be supported by all those who today oppose modernization.

"The debate in the Executive Council has shown that there is quite extensive opposition to NATO's plans, and this opposition cuts across the previous distinction between supporters and opponents of membership in NATO," Jagland informs ARBEIDERBLADET.

6893

CSO: 3108

## GOVERNMENT LIKELY TO GET WIDE SUPPORT IF MODERNIZATION ENDORSED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Nov 79 p 5

[Text] The government is fully supported in its efforts to promote negotiations between NATO and the Soviet Union regarding disarmament. The government has wide political support for its efforts to create the basis necessary for realistic negotiations with a steadily-rearming Soviet Union. A Norwegian "yes" for a modernization of NATO's atomic arsenal has the support of the Conservatives, the Center Party and the Christian People's Party, in addition to that support the government can get from a divided Labor Party. This was apparent from the TV debate of party leaders on Wednesday.

The defense chief, Gen Sverre Hamre, made clear in the debate that when a balance after a modernization of NATO's atomic weapons is mentioned it involves an approximate balance but with a sufficiently frightening effect, 3 to 1 in favor of the Soviets.

Kare Willoch of the Conservatives said that every week the Soviet Union is arming itself with rockets equal to 20 Hrushina bombs. Our strong desire to negotiate must be combined with a resolution that if we don't achieve results from the negotiations the West must respond with a corresponding modernization. We have throughout the whole postwar period created by means of NATO a balance which has provided peace and security. A "no" to modernization involves a gamble which will still further distort the balance and increase the danger of war.

Kare Kristiansen of the Christian People's Party, as well as Johan J. Jakobsen of the Center Party, emphasized their common goal: negotiations to reach an agreement on disarmament. "We are taking a stand so the Soviet Union understands we are serious, and we negotiate accordingly," that was what Kare Kristiansen said.

Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund stressed, "It is not a matter of arming in order to disarm but to reach a decision on modernization and on an offer to negotiate. It will take 3 to 4 years to implement the modernization program. It is appropriate to have such a timeframe for negotiations," the foreign minister pointed out.

Berge Furre of the Socialist Party of the Left as well as Hans Hammond Rossbach of the Liberal Party strongly opposed NATO's modernization program and had little confidence that "rearmament as it actually is going" can increase the possibilities for reaching a negotiations accord with the Soviet Union. Even if Furre and Rossbach admitted that the Soviet Union is rearming intensively, their answer is the same: let us try something new--negotiations without rearmament. Hence. their view that the government should support a postponement.

6893

CSO: 3108

## ANTIMODERNIZATION FORCES BEGIN MARSHALLING FORCES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Nov 79 p 3

[Text] The government has failed to inform the people and parliament as to what NATO's modernization plans actually involve. This is what the movement "No to New Atomic Weapons," which is mobilizing its forces to the utmost before 12 December when Norway will give its reply to the Council of Ministers in Brussels, is maintaining. The leaders revealed at a press conference in Oslo yesterday that there had been a tremendous response from all parts of the country to its appeal for a "no." There will be nationwide campaign between December 3 and 9.

How then does the cross-party no-movement interpret the results of the meeting of the Labor Party's Executive Council in Lillehamar. Jon Gripstad, the day-by-day leader, characterizes the results as a halfway victory for the opposition, that is to say, for those elements within the government party who oppose NATO's plans.

The value of a difference of opinion within all parties was strongly emphasized during the press conference. The government was criticized for not having made available an adequate analysis of the situation, nor has information been provided regarding plans for negotiations which are intended to accompany an eventual decision in regard to introducing new atomic weapons. It was pointed out, in addition, that the debate is being conducted on the basis of conflicting data, not least in regard to current Soviet weapons.

As a beginning, the new no-movement desires a half-year delay such as the Danish Social Democratic Government supports. It is believed that the developments which are taking place in the Labor Party, the labor movement and in public opinion will make it possible to get the government to change its views.

"We have plenty of time in regard to this question," Rolf Thue, who is one of the leaders, said. "We do not run any risk at all in delaying a final decision regarding the placement of new atomic weapons in Western Europe.



The Soviet Union is not waiting in the frontline trenches 'to take us.' And half a year more will give us additional time to make a decision even if it is too short a period to initiate meaningful negotiations with the Soviet Union," Thue explained.

Tove Bye, an alternate representative in parliament for the Akerhus Center Party, strongly emphasized her defense orientation and her positive attitude toward NATO. But she was of the opinion that NATO's solidarity could be weakened if additional atomic weapons are placed in Western Europe and hinted that the possibility for advantageous agreements for the armament industries were the hidden motives of the proponents of modernization.

The movement believes that a decision in favor of new middle-range weapons would most likely result in increased atomic rearmament and moreover not increase NATO's deterrent capacity, that NATO today has already at its disposal atomic weapon systems which are comparable to the Soviet Union's SS20, and that an affirmative decision in Brussels will make negotiations more difficult and impede effective arms control.

The plans for the action week involve mass meetings, torchlight parades and an advertising campaign urging the government to say "no" on 12 December.

6893

CSO: 3108

## SUPERPOWERS PUT PRESSURE ON DENMARK, NORWAY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 25 Oct 79 p 15

[Article by Per Sjogren]

[Text] The American and Soviet superpowers are putting pressure on Norway and Denmark in a security struggle over the military balance in Europe. Soviet pressures against Norway are most vocal and visible. They have been going on since last January. Sweden sits listening in the best seats in the house, like during Igor Zemskov's, Soviet vice minister of foreign affairs, visit to Stockholm earlier this month. He spoke in favor of Moscow, but got noncommittal answers from Sweden.

NATO ministers are about to hold their traditional meeting in Brussels in December and the United States wants the alliance to come to two unanimous decisions. The United States wants the go-ahead for producing 464 cruise missiles (low flying bomb carriers) and 108 Pershing II rockets. The United States also wants these to be placed in central Europe.

The United States does not expect the NATO members, Denmark and Norway, to change their basic nuclear policy and accept the placing of nuclear arms on their territories during peace time. The United States is simply asking for the entire alliance to carry the costs of the project.

The point is that once NATO makes a decision as to production of these arms, room for negotiations with the East regarding the placing of them can be made later on. This way the West would primarily gain entrance into the negotiations.

This is why Brezhnev recently gave his speech in East Berlin and wrote letters to Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen and Odvar Nordli, while the Kremlin preached through Zemskov in Stockholm.

The point of these messages is that the Soviet Union is ready to decrease the number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles stationed in the western areas of the country provided no new missiles of the same kind are placed in Western Europe.

The Soviet Union accepts production of new NATO arms, but is inviting the West to negotiations about their placement.

The West explains the need for armaments by pointing to the hundred some intermediate-range ballistic missiles type SS-20 which already have been positioned.

The Danish Foreign Ministry tells DAGENS NYHETER that the additional costs for the rearmament will not cause major problems in the defense budget, but officers there do not believe that any decisions will be made during the December NATO meeting. Most probably these decisions will be postponed until the spring. Representatives are not very worried about the pressures from the Soviet Union.

#### Storing in Norway

"Brezhnev knows that he has lost," they say. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Knut Frydenlund, will touch on that issue in his report on foreign policies on Thursday. On 5 and 6 November a delegation from the State Department in Washington will come to Oslo for discussions. Representatives from the State Department in Oslo inform DAGENS NYHETER that the discussions will primarily deal with security in the Northern part of Europe, but most likely the question of the NATO missiles will also be discussed.

Besides, Moscow has other problems in Norway. They concern the storing of large NATO arms in Norway. In a case of emergency these arms would be used by troops flown into Norway from England and the United States.

An increased preparedness of such a nature would primarily concern the defense of northern Norway. Plans for such an increased preparedness have already been worked out, but no political decisions have yet been made. Today no foreign NATO arms are stored in Norway. According to the Norwegian understanding of the situation, this means no change in basic political positions. Apparently the Swedish Government supported this attitude during Zemskov's visit to Stockholm.

#### A System of Defense

The other Soviet problem concerns the warning and control system called AWACS. NATO will have 18 airplanes which are equipped with this system and the American Air Force will have 25 of them. According to certain sources this system enables a pilot flying over the Oslo fjord to "see" all the way to Leningrad.

Planes equipped with AWACS will operate in northern Norway, but these operations will be carried out under Norwegian supervision.

No matter what circumstances, the issue concerns a system of defense.

8901

CSO: 3109

FINNISH MINISTERS DISCUSS COOPERATIVE VENTURES WITH SWEDES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Oct 79 p 31

[Article by Kerstin Kall]

[Text] The Swedish and Finnish industries' desire for cooperation leaves a great deal to be desired. Instead of cooperating on the world market, especially on large systems projects, companies in the two countries continue to compete in the same areas.

Such short-sightedness could bring about the kind of competition which might have a disastrous effect on both parties.

As the Finnish minister of foreign affairs, Paavo Vayrynen, the Finnish minister of commerce and industry, Ulf Sundqvist, and the Finnish minister of labor, Arvo Alto, arrived in Stockholm last Monday on a visit this was one of their messages.

The three Finnish ministers were here on an unofficial visit in order to talk about industrial collaboration with representatives from the Swedish Government, Swedish trade organizations and unions as well as representatives from a number of large corporations and banks.

The main message, however, was that it makes more sense for Swedish companies to invest in Finland than it does for them to import Finnish labor.

Since the improving market trends have led to local shortages of labor in certain areas, Finnish politicians fear an increase in the Finnish emigration to Sweden.

Swedish corporations are already owners or part owners of more than one hundred industrial companies in Finland. Finnish owned companies in Sweden amount to a little over 20. There are more than 350 Swedish marketing and service companies in Finland; the corresponding number of Finnish businesses in Sweden is approximately 250.



In Finland the financing of local projects is handled by a development fund. Together with the Finnish-Swedish Chamber of Commerce members of this fund now plan to increase the flow of information to Swedish companies regarding the possibilities for investing in Finland.

Swedish companies invest an annual amount of 3 to 4 billion kronor abroad. Paavo Vayrynen pointed out that only 70-90 million of this money is invested in Finland. He thought it deplorable that so little has been done in order to facilitate the moving of capital.

The Finnish ministers also said that collaboration ought to increase in the areas of trading, research, tourism and education. In connection with increased collaboration with regard to trading, Ulf Sundqvist pointed out that Sweden traditionally has held a strong position on the Common Market and on the U.S. market, while the Soviet Union is Finland's major trading partner.

"This could certainly bring obvious advantages in the event of a more extensive industrial cooperation between the two countries," he said.

The Finnish ministers brought no concrete suggestions for collaboration.

In a press conference, organized by Soviet and East German journalists, Paavo Vayrynen pointed out that according to the principles of a free market economy, individual companies take the initiative and are responsible for the realization and development of this collaboration. The press conference dealt just as much with Finland's attitude toward Brezhnev's move concerning troop reductions in the DDR as it dealt with Finnish-Swedish cooperation.

8901

CSO: 3109

## GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATES IN MOSCOW ON POWER LINK WITH CEMA

AU211441 Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German 20 Jan 80 p 1 AU

[Summary] In an interview in Vienna [18 January] Walter Fremuth, director general of the Austrian Federal Power Company, declared after his return from Moscow that his talks with high-ranking Soviet political figures and experts on the establishment of a power link with CEMA had been highly encouraging. "It was agreed to appoint a joint experts commission, which will meet for the first time in Moscow at the end of February. The planning work is to be completed by the end of this year and the project will then be ready for adoption at the political level.

"The East-West link will permit Austria to deliver domestic peak-load power to the socialist countries in exchange for base-load power from these countries to the extent of 4.5 billion kilowatt hours annually--that is, about 10-12 percent of the entire Austrian power consumption. Italy, the FRG and Switzerland are also interested in the East-West power link. Although in principle only an exchange of power is envisaged, this exchange will be to Austria's benefit: it will supply the more expensive peak-load power, but far less in quantity than the base-load power it will get in return 'from the other side'--namely, the mentioned 10-12 percent of its total power consumption."

The favorable possibilities for such a power exchange, according to Fremuth, result from the time difference of at least 2 hours, as well as from the different climatic conditions existing in the countries participating in the grid system. The expected participation in the grid of Austria's southern and western neighbors would give Austria additional importance as a pivotal point for the power exchange between CEMA and Central and Southern Europe. "There are not going to be any problems as far as power cables and transport losses are concerned, the director general declared, because the CEMA grid is interconnected, so that the power will be supplied only indirectly from the Soviet Union but directly from Hungary. The Austrian power supplies, too, are to be fed into the grid via Hungary." Talks with Hungary were held as early as in November. "'Our endeavors were fully supported.' Fremuth said."

## USSR OFFERS NATURAL GAS

AU221056 Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 22 Jan 80 AU

[Report on Trade Minister Josef Staribacher and Austria Federal Power Company Director General Walter Fremuth press conference in Vienna on 21 January 1980]

[Summary] At a press conference in Vienna on 21 January 1980 Trade Minister Staribacher declared that the question of adding 5 percent methanol to gas line in Austria would require an agreement between ethanol producers and the oil industry, which would have to take charge of marketing and distribution. Technical experts declared at the press conference that adding 5 percent bioalcohol to gasoline in Austria poses no technical problems but would raise retail gasoline prices by between 30 and 50 groschen per liter. At the same time, 65,000 tons of oil annually could be saved. Staribacher stressed that Austria's energy supply for 1980 is secured, on the basis of an assumed increase in energy consumption by 3-4 percent.

Dr Walter Fremuth, director general of the Austrian Federal Power Company, reported on his talks in Moscow last week on the planned establishment of a power link between Austria and the CEMA grid. The project provides for an extension of the CEMA 750 kilovolt power rail from Hungary to the Vienna-southeast transformer plant where the power is to be fed into the Austrian grid with the aid of a direct current coupling plant that will have to be installed there.

"According to Fremuth, at last week's talks the Soviet Union also showed interest in using Austria as a pivotal point for natural gas deliveries to Western Europe. The Soviet side declared that new pipeline systems with a higher throughput have been developed, and that a quantity of 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas is envisaged." According to Fremuth, some other projects of interest to Austria have been discussed with the Soviets, for example the modernization of Soviet power plants by Austrian firms, sub-contractor deliveries of parts for nuclear power plants, and the construction of a Soviet pavilion for the world fair, worth about 650 million schillings. Fremuth pointed out, however, that Austria is considerably handicapped by the fact that other Western competitors can offer more favorable loan terms.

## PARLIAMENT APPROVES CRISIS PACKAGE, AVOIDS NEW ELECTIONS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 22 Dec '79 pp 1, 2

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen: "The Threat of an Election Saved the Government's Crisis Package; New Economic Retrenchments Expected by Spring"]

[Excerpts] The government's crisis package was saved by the Folketing, but political peace will only be permitted to reign over Christiansborg until the spring.

Government sources have confirmed the truth of the above to the BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. By that time it will prove necessary to prepare for new economic belt-tightening. The government's scattered and shifting majority which obtained the reduced package solution in December does not provide the prime minister with any political assurance as far as carrying out the coming retrenchment measure is concerned. On the contrary, the political attitude toward the government's way of negotiating in connection with the crisis package has been very severe, and the government did not get a solid nucleus of parties to support all 18 proposals in the third reading in the Folketing yesterday.

After undergoing severe pressure for several days, the Christian People's Party yielded yesterday and voted for the government's cost-of-living project, although the party felt that it was inadequate. The Christian People's Party's five votes saved the government and prevented a massive resistance to large portions of the government's crisis package in the Folketing from bringing about a new election less than two months after the last one.

During the third reading, the prime minister thanked the small parties in the Folketing--the CD [The Democratic Center] and the KrF [Christian People's Party], among others--for being willing, in contrast with the Liberal Party and the Conservative People's Party, to continue to support the government's proposed solution for the critical situation which the leftwing party and the Single-Tax Party could not support. The CD and the KrF, which rescued the government, were subjected to severe criticism by the Liberal Party, the

Conservative People's Party and the Progressive Party during the process, and the former cooperation among the four parties now seems definitely to have been brought to a conclusion.

The Single-Tax Party's votes ensured the passage of the other proposal in the government's crisis package which constituted a problem--the government land tax imposed on agriculture. In the final vote yesterday, the radical group split up into three members who voted directly against the proposed 7 mills tax, while seven members of the group abstained from voting.

The debate regarding the government's crisis package then became a marathon performance in the Folketing for the next ten hours, but the suspense as to whether the government's package of bills had a chance of getting through the Folketing was relieved early in the day through an announcement by the KrF.

#### Application to the Common Market

One of the bills in the government's crisis package will be run through a second time in the EC Commission. Late yesterday evening, after the government land tax passed, the Agricultural Council of Denmark delivered a note to the prime minister in which it said that the Agricultural Council now wants to ask the EC Commission to investigate the extent to which the law comes into conflict with obligations under the EC treaty, and, if it is in conflict with such obligations, to take the necessary steps against the Danish Government.

#### Deep Split in the Folketing

As we enter a new decade, the coalition parties and the parties which are represented in the Folketing are in agreement about just one thing--namely, that the economic "package deal" which passed yesterday, with a shifting parliamentary majority in the Folketing, is inadequate, and that it must be supplemented by additional emergency measures in a few months. Aside from that, the Folketing does not agree on anything.

The previous day's long and acrimonious debate at the last session before the Christmas recess turned out to be a sort of statement of the existing situation which demonstrated that there is a greater lack of unity and more of a split in the Folketing at the beginning of the 1980's than there ever has been at any time before. Everybody is accusing everybody else of something.

The opposition parties say that the government is entering the 1980's alone and without friends.

The government says that the opposition is entering the 1980's without any new ideas.



The concluding debate on the government's emergency proposal lasted for most of Friday. There the parties once again got an opportunity to present their principal points of view. Ole Espersen (S [Social Democratic Party]) praised the employee organizations for their conciliatory behavior. A trade union had hardly ever relinquished anything to that extent. The bourgeois parties' only alternative to the government's plan will actually be to let the country come under a sort of administration by international capital.

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (V [Moderate Liberal Party]) took the government severely to task. It is running the risk of tiring the population to the point where they no longer believe that there is any use at all in bearing burdens, he said. In that way, we could get to a place where confidence in democracy has vanished. "Instead of a reconciliation at Christmas, the government has sown dissension and reaped chaos. That is bankruptcy at Christmas time," he said.

Poul Schlueter (K [Conservative People's Party]) had hoped for an overall, national solution which could have inspired confidence among the entire population, but the government extinguished that hope itself by deliberately choosing, right from the beginning, the line of not seeking to cooperate with the Conservatives and the Liberal Party. The Social Democratic Party people encountered after the Folketing election in October was something different from what people had known for many years.

Erling Askjaer Jorgensen (Frp [Progressive Party]) did not believe that the Social Democratic Party was capable of managing the Danish society. Anker Jorgensen will go down in history as Denmark's worst prime minister up to the present, he said.

Gert Petersen (SF [Socialist People's Party]) would like to have effective democratic reforms, but not in return for pay. The structural reforms which were needed could not come into being until the day when the Social Democratic Party abandoned the incomes policy.

Niels Helveg Petersen (R [Single-Tax Party]) felt that the result was too small, too weak, too shortsighted and too lacking in vision.

Arne Melchior (CD), who regarded the result as "a portion of stewed codfish," did not think that the method of negotiating which the government had selected was a good one.

Preben Wilhjelm (VS [Left Socialist Party]) called for a break with the market economy--that would be beneficial for wage earners.

Arne Bjerregaard (KrF) stated that when his party voted for the income policy section of the package deal it did so because it was afraid--afraid, that is, of a repetition of the situation in 1967, when an incomes-policy solution was prevented for many years.

Ib Christensen (Rvb [expansion unknown]) thought that the Liberal Party and the Conservative People's Party had behaved more irresponsibly than the Progressive Party. It had proved to be the small parties which had been responsible.

Henning Christophersen (V) told Ole Espersen that the alternative to the government's plan was not for Denmark to be placed under receivership--that could possibly be the consequence of the government's plan--but the alternative was for the government to have entered into negotiations regarding a long-term policy based on a solid majority, and therefore a policy which could produce the required confidence.

The member from Greenland, Otto Steenholdt, stated that he would vote for all the government's proposals with the exception of the government's land tax, which was so alien to him that he had to abstain from voting.

In response to Poul Schlüter's remark that it was a different Social Democratic Party which had made its appearance after the Folketing election, Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen said that the great thing to do is to look reality in the eye and get the best one possibly can out of the situation. It was a traditional social democratic thing to adopt a policy which perhaps does not produce anything admirable but which, on the other hand, has something over it which is unified. He was looking for a little more optimism among the bourgeois parties and regretted that in the present situation the Liberal Party had been the party which was the most aloof, although the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party had been involved in working with the government. However, the prime minister hoped that both the Liberal Party and the Conservative People's Party would contribute to the obtaining of positive solutions to problems in the future.

#### Crisis Package Passes

In a session which began yesterday morning and continued until late in the night, the Folketing finished its work on the government's crisis package, which consisted of 18 bills. Only 8 of those bills came through successfully in the shape the government had originally proposed. The other bills underwent smaller or larger alternatives during the discussion of them in Parliament before being accepted by a majority of the members.

The package plan was carried by a shifting majority, and in a few cases the majority was a modest one, although not as narrow a one as one might perhaps have expected. That was true of the bills concerned with the cost-of-living adjustment and the government tax on agricultural land.

#### One Year of Government Land Tax on Agricultural Land

In 1980, a government land tax of 7 mills of the basic value after deductions for improvements will be imposed on all agricultural land. No deductions can be made from the land tax. The government's reason for imposing the new tax

is that a part of the profit the farmers are thought to have made through the recent devaluation (adjustment of currency valuations) ought to be surrendered.

The new tax, which occasioned passionate protests from the outset, especially from farmers, was the subject of violent debate in the Folketing as late as last night, before it passed.

#### A Higher Income Tax

The income tax will be increased in 1980. Indeed, the tax imposition percentage for income tax paid to the government has been fixed at 90 percent up to now, but the temporary increase of personal exemptions to 500 kroner, which has been in effect for several years, will only be continued for retirees. Thus, everybody else will actually get an increase of 500 kroner in the minimal exemption. Perhaps that does not sound like very much, but for the government it means an increase in income of 600 million kroner.

#### Light and Heat Removed From the Price Index

Calculations of the price-index adjustment is being changed. Entries for fuel and energy are being eliminated from the information forming the basis for calculation, and the price index is being set back to 100 as of 1 January 1980.

#### Closed Fund for the Frozen Cost-of-Living Allowances

An employees' cost-of-living fund is being set up with the aid of the frozen cost-of-living increases, but the fund, together with the ATP [supplementary pension fund] fund, cannot invest in more than 20 percent of the shares of one company. It continues to be a closed fund. No further amounts of money can be added to the fund, so the possibilities for making loans from it are limited under any circumstances. In addition to wage earners, the auditors of public accounts are represented on the fund's board of directors.

Ninety-six members (S, SF, R and CD) voted for the bill, while 79 (V, K, Frp, KrF, Rfb [Legal Federation] and VS) voted against it.

#### Breaking Off of the Cost-of-Living Adjustment

An actual wage freeze, as originally proposed by the government, came to nothing. Instead, changes in the payment of cost-of-living increases are being introduced. Possible cost-of-living increases on the basis of the January price index are being dropped. Cost-of-living adjustments are to be carried out on the basis of the adjustment price index for July and thereafter for the first 3 points of fluctuation over 100 (in accordance with the new price index, which has been returned to 100) at 60 ore per hour for persons over 18. The guarantee payment will be increased by 120 ore per hour, and by 60 ore for young people under 18, as of 1 March.

The law, which was one of the most disputed ones in the crisis package, was passed in the evening with 89 votes in favor of it (S, R, CD and KrF) and 85 against it (V, K, Frp, Rfb, SF and VS).

#### A Hundred Voted for the Price Freeze

The price freeze in force, which expires on 31 December 1979, will be continued from 1 January to 1 March 1981, but it will be changed in such a way that increases in wages in relation to collective agreements or regulations regarding cost-of-living adjustments can be included in calculating the prices. A number of technical changes are being made in the price and profits law which has been in effect up to the present.

A limitation on the size of the dividends, "tantiemes" and remunerations which can be decided upon at general meetings of limited liability companies and partnerships was introduced. Dividends must not be larger in kroner and ore than in the immediately preceding financial year.

This law was carried by 100 votes (S, R, SF, KrF and CD) against 69 (V, K, Frp and Rfb), while 6 members (VS) abstained from voting.

9266

CSO: 3106

## PASSAGE OF CRISIS PACKAGE MEANS DEFEAT FOR LO CHIEF

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 21 Dec 79 p 3

[Article by Lasse Ellegaard: "The Losers Were the Traditional Women's Federations--Thomas Nielsen Was Threatened When the Government Threw Out the Bait"]

[Text] Lack of unity in the LO's [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] executive committee was of help to Anker Jorgensen with his curtailed crisis package and Thomas Nielsen was left behind, disappointed. His authority is tottering, and on Monday he had the experience of seeing the two largest unions, the Metalworkers' Federation and the SiD [Semi-Skilled Workers' Union], reject points of view which they had firmly supported a few days earlier.

## Federation of Trade Unions

"Thomas Nielsen is 'deeply disappointed,'" it said in Tuesday's accounts of the animated meeting between Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen and the executive committee of the LO on Monday. It was at that meeting that Jorgensen presented his truncated crisis package and obtained support, first and foremost, from the chairman of the Danish Metalworkers' Federation, Georg Poulsen, and, secondarily, from the chairman of the SiD until Wednesday, Poul Christensen, Age Andersen of the Postal Workers' Federation--who also is a member of Anker Jorgensen's Folketing group--and the chairman of the Painters' Federation, Agner Christensen.

The name of the new chairman of the SiD is Hardy Hansen. He was elected at the SiD's annual congress on Wednesday afternoon, getting 446 votes. He beat Poul Christensen, who got 233 votes, and John Molgaard, who got 86 votes. Hardy Hansen did not decide to become a candidate until just before the congress began.

Some suspense has prevailed, since the switch in chairmen, as to what attitude the SiD's executive committee will manifest toward the Social Democratic Party's revised package plan at a meeting today.



The LO chairman's deep disappointment resulted, of course, from the fact that the government had dropped profit-sharing and the central fund and in that way had once again done damage to hopes that the LO's favorite subject might be brought up. But the evident lack of internal unity in the LO's executive committee, where Thomas Nielsen was contradicted by two important trade union chairmen in the presence of the prime minister, undoubtedly also disappointed him, and especially because it was specifically Georg Poulsen and Poul Christensen who, at two contact committee meetings with the government prior to the weekend, had stressed the need to stand firm on the 18-point plan with profit-sharing, in accordance with the original proposal. After each meeting, Thomas Nielsen was entitled to conclude that a united executive committee wanted to have the whole thing or nothing at all. The leader of the LO was ready to embark on an election campaign in January, even if it would cost a few seats in Parliament.

#### Advantages for Metal Workers and the SiD

When Anker Jorgensen presented his reduced plan in this way and switched to wages on a sliding scale to replace the profit-sharing which had been abandoned, the two big unions changed their positions and Thomas Nielsen was left to maintain his point of view alone, although he was backed by the women's unions, the construction workers and the government employees.

The new chairman of the HK [Retail Workers Union], Jorgen Eiberg, is not a member of the executive committee yet, and the deputy chairman, Hans Jensen, was absent owing to illness. The HK is of the opinion that an election now will not solve the problems, but at the same time it states that those who are actually responsible for the impossible situation are the bourgeois parties. However, it is known that the HK supports Thomas Nielsen in his refusal to recommend government intervention.

It is not so very surprising that Georg Poulsen was able to approve the altered government plan. First of all, it will be to the advantage of the members of the Metalworkers' Federation, who work under the minimum wage system--that is, the adjustable wage system, under which wage increases can be negotiated throughout the period of the agreement. Furthermore, there is the fact that Georg Poulsen needs to draw attention to the fact that he is the man who "saved the party and the trade unions from losing an election." In the eyes of many people that makes him a responsible person, and therefore one who is very well suited to the position of deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party and that of the chairman of the LO when Thomas Nielsen retires 3 years from now. The fact that Georg Poulsen only came in ninth in the election to the LO's executive committee at the last congress of the LO may also have played a part in this. It had never happened before that a Metalworkers' Federation chairman had ended up in a position so far down on the list, and regardless of how many plausible explanations can be given, "the handwriting was on the wall." Therefore Georg Poulsen needs to draw attention to himself as powerful with the metalworkers and a chairman who

works in the interests of the members of his organization. He has denied that he agreed to and approved the government's plan in advance, behind Thomas Nielsen's back, indicating that he found the idea shocking.

The Semi-Skilled Workers' Union's pleasure over the truncated package plan will be more modest, but in spite of everything, the SiD has many thousands of members in the minimum wage range. The modification of the wage freeze means, for example, that the union now can start negotiating a number of bonus arrangements which will be frozen if they do not do so. Furthermore, the union leadership estimated that an election on 22 January would cost 10 seats in Parliament and that they would be left with a bourgeois government afterwards whose policies they would not be able to influence under any circumstances. Poul Christensen also takes his stand on the belief that the package of tax laws would pass and that the government has guaranteed social equilibrium in the plan. In addition to that, Poul Christensen hardly wanted to be involved in election campaigning while he still had not been formally elected the chairman of the union. In the SiD, they regard it as catastrophic for one to go into an election campaign with a split or disunited labor movement--a thing which, in spite of instances of friction, has never happened yet.

The fact that the construction workers, and primarily the carpenters' and bricklayers' unions, supported Thomas Nielsen was chiefly owing to the fact that they neither lose nor gain anything through the altered plan. Their members work chiefly in accordance with the piecework system, which remains tolerably firm during the period of an agreement, and in that occupation earnings depend on how fast the individual works. "They could afford to stand on principle," as one observer expresses it, but their support was also owing to considerations of loyalty to Thomas Nielsen and the original decision to stand firm on an either-or position. The fact that the representatives of government employees on the executive committee, Jorgen Knudsen and Berge Anaes, supported Nielsen is more surprising when looked at from the point of view of narrow occupational and economic interests. Specifically, the government employees will get more from a plan which the government now has presented because it will save significant portions of the regulation of the rate of speed, which otherwise would be "killed" by the 18-point proposal.

The actual losers are the Women's Labor Federation and the Danish Garment and Textile Workers Federation--the traditional women's occupations--which are located farthest down in the low-wage range, and which certainly will get compensation continually under the two cost-of-living allowances but which also will see history repeat itself as the interval between them and the "wealthy" unions increases. That is to say, the 18-point program in reality was one form--although a simple one--of low-wage policy because the lowest-paid person will constitute the only group which will get compensation under the government's first package plan. So it also was Ruth Lojbort of the Women's Labor Federation who protested most violently against Anker Jorgensen's new project.

## The Bait Worked

Whether it was luck or tactical finesse will probably never be made clear, but the fact is that the prime minister put out bait for the three biggest unions in the LO (the HK also has a paragraph full of promises in the agreement) with a total of 660,000 members, which is more than half of all the individuals who are affiliated with trade unions. And the bait was snapped up, except in the case of the HK.

Fear of a fatiguing election, combined with obvious advantages for the two large unions, got the LO divided approximately in the middle, and Thomas Nielsen was obliged to remark afterwards: "That is the third time we have been taken advantage of." That he must have felt himself taken advantage of by his people at the same time, since they had called for an all-or-nothing attitude until that Monday, is more than likely. "Actually, Thomas Nielsen was basically honest in this matter," says a well-oriented source of information, "and it really is astonishing that he is not more furious than he is."

For the chairman of the LO, it was a disappointment that the profit-sharing was dropped, and it also was a disappointment because he had invested a great deal of his personal prestige in getting it put through as a prelude to the OD [economic democracy] proposal from 1971, which is incessantly being "presented."

People are saying: "Thomas Nielsen does not want to be the LO chairman under whose leadership the right to negotiate was abolished while he did nothing to prevent it."

These events are also an indication that Nielsen's authority is tottering. He has announced that he will resign 3 years from now, and now the first indication that somebody else is maneuvering himself into position has become apparent.

9266

CSO: 3106

## IN APPROVING CRISIS PACKAGE FOLKETING CAPITULATED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 22 Dec 79 p 8

[Editorial: "With the Fear of Dissolution Predominating"]

[Text] The Folketing voted yesterday not to allow the election bells to interrupt the ringing of the Christmas bells. After 6 days and nights of intense fear that there would be an election, the Christian People's Party's 5 members of Parliament yielded and agreed to vote for the government's weakened wage project, thereby saving its life and its economic package plan.

Peace at Christmas time and the postponement of an election were purchased by Parliament at a high price. Measures were passed, against the actual convictions of the majority, which are not suitable when seen from the point of view of the country's deep economic distress, but only after a minority government's hope of changing society, contrary to the people's wishes, through an alliance with forces outside of Parliament, had been disappointed.

By yielding to a hitherto unperceived pressure in that way, Parliament did new and profound damage to its reputation. Politically and parliamentarily, the 1970's are being rung out with the fear of dissolution of Parliament predominating, although the Folketing election in October otherwise would have allowed us to hope that that fear would melt away. The incipient reduction in the number of parties, the Progressive Party's loss of constituents and the gathering around the old, leading parties by the voters gave promise that the voters realized that the critical situation called for broad political solutions.

During the last 2 months, and culminating in the last 6 days, the Social Democratic Party, headed by the prime minister, has led the way in the scandalous activity which the House's handling of the economic crisis has become. The majority in Parliament knows that the package plan is not a solution which will take care of the situation for a number of years, but that, during the few months which will pass before it is supplemented and improved, it will do damage to some extent. The majority in Parliament also knows that impartial behavior in the House is unjustifiable, but nevertheless

a shifting around of party groupings, without breadth and without any built-in possibilities for the future, is tantamount to approving and defending the government's future behavior. The fact that Ole Espersen, the spokesman of the Social Democrats, can speak in the debate of Denmark operating under international receiver-ship as the only alternative to the crisis package is the high point of the caricature of a parliament which the voters saw yesterday as far as hypocrisy is concerned.

It is Social Democratic policies which have led Denmark along the path leading to the abyss where nothing but international receiver-ship awaits her. But it was Parliament which failed to put on the brakes yesterday when it passed the package plan. "Merry Christmas" didn't arrive.

9266

CSO: 3106

## GOVERNMENT PRESENTS ECONOMIC CRISIS PLAN TO FOLKETING

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Dec 79 pp 1, 16

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen]

[Text] Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen will, as early as tomorrow--the day after presentation of the government proposal to the Folketing--be in a position to observe that his government and crisis plan are bogged down unless he rescinds his and the labor unions' most crucial demand in the package of solutions to economic ills: compulsory profit sharing.

The prime minister's account of the crisis plan, submitted today, will be debated in the Folketing tomorrow, and here Anker Jørgensen will become aware of the coolness with which the political parties, already yesterday, received the contents of the plan. At an orientation meeting with the different organizations, the reaction to the crisis plan became so violent that Wholesalers Association in no uncertain terms accused the prime minister of lack of economic know-how, and the spokesman for the Union of Danish Metal Workers, Georg Poulsen, left the meeting early as a protest against the objections of the employers.

The extensive plan which will now be debated in the Folketing during the next 2 weeks is referred to by the government as a comprehensive solution that will continue for several years. According to the government's own calculations, the plan would result in a 5 percent cut in real income, and the plan is intended to cut the pay hikes expected for the remainder of the contract period by more than 50 percent. The plan would mean that the deficit in the balance of payments would be cut from the expected 15 billion kroner to 12 billion kroner in 1980, but after that, it would remain virtually unchanged at 11-12 billion until 1983. The unemployment rate would only come down by 55-60,000 until 1983, and 250,000 unemployed is the figure anticipated.

The main points in the government's crisis plan are:

1. Strict price controls.



2. A cut in pay hikes to 6-7 percent, due, among other things, to the abolishment of cost of living increases.
3. An emergency supplement toward heating expenses of all in all 400 million kroner to the neediest groups in the union. The form of payment has not yet been determined.
4. Compulsory profit sharing with a central fund and added input from employees.
5. Tax reforms and tax increases in a number of areas. Changes will affect deductions for interest charges, result in increases in corporation taxes, and increases of charges for payment of lump sum pensions. Lastly, a tax on unearned income which will take effect on 1 January 1981, and a separate land tax for agriculture which will bring in 44 million kroner.
6. A trade policy which will increase export trade through cooperation with a contact committee, which will replace the concept of a council on economic policy.
7. Implementation of an employment plan up to 1983.
8. Implementation of continued comprehensive energy savings.
9. Separate help to young farmers with economic problems; 200 million kroner will be put aside for this purpose.
10. Establishment of a cost-of-living fund for employees to compensate for the frozen pay hikes and the ATP (Employees Pension Fund) fund.
11. Restriction of loan opportunities for consumption purposes.

In connection with the presentation of its plan, the government states that the plan would make it possible to avoid new taxes and charges for the remainder of the contract period. The government also states, with regard to the next contract period, that low pay hikes will continue. Unforeseen imbalances and particular problems concerning the abolishment of step increases for state employees during the wage freeze period are the only things that may be rectified in 1981.

"Changes in the solution I have sketched here which disturb the balance of this solution will not be acceptable. The government puts decisive emphasis on the totality of this long-range solution and consequently assumes simultaneous passage of the separate elements in the proposed total solution," states the conclusion of the government proposal.

At a press meeting yesterday, Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen conceded that he does not visualize an immediate majority for his comprehensive plan in

the Folketing, and he declined to state whether the government would be able to accept a withdrawal of that part in the plan for which, it has already been demonstrated, the government has the possibility of passing. LO (Danish Federation of Trade Unions) has not made any objections. For the unions it is an absolute requirement for their cooperation in the rest of the plan. This was reiterated by several union representatives yesterday.

After the prime minister's presentation in the Folketing today, debate on the total content of the comprehensive plan will take place tomorrow. Already on Thursday and Friday, the Folketing will embark on its initial discussion of the government crisis package whose implementation before Christmas the prime minister continues to count on.

9542

CS0: 3106

## LO CHIEF NIELSEN IS OLD-FASHIONED 'CLASS STRUGGLE BOSS'

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Jan 80 p 12

[Report by Werner Adam: "A Nightmare for Many Danes"]

[Text] At best he is compared to the princess on the pea, at worst described as a national misfortune. In any case he could serve as a model to illustrate publications concerned with the class struggle: His image and habits accord almost ideally with the old-fashioned portrait of a shirt-sleeve boss, an obstinate capitalist. He is a boss with a cigar always firmly clamped between his lips: He is Thomas Nielsen. According to malicious tongues the chairman of the Federation of Danish Labor Unions is also a hard-boiled capitalist whenever he acts in his capacity as manager of union-owned firms. Nobody, at any rate, has the slightest doubt about his ability to arouse nightmares in other people. All too aware of this ability are especially Prime Minister Jørgensen and the Social Democrats led by him.

By hook or by crook Nielsen intends to enforce what he himself calls "economic democracy," while the bulk of his critics regards this as an extremely dubious claim to power by the labor unions. Though he is apparently not even backed by the majority of the 1.2 million employees he represents, the union leader wages a vociferous struggle for partial control of corporate profits. Defending themselves against his attacks are not only the employers in league with the bourgeois opposition, because they regard this step as the beginning of the end of any free market economy; some left parties also have reservations and suspect that Nielsen intends to establish a kind of "labor union capitalism." The dispute has now dragged for several years, managed to shatter the government coalition and led parliament to doubt its right to survival, repeatedly caused early elections and either hindered or completely foiled any attempt to restore the health of the economy.

There is not the slightest doubt that relations between party and trade unions have notably deteriorated since the early 1970's. Nor does anybody deny that this conflict is due largely to the personal animosity between Nielsen and Jørgensen. Admittedly we can no more than speculate about the more profound reasons for this feud. One of them, though, is likely to be the almost identical career of these two men. They began as manual workers

in the trade union movement and municipal politics: Nielsen (62) as a molder and Jørgensen, his junior by 4 years, as a warehouseman. Before the latter rather unexpectedly advanced to the premiership in 1972, the first had assumed office as head of the trade unions. Nevertheless Nielsen appeared to be jealous of his former comrade-at-arms' achievement of the highest government office and intent promptly to impose on him the fetters of unionist claims. This was particularly evident in 1978 when, in order to consolidate his parliamentary base, Jørgensen entered into a coalition with the liberal Venstre Party, and Nielsen quite seriously accused him of treason to the workers movement.

Now that the parliamentary majority has again demonstrated its rejection of "economic democracy" the labor boss has retired, sulking, to his corner--at least for the time being. It would be something of a miracle, though, if he were not to sally forth again quite soon.

11698

CS0: 3103

## CONSERVATIVE PAPER ATTACKS ECONOMIC PLAN AS INADEQUATE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Dec 79 p 10

[Editorial: "The Plan Will Not Do"]

[Text] The presentation of the government proposals for a decisive change in the wholly untenable development in Danish economy has been expected for quite some time. The Social Democrats have experienced great internal problems in reaching even this phase in the decision process. The establishment of the SV (Socialist, Liberal) government last year can quite well be seen as an expression of a search for nontraditional political cooperation used to arrive at the necessary proposals. As we already know, this attempt was not successful, and now there had to be a Folketing election before the requisite decision can be made by the Social Democratic Party which, during the election campaign, did not even want to give an account of its policy.

In itself there has not at any time been any particular uncertainty concerning the kind of economic cure needed in Denmark. That Danish economic policy must lead to particularly favorable conditions for the import-export trade is something that has been obvious to the Social Democrats: the prime minister's opening speech at the beginning of November can be seen as the most recent example. The problem was rather whether, in practice, the party would be able to come up with the necessary steps. After the Folketing election, the answer to these questions could not be postponed much longer. Now it is make or break for Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen's ruling party.

Those proposals made public yesterday show that it was "break." In the area of wage policy, proposals have been made that will not--especially after the devaluation last week--improve the competitive power of Danish trade sufficiently. The most sensible part of the proposals is the intervention into cost-of-living regulations. But there is undeniably a bomb buried under the attempts to create a wage reserve, for apparently the intent is for low wage earners to benefit at the same time. Such a policy would either bring about wage dodging in a short time, or else it would create still greater unemployment, especially among low wage earners.

There is no way in which the government has made it appear likely that it will be possible, in the long run, to peg Danish wage increases at a level clearly below that of other developed countries: this is what needs to be done if the wage policy is to be employed in earnest. In addition, the government, by its proposal for the discontinuation of favored treatment for agriculture at the devaluation, has demonstrated a lack of understanding concerning the economic aims of its own policies.

Comprehension also fails totally when one finds out the further intention of the government concerning important policies for the import-export trade, hard pressed by competition. In this area the same strict price regulations, which make it difficult for law-abiding firms to plan ahead, will be put in force; corporate taxes will be raised, the temporary investment deduction will be suspended, compulsory profit sharing with the establishment of a centrally administered fund will be instituted, as well as a large central employee fund with ATP money. In addition the government intends to direct a telling blow at private savings through a raise in the capital gains tax, profit regulations of old age pensions, added taxation of capital pensions, and so on.

So it is "break" for the government. Their plan won't do. It doesn't create security for the needed improvement of competitive trading, but altogether it will hinder the development of private trading and create uncertainty about future prospects. This was the opposite of what it was supposed to do.

9542

CSO: 3106



## LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO SUFFER IF GREENLAND QUILTS EC

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Dec 79 p 6

[Article by Johannes Bundgard]

[Text] It will be the citizens of Greenland who will have to make the sacrifices if the left wing of the ruling Siumut party gets a majority of votes in favor of quitting EC and if the Social Democratic government carries those wishes to EC.

Large and increasing subsidies, especially to smaller cities and to country districts, will disappear, and Greenland will stand alone in its fishing policy if it quits EC. Greenland will be treated as a "Third World" country. Although this was not intended, the result may be relief for the state authorities who defend Denmark's fishing interests. But the Faroes which, as an area with home rule before the EC-vote, chose to remain on the outside, have long since had to form strong ties with EC. Only in this manner can the fishing interests of the islands be defended.

The discussion about Greenland's relationship to EC has flared up because in the EC council, Greenland is represented by Siumut's critically inclined candidate and because the government has carried on a closed debate with EC on this subject.

The opposition party, Atassut, which is only 500 votes short of a majority in Greenland and which is backed by a majority of votes at the Folketing election, is worried. The party wants to contact the government and EC, trusting that some favorable special agreements can be made for Greenland in EC.

Much is at stake for the average Greenlander. Electric and water companies, piers, ports, roads, warehouses, etc. in the cities and in country districts are constructed with EC money. The public fund has yielded a profit of 124 million kroner over 7 years. The regional fund has yielded 173 million kroner over 5 years. The agricultural fund (for sheep raising) has yielded 7.6 million kroner in 3 years. All in all, the profits of 304 million kroner

almost equal a year's budget for home rule. In addition there are five loans in EC's investment fund totalling 300 million kroner.

These large contributions to improve conditions in city and in country districts will cease if Greenland quits EC. They will not be compensated for by state funds. It is a clear prerequisite for home rule that state expenses shall neither grow nor diminish. If Greenland voters relinquish the prospects offered by EC, they themselves will pay the price.

The question of the feasibility of Greenland quitting EC cannot be answered until the wish--perhaps--is a reality. From a purely legal viewpoint Greenland has, according to experts, hardly the right to quit. Greenland was and is, in spite of the later establishment of home rule, part of the Danish state when Denmark joined EC on 1 January 1973. There are no legal arguments to allow part of a state to quit at a later date. However, legal consideration may be drowned out by the clamor of political undertones. If the Danish Government stresses to EC that it is dutybound to keep a given promise to Greenland concerning Greenland's ability to vote on quitting EC, then, according to the opinion of foreign office experts, the other EC countries will grant permission as "a gift" to Denmark.

This situation may develop if Siumut succeeds in gaining its wish for a referendum in Greenland and if the referendum results in a majority for quitting and if, at that time, the country has a Social Democratic government.

As early as 15 July 1975 the then secretary of foreign trade, Ivar Nørgaard, predicted to EC's council that a desire on Greenland's part for "revision" of the EC tie might come up. The subject was then debated in the Folketing and on 5 October 1977 Greenland minister Jørgen Peder Hansen said, on behalf of the government, "When home rule has been introduced, the Greenlanders themselves will, on the basis of their own experiences with EC, be able to decide if they want to quit or if they choose--to remain members." This vote would take place at a referendum. Thus the Social Democrats, too, are bound by a promise. This does not apply to the other parties in the Folketing.

The resistance against EC, which Siumut took over in the Folketing together with the Socialist People's Party, has received decreasing support among Greenland's population. At the EC referendum in 1972, 70.2 percent in Greenland voted against EC. At the election of a Greenland member to the EC council, Siumut's candidate won by only 55 percent of the vote. In addition there are major differences of opinion on this subject within Siumut, and the opposition party, Atassut, works for reasonable separate agreements with EC.

## COMMENTATOR ON SUPPORT FOR OLYMPIC BOYCOTT

DW220948 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Jan 80 p 1 DW

[Commentary signed FK: "A Sacrifice"]

[Text] Olympic Games worth that name will not take place in Moscow in 1980. One can welcome or regret it--after the basic recommendation of President Carter to the Olympic Committee of his country, it is as good as certain that American sportsmen will not go to Moscow. That will necessarily result in certain consequences: without that great sporting nation the global comparison of strength will decisively lose its attraction, particularly among sportsmen whose disappointment will be only too understandable. Other nations will also cancel their participation; in the end, these summer games, if the Russians insist on having them, will deteriorate to a sort of Spartakiade.

Not just the man in the street shows remarkably much understanding for Carter's decision, sportsmen approve it also. This illustrates how much the Soviet invasion of a small neighbor country has violated the feeling for justice and the need for security of people everywhere. It is the same mood "up to this point and no further" that 40 years ago stopped Hitler who had broken the treaty, stopped him to his great surprise. Widely spread opinion maintains that the Soviet Union must be taught a lesson in connection with Afghanistan, a lesson that will cost its government prestige and that will not merely inflict economic disadvantages on its populace. Basically the free world should have called the Moscow games into question much earlier, namely at a time when it turned out that an important preparation was the locking up of many dissidents and opposition people.

It is possible but unlikely that the Olympic games, where Soviet sportsmen particularly have scored great successes, will be destroyed in this way for a foreseeable future. This side effect is certainly the reason that prompts the leading sports people to voice their warnings which are sometimes a bit shrill not to intermix sports and politics at any price. That is an honorable standpoint although it may be shortsighted, a standpoint that should not be criticized. But if one thinks calmly one ought to realize that sports can be separated from politics as little as can trade, and that there are high-ranking national and international interests to which everything else must be subordinated. An insight one does not like to accept, particularly here, but an insight that seems to have a wide basis of legitimacy in the judgment of our fellow citizens.

## BRANDT ADDRESSES BUNDESTAG ON AFGHANISTAN

DW231308 Cologne Westdeutscher Rundfunk Network in German 1420 GMT 17 Jan 80 DW

[Speech by SPD Chairman Willy Brandt, on behalf of the SPD Bundestag faction, in the Bundestag debate on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan--live]

[Excerpts] Mr President, esteemed ladies and gentlemen: In these past few days and weeks there has been a lot of talk about Western solidarity. And if it were a question, the answer to it--my answer, our answer--could only be an unmistakable, unequivocal and express yes, a passionate yes to Western solidarity. [applause]

But this also raises the other question: What about the solidarity in our own house? And since I want to deal with that question a bit I would like to emulate the Bavarian minister president in his polemics.

It is, at any rate, good to know on a solid and circumspect management of the government business in critical times--this is the way I see it. [applause] The world looks differently than some people out there, and some people here in this house, imagine; yet we need not quarrel over one thing, ladies and gentlemen, we as Germans belong to that very vast majority of the United Nations--the United Nations about which the talk has not always been so friendly here as it is today--which demands the withdrawal of the foreign, that is Soviet, troops from Afghanistan. This is what our colleagues in the European parliament advocated yesterday, this is how we advocate it jointly with my friends Bruno Kreisky in Austria, Francois Mitterrand in France, Bettino Craxi in Italy and Olof Palme in Sweden. The attitude of the European Social Democrats is unequivocal. It does not need any advice. [applause]

We should, however, go to the trouble, esteemed colleagues, to think a bit more about the question as to what solidarity could and should mean in concrete terms at this time as far as I am concerned, one thing is definite: the responsibility of the world power United States, which is not just based on interests, extends further than that of the Federal Republic of Germany or that of our European neighbors. Actually it cannot be surprising to anyone that the Federal Government last week already drew attention to certain objective conditions which would make it impossible, to plan measures parallel to those of the United States.

But even if this were possible it would still be necessary to ponder in addition the question of whether it would also be sensible. I ask this house: Can we not help the United States, our friends, our main ally, the core of the Western alliance as the chancellor and the federal foreign minister have termed it once again, can we not help the United States and its president best by preventing Europe from also becoming a region of acute crisis? In other words, by our trying to continue the policy of managing and containing conflicts, as difficult as this might be at the moment and at times.

Whom would we help by that if we contributed toward the express Europeanization of a central Asian and an East-South problem, as it were? We did not even do that in the case of Vietnam. There are some people who are familiar with this issue. I see in this assembly former Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder who knows how strong the temptation was at the time and who knows the understandable efforts of the United States to exert influence. The upshot of it all at that time was to dispatch a medical battalion. The Bavarian minister president was right when he said today on this point--as I saw it--without any polemics and to whomever it may concern that nobody has an infallible concept.

It is correct, ladies and gentlemen, especially in a situation of additional conflicts in other parts of the world which then can always lead to farther-reaching confrontation, not to let the dialog break off with the responsible people in the Soviet Union and the states connected--I could also have said allied--with it. [applause]

Who would benefit, anyway, if an East-West crisis in our region were added to the dangerous disorders in the Middle East? But I also know that this is not a situation where one might, like a classical sergeant, tell the troops simply: carry on! This rather is a situation in which one who also has had dealings with such things says out of profound concern: it may well be that soon it will be necessary to save what can still be saved for our people and for others. I have read with emotion what the man in Schoeneberg City Hall, who is sitting on the chair which I had occupied for 10 years, said this morning. Dietrich Stobbe said, better yet, he demanded, that despite the conflicts in the world every effort be made to safeguard at least the existence of detente in Europe. And he added: a constructive basic attitude in detente policy alone is suited to help contain conflicts in other regions. The governing mayor is right. [applause]

Besides, and I ask you to listen to me calmly, I am for taking General Secretary Brezhnev at his word, namely at his word about the withdrawal, no matter how hedged with clauses this had been conveyed to the world.

Solidarity in the Western alliance and with our allies means to me the continuation of not just anything but the continuation of a policy which is extremely difficult, full of risks, jeopardized yet tested in some crucial fields, also and above all where the limitation of troops and arms is at stake.



[DW231358] Who would benefit if we on our part were to give up SALT--and we can only hope that the chancellor is right about the anticipated behavior, an adequate behavior of both world powers as though the treaty had been signed, since otherwise this would be bound to unleash new, immense revolutions of the spiral--and if we were to give up what is happening in Vienna, and what is supposed to happen in Madrid late this year? Nobody would benefit, and this would be all the more true for the settlement of practical and humanitarian issues between the two German states. I am skeptical when I look at what might develop in the next few months.

Yet, if at all possible, I advocate a meeting between Chancellor Schmidt and the GDR leader. And I state this in the first place without mistaking the order of rank with respect to the powers; but I say secondly that I advocate the continuation of the dialog with the Soviet Union and Poland--Poland underscored--and others. [applause]

I advocate the view that no matter how hopeless this may look at the moment, the topic of limiting troops and arms in Central Europe be discussed further in Vienna despite all difficulties and that the preparations for Madrid, the second followup meeting to the Helsinki conference, as skeptical as I may be as to whether it will start later this year--and this skepticism on my part existed even before Afghanistan happened.

I am an advocate of something else. We know that the Soviet Union says that it does not want to talk about the note of NATO, for by now this note has been passed on to the Soviet Union. And the West has said that it does not or did not want to talk, at least not at that time when the Soviet Union felt it contained a bit of Brezhnev's negotiating offer of October. [sentence as heard] Perhaps both will reconsider, and others along with them, that somewhere there is a French proposal to talk about European security with the inclusion of the Americans; and there are German thoughts, and those of others, as to how one could derive something from a second followup conference to what began in Helsinki, something that might be extended to military confidence-building measures as well as something else. I am just posing the question.

It is clear, ladies and gentlemen, that we are working for worldwide detente, and we must work for it if alone because the fact that the world powers are affected also may always entail the escalation of conflicts which, for the time being, seem to be localized. And this at a time--I am saying this carefully but hope that everybody will understand me--when the superpowers, too, in part must first gather the bitter experience that notwithstanding all the amassment of armaments their power is not unlimited. By the same token it is clear that we cannot base our policy on the maxim: everything or nothing.

I shall repeat here what I said elsewhere with reference to my friend, the Austrian chancellor: The Soviet Union has engaged in an adventure in Afghanistan which has not at all been thought through to the end. By its forcible action it will hardly be able to prevent in the long run, at any rate, a return to Islamic fundamentalism which is more than just Muslim



nationalism, also in Afghanistan and elsewhere. At the same time it has lost much sympathy in the Third World. There are many indications that this action will not gain the authors any real advantage.

An American expert yesterday spoke of an historic mistake. This is a man whome some of you also know--Marshal Shulman, who advises the United States, its president, its secretary of state. He spoke of an historic mistake which, as he says, might cause the Kremlin to change its policy as early as in the next few months, but in both directions: either even more into military operations in the region or elsewhere in the region in the broader sense of the word, or a review in the direction, which from our angle is more favorable.

Ladies and gentlemen, the German Social Democrats leave no room for any doubt about their attitude toward the invasion of Afghanistan. I want to make this clear. And yet it would be nonsense were anyone here or elsewhere to draw the conclusion from this state of affairs that one might arbitrarily impair what has been achieved for the people in Europe over the course of many years. [applause] And it would tend to strongly reduce rather than improve the chances for settling the crises over Iran and Afghanistan peacefully were we to abandon the principles of our policy.

An additional word concerning the hostage drama, presumably many people, like myself, are deeply impressed by the extreme discipline with which President Carter has so far weathered these terribly oppressing development. [applause] If it would be of any help, then I would want to underscore here once again what I said in November for political friends beyond the borders of my own country, namely that the struggle for the independence of a nation and the implementation of its social justice must not be devalued by actions which cast doubt on the dignity of Iran just as they cast doubts on the integrity of those who fought against the shah. And they were right, too. [applause]

I hope that in all measures deemed inevitable people will not lose sight of how much we are interested in good relations with the Iranian nation and how important we consider it for this reason that no bridges be destroyed but that objectively existing bridges be cleared or opened in a new way and under strict observance of Iranian sovereignty.

[DW231413] As regards the historical process characterizing our relations with the Soviet Union and its efforts in the past 10 years, a hint at De Gaulle's statement on detente, understanding and cooperation may be helpful. For us it was important to eliminate the tension of cold war, to promote reconciliation where this was possible, facilitate mutual normalization of relations and to find ways of cooperation in as many fields as possible. We succeeded in achieving this and nobody has contested it today. This has been useful for many people. All in all it has also served peace and we will have to stick to it. [applause]

Wishful thinking or illusions, as you frequently say, are not involved, but rather the keeping of conflicts under control. Actually, I ought to mention

first what the federal chancellor this morning called taking the edge out of the crises. Taking the edge out of the crises, keeping conflicts under control, making dogged efforts aimed at limiting arms on both sides [shouts]-- I will get back to this, just one more sentence. We all know that if it is impossible to stop the arms race here and there in the eighties and nineties, of which Mr Strauss spoke, mankind will arm itself to death. [applause]

So we must keep to that subject and, despite all the differences and contrasts, open up areas where one can cooperate. The reproach that has been voiced so loudly these days, namely that we have fostered erroneous hopes in implementing our policy, this reproach is unfounded. [shouts] Federal Chancellor Schmidt this morning quoted passages from the 1969 government statement that you opposed at that time.

Just to quote one more example I will recall the words I said here, when I had another function, against your dogged resistance on the occasion of the second reading of the treaties in the Bundestag on 10 May 1972. I said, and I quote: Equalization and understanding does not mean that we will retrospectively consider the partition of Germany as legal or the partition of Europe as irrevocable. I said further, and I quote: Renunciation of force does not mean renouncing the peaceful implementation of human rights; intangibility of borders does not mean cementing them as hostile barriers; preparedness for equal curtailment of arms does not mean neglecting Western safeguarding of peace, including our own defense contribution. More security through the mitigation of tension in further developments, hopefully also through a balanced reduction of troops and arms, is what is involved.

I added on 10 May 1972, some of you were present, and I quote it verbatim again: A prerequisite for this is the fact that the Western alliance must continue to function, and we must contribute as much as we can to its military and political effectiveness. This is still valid today. You were against it. You ought to eventually decide to say that it was wrong to have been against it at that time. [shouts, laughter, applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, how about the argument that was also used by Mr Strauss today, somewhat different from the article or the Monday speech but similar in its contents, saying that the arms potential of the Soviet Union in the period of time that was called detente has increased enormously? Could we not agree that the Soviet Union became a nuclear arms power, a hydrogen bomb power and a sputnik power before there was talk of detente? [applause] A missile gap was stressed that turned out later on not to be so grave as it was supposed to be. It played an important part in the beginning of the Kennedy period.

If we speak of analyses, and I am willing to take that up, is it not so historically, esteemed ladies and gentlemen, that we see now that the Soviet Union is on its way to becoming a full-fledged world power, whether we like it or not? I fail to see [shouts] that the development of the

Soviet Union toward becoming a world military power will be slowed down through further aggravation of the international situation. I fail to understand that. [shouts]

The other question is: Has the Soviet Union in the years after World War II always gained political and strategic terrain? What unbelievable defeatism is contained in such a question! [hesitant applause] The Chinese, with whom I do not have to identify myself here, but the Chinese and before them the Yugoslavs see that differently with regard to the permanent expansion of the Soviet area. The presidents of Egypt and Somalia, Mr Strauss, do not think the Soviet Union has permanently extended its area. I recall your speeches, you had already given up Portugal and Spain, you had written them off to what you called Marxism! [applause, shouts]

One hears good and encouraging words now about the nonaligned in the United Nations. If we talk about the nonaligned, however, and if we talk to them--one need not play up to each other--we will have to discuss the necessity of more clearly defining their prerequisites for independence and non-interference. Thereafter we must derive from this what they can do alone, regionally or otherwise in this regard.

It is of no help vis-a-vis the United States, the European allies or our own people if we describe the situation in the world, our opportunities and those of others quite differently from what they really are.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am coming to the end but I want to say the following: If the discussion on the divisibility of detente made any sense, it may have made more people aware of the fact, hopefully all of us, of how narrow the world is in which we live. It may have made them aware of how events in one part of the globe may bring influence to bear on the fate of the people in faraway regions. We cannot ignore developments in Iran, Afghanistan or in the Middle East--I would add an exclamation mark here in brackets or several exclamation marks if it were possible--in Cambodia or in Zimbabwe or all these crisis areas. Every political development regardless of what part of the world will have an effect on relations between the big powers and their allies. No important event will remain without consequences for our security which, as we know, consists of more than just the military element. But I have explicitly stressed its importance also.

The result is that East-West relations cannot be viewed or even formed separately any more, separately from North-South relations. That pertains to all main components of the northern industrial world for a long time to come if no big accident happens.

[DW231430] Peace policy in the early seventies mainly had one dimension, namely the dimension between the blocs. Today and in the future those who want to safeguard peace must give the same priority to the second great world political task, namely equalization between the industrial nations and the developing nations. [applause] That is the crisis of mankind mentioned by Karl-Friedrich von Weizsaecker, who says that it will probably accompany us as a decisive factor for more than 1 decade. I say [words indistinct].

The development of new international relations, particularly economic relations, must take place quickly if we want to avoid new flames in the Third World touching off a great world political fire. It is good that some new thought is being given to relations between the European community and the Third World. But please, esteemed colleagues in the government and in the European community, please do not do that as a mere function of something else. It must be done, as our foreign minister said, because these are independent partners with equal rights. I will also add that this involves the dominating social problem of the end of this century.

It is good that some thought is being given to southern Europe. I wish the suggestion for a southern European program had not deteriorated in 1976 and 1977. It is good that the treaty with Yugoslavia is finally being viewed more positively. But if I may put it succinctly, Mr Federal Foreign Minister, tell your colleagues in the European community who have so far had great difficulties with this and who wanted to shift some of the experience to us-- I know what I am talking about--give them my greetings and tell them: Why have they done this so late and against the background of a world political crisis? [applause] For tactful reasons I do not want to mention another possible reason. What is correct now vis-a-vis Yugoslavia, was also correct a year ago! and what is right today against the background of the Mideast crisis and European energy policy, would also have been right a year or two ago.

One can if one will make the effort achieve an agreement in North-South matters that will amount to a common definition of common interests.

Ladies and gentlemen, the result is that one ought to point out to the Soviet Union with all sensible means how wrongly it has been acting in view of the real global tasks. He who disregards national sovereignty and self-determination that much, not only undermines East-West relations, he also creates a setback for us in the difficult efforts to set up the general network of international relations in such a way that all peoples can take their proper place. [applause]

Esteemed colleagues, if not all involved understand that the eighties will create the task for us to develop relations among us and vis-a-vis the developing countries of different development phases so as to eventually end the arms race--I say again--and to use the freed resources productively, we will enter even more difficult times than we now believe. We owe it to our people over and over again to do everything that is suitable for avoiding damage. We must increase the advantages for our people and for Europe. That can be achieved not merely with a sensible policy, but this policy is necessary in any case, namely a sensible policy that will strictly maintain our interests and that will help to safeguard peace if this is at all possible.

## CDU/CSU FLOORLEADER KOHL ADDRESSES BUNDESTAG

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[Address by CDU/CSU floorleader Helmut Kohl at the 17 January debate on the international situation after USSR intervention in Afghanistan--live]

[Excerpts] Mr President, esteemed ladies and gentlemen: Mr Federal Chancellor, when one hears and reads your government statement the tenor of your elaborations can be expressed by the following brief summation: Bad weather is in the offing with regard to world politics; and then you go on to say: We must just continue our policy as before, add a bit of crisis management and then we will overcome the turbulences and enter the quiet and sunny fields of the age of detente. [applause]

Mr Federal Chancellor, I ask myself--and you live together with us in the Federal Republic of Germany, in our world--what illusions have been expressed again in today's speech? [strong applause]

The whole world writes and speaks about as well as warns against the danger of a catastrophe; it is only your government statement that does not reflect that danger. I fear, Mr Federal Chancellor, that you transfer your personal bad weather experience gathered in Brahmsee [chancellor's summer residence] to the international situation. [applause]

Mr Federal Chancellor, that is not enough. You have rightly quoted Immanuel Kant who said: Creating peace costs strength. But creating and maintaining peace calls most of all for the will and the strength to achieve a sober assessment without illusions, a realistic assessment of the matters of our world. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a bitter experience that not just a few people in the West find the way back to a sober and realistic assessment of Soviet power policy whenever a new aggressive act of Moscow has taken place. And even if it does eventually happen, it often happens only whenever the Soviet Union's responsibility cannot be covered up anymore, when it becomes obvious that the outbreak of a worldwide conflict threatens endangering the peace of all of us. This was the case in the Cuban crisis of 1962, and we are experiencing it today after the Soviet aggression and intervention in



Afghanistan. Even the Soviet attacks on Hungary in 1956 and on Czechoslovakia in 1968 only touched off a shock in broad areas of the Western world. After a few months the West was prepared again to take up routine political work as if nothing had happened. The Soviet proxy wars of past years in Asia and Africa were viewed with understanding by some people in the West and no real lessons were learned from them.

Mr Federal Chancellor, your government statement of today is a reflection of these bitter experiences. Government statements have often enough been your only answer to international crises or domestic political problems. You pretend to be active without actually doing anything. That can be seen again today. [applause]

Mr Federal Chancellor, how far away you and your political friends of the SPD are from facts of international politics, and particularly from a realistic assessment of Soviet policy, has been demonstrated by your statements made in past weeks. In your STERN magazine interview of 3 January, your new year's eve interview, you said, Mr Federal Chancellor, that the Soviet Union is basically interested in preserving peace. My question is: What kind of peace do you mean? You gave that interview prior to the Soviet attack on Afghanistan. I would like to grant you that you could not change your statements on short notice. But I ask myself whether you wanted to change these statements at all? That is the question that must be asked. The contents of your new year's statement are evidence of this, a new year's statement that was announced in an unusually dramatic way. German papers reported on the fact that you ordered a television team to Mallorca to change at short notice your new year's statement in view of the Afghanistan events.

Ladies and gentlemen, there was great tension: What will the Federal Chancellor say in Mallorca in view of the difficult situation? And what did you say, Mr Federal Chancellor? You said you could not keep quiet about your irritation with regard to the action of the Soviet Union and its allies in Asia and Africa. [shouts] A mountain labored and brought forth a mouse. You cannot keep quiet about your irritation. That was your comment, it was the comment of the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in these days of crisis.

Ladies and gentlemen, that was all. And you did not even dare call Afghanistan by its name. That statement was inappropriate, and it indicates your terrible insecurity regarding statements and reactions of a German Government chief to such an event.

Mr Federal Chancellor, you stated in the STERN interview that the Soviet leaders will not become involved in any perilous action. Yes, aggressions such as in Afghanistan are not dangerous to life for the Soviet Union as long as it can count on politicians in the West who do not want to realize the brutal fact of Soviet expansionist policy. [strong and lengthy applause]

As long as there are advocates of a sterile detente rigmarole, as you are, Mr Brandt, or such as Herbert Wehner [applause], Horst Ehmke and others who have kept quiet until this hour [shouts]; when you, Mr Federal Chancellor, in your statement demanded sobriety, calmness, discipline and a proper perspective, you should please direct this most of all to your own address.

It was Herbert Wehner who said with regard to the increased Soviet armament that it was of a defensive character. [shouts] At the SPD Congress in December, at a moment when the Soviet machinery was cranked up with regard to Afghanistan, many of your comrades quoted Herbert Wehner in order to fight against the NATO decision on producing and stationing medium-range missiles in Europe.

Mr Federal Chancellor, to this day you have not had the courage to contradict Herbert Wehner in public in Germany. [strong applause]

[DW211240] Senator Henning Scherf, your Bremen fellow party member and colleague, said: I, like Helmut Schmidt, am firmly convinced that there is no preparedness on the part of the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw Pact states to cause an aggression, and that it would be misleading to say that we are directly facing war or the danger of war.

Mr Federal Chancellor, in what kind of world do you live, together with the leading comrades of German Social Democracy? [applause] Is warnings are called for today, they are certainly called for in connection with pussy-footing and pacification. If the danger of an exaggerated reaction existed at all, it would exist only because you, Mr Federal Chancellor, the SPD and some politicians in the West have lost the ability and the standards for assessing Soviet policy soberly and realistically.

One cannot promote illusions systematically for years about detente and cooperation with disregard for factual international developments and with disregard for the factual aims and actions of Soviet policy and then, ladies and gentlemen, be amazed by the fact that the pendulum of international politics is about to swing in other direction. As long as the free world is not guided in its political aims and decisions by its own long-term intentions and convictions, it will have to react to Soviet actions in a short-winded way. Actions, ladies and gentlemen which today in one part of the world may be aimed at detente and tomorrow in another part of the world at confrontation, always following Soviet needs and interests. Only a realistic foreign policy and particularly realistic assessment of Soviet policies will keep one from illusions and from exaggerated reactions.

Mr Federal Chancellor, we doubt your ability to assess realistically this international development. I recall your federal press conference in January 1979. That was exactly a year ago when you were talking about the events in Iran, stating that you expected only a temporary deterioration that could be overcome. You promised the citizens that they would have to expect only temporary heating oil and gasoline price increases. [shouts] Today, Mr Federal Chancellor, 12 months later, you said this morning that oil prices in 1979 alone more than doubled. Are these temporary price increases?

At that time you charged that we were painting everything in black. You have nourished illusions in this sector of German politics as well! [strong applause] You also said at that time that every dramatization of this development would be harmful for our national economy. Today Graf Lambsdorff announced to us that we will have to walk along the edge of a ravine with regard to energy supply in the coming decade. Esteemed Graf Lambsdorff, member of the

FDP Presidium, if we walk that much the edge of a ravine, how can you admit that your party and the coalition are making preparations for suing an association that would delay for years every new energy supply in the future. [strong and lengthy applause, shouts] Out of fear of the greens [environmental protection party] in the forthcoming langtag elections you are about to lose a piece of our country's future. You know as well as I do that if that institute, the new legal institute, is introduced, not just the problem of building nuclear powerplants will be delayed for a long time, but also the construction of conventional powerplants. In the end such a policy will lead the Federal Republic of Germany in the late eighties to become an economically second-rate state; that will be the result of your policy! [applause]

In view of the internal and external situation of our country, we can only say today: You have done too little, and if you cannot do more, it is time for you to vacate your position for better people. [applause, shouts of "phooey"]

You wished our fellow citizens a happy new year. One of them, Oskar (Fehrenbach) of STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG, certainly not a follower of the Christian Democratic and Christian Social union wrote recently: fear is spreading, the people are more afraid than they have been for a long time. They are insecure about what bad surprises will follow the shock of Afghanistan. How do they feel when they think of the crises that may come in the future of the eighties?

That is the way in which many people see the world; they do not see the sound world you are outlining to the citizens in this election year. Mr Federal Chancellor, ruling also means always having the courage to say to the citizens how things really are. As long as this contradiction continues to exist between claims and realities in your policy--let me say that also with a view to detente policy--there will be no common path with the opposition with regard to foreign or energy policies. We maintain that a common path presupposes for us the ability and the will to analyze the problems soberly and in accordance with reality.

Colleague Genscher, if you want to have a common path you ought to see to it that the ability to assess a situation realistically to the benefit of our people should gain ground in the ranks of your coalition partner.

This debate today should deal with a realistic attitude. What has happened? During Christmas the Soviet Union invaded its neighbor country Afghanistan with five divisions. May I recall that 1 year ago, also during Christmas, communist Vietnam with arms from the Soviet Union invaded neighboring Cambodia. Afghan President Amin, who was said to have asked for the help of Soviet troops was killed in the framework of this aggression. Farsighted and circumspect as Soviet policy is, it brought along the successor from East European exile and introduced him into office.

[EW211737] Ladies and gentlemen, the Soviet Union has attacked a state whose government was communist-oriented and which had signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union in 1978, a state which considered itself as belonging to the movement of nonaligned states. It will be now a task of the 12 states of the Third World who have concluded

friendship agreements with the Soviet Union since 1971 to examine how much Moscow can derive the right to interfere in their internal affairs or even make a military intervention from these treaties. The fact that such ideas exist not merely in the sphere of these 12 states, but that the spectre of intervention is haunting Europe is demonstrated every hour by the news we are receiving from Yugoslavia. Mr Federal Chancellor, you said not a word about that in your government statement. [applause, shouts]

With its aggression against Afghanistan the Soviet Union recklessly violated the most important principles of international law and of the UN Charter. Principles that are also parts of the German-Soviet treaty of 1970 and of joint statements and agreements of the final CSCE document of Helsinki. It is important at this moment to recall these principles once again: no state is allowed to use force against the territorial integrity and political independence of another state; no state is permitted to interfere in the internal affairs of another state; states must respect the basic principle of equal rights, of the people's right to self-determination and the basic principles of human rights; international conflicts must be settled peacefully and with peace. It means.

The Soviet Union with its aggression has again brought up the question with regard to the credibility of its own statements about what value its signature on such documents is.

Ladies and gentlemen, this pertains not merely to relations with the states of the Third World. It is valid worldwide. The fact seems to me to be of special significance that the Soviet leadership for the first time since World War II has intervened militarily in a neighboring state which is located outside the Warsaw Pact sphere. The comparison one must think of here are Finland, the aggression of 1939-40 and the annexation of the Baltic states in 1940 together with Adolf Hitler.

The illusion has become obvious which termed the Soviet aggression against the CSSR in 1968 as being a mere traffic accident on the way to detente. Routine political work was continued. The illusion of those has been destroyed who believed that the Soviet Union would be content with a military balance. The illusion has been destroyed that believed that the rearmament of the Soviet Union and its conventional superiority would just serve the maintenance of the Soviet sphere of influence.

Mr Federal Chancellor, little is left of the common statement you and General Secretary Brezhnev signed on 6 May 1978. It says there explicitly, and I quote it literally: respect for the indivisibility of peace and security in all parts of the world must be put on record. Detente is indivisible. This did not keep Brezhnev from brushing aside with a military act of force the principle of the indivisibility of peace, security and detente. The Soviet Union has demonstrated once again that it is directed only by the interests of its own power and its unbroken striving for hegemony.

Ladies and gentlemen, that ought to be eventually considered by everybody in the free world and by everybody in the Federal Republic of Germany. [applause]



Mr Federal Chancellor, ladies and gentlemen, I remind you in this connection--you must listen closely--of Brezhnev's statement made at the Warsaw Pact conference in April 1974 when he said, so to speak at the peak of detente policy when broad parts of German social democracy were most euphoric, it was in April 1974: We communists must cooperate for some time with the capitalists, we need their agriculture and technology, but we will continue our most massive arms programs and in the mid-eighties we will be in a position to return to a considerably more aggressive foreign policy in order to gain the upper hand in our relations with the West. Brezhnev spoke absolutely frankly and honestly. The only thing that has changed is the date: It was not the mid-eighties but the early eighties.

Seen this way the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan did not result from a momentary mood of the Soviet leadership, as some Kremlin astrologists say now. It is part of the global strategy that has been pursued insistently for years.

Mr Federal Chancellor, according to all we know and you certainly know, the developments in Afghanistan did not just begin in December 1979. The lines of this policy were drawn much earlier. This thesis is confirmed by the Soviet News Agency APN. A few days ago in January in Moscow it answered the question of whether such actions as in Afghanistan could be repeated. It stated simply: that depends on the particular concrete situation.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, what kind of illusions do you have about detente policy if it is as simple as that: all these documents and treaties depend on the concrete situation. Moscow has had a hand in three coups d'etat in Afghanistan. It has set up loyal, pro-Moscow regimes in Ethiopia and South Yemen. It concluded alliance treaties with them. It supports the rebels in Baluchistan, in that part of Pakistan that still separates Afghanistan from the Indian Ocean. In doing this it systematically promotes the aggravation of Pakistan.

The Soviet Union has strengthened its fleets in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific, and it pursues directly its own interests in Iran against the interests of the United States. It does this in a country where civil war can break out tomorrow. The Soviet Union worked with fifth columns, with Cuban mercenary troops and with the setting up of willing governments. And now the Soviet Union for the first time has used its own troops in Afghanistan. This obviously demonstrates the acute endangering of Pakistan and Iran. The stability of the entire Middle East is directly endangered. The entire Middle and Near East in this way is becoming a hotbed of dangers in the eighties.

[DW211755] Mr Federal Chancellor, you mentioned a possible meeting with Honecker. I would have welcomed it had you said a word here about the sad role the GDR played as a mercenary unit of the USSR in Africa. [strong applause] We all feel the continuity, the burden and responsibility of German history, including the times of national socialism, the continuity of a history that we must bear jointly in the Federal Republic and the GDR. We all feel what it means when German soldiers, soldiers speaking our mother tongue, are used by a dictatorship and by regimes that stamp on human rights with their feet. The worst associations with the evil spirit of recent German history are being awakened.

Seen that way it is even understandable that the GDR representative in the United Nations said his vote in the Russian language.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Soviet Union is about to bring under its control a lifeline of the West--the oil route through the Persian Gulf. The importance of this was summarized very wisely by a man who has been for many years your military-strategic adviser, Mr Federal Chancellor. Theo Sommer says in a sober sentence: This would be a direct attack on the vital interests of the Western industrial states and it would be not less of a challenge than a surprise attack on West Berlin, which would mean war. I heard nothing in this government statement about the danger of such a dramatic development. This report on the situation is indeed sober and precise.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Middle East has become a first-rate hotbed of crises in this way. Only once since the war has there been a comparable situation: the Cuban crisis of 1962.

We, all of us, therefore must take seriously the words that have been repeated over and over again by American President Jimmy Carter, who termed the Soviet action a grave threat to peace, endangering the security of all countries including the United States and our allies and friends. He added: In the meantime, neither the United States nor any other nation that advocates peace and stability in the world can deal with the Soviet Union as if nothing had happened.

Mr Federal Chancellor, why did not you use this sentence in your appeal? Nobody can pretend that nothing has happened, that we are not involved and that the only ones concerned are the nonaligned states and the United States. Are we really involved that little also with regard to the human aspect? I have not heard a word about the new misery and suffering caused for many hundreds of thousands of Afghans by the new Soviet aggression. Far more than 500,000 refugees have fled from Afghanistan in a few weeks to poor Pakistan. It was communist policy that has again created suffering and misery for millions of people. [strong applause]

Our involvement and that of Western detente policy as a whole is demonstrated by the refusal of the Soviet Union to accept NATO's negotiating offer before the revocation of NATO's December 1979 decision on the production and stationing of medium-range arms in Europe. Mr Federal Chancellor, you have not said a word about that either. [shouts] You have not said a word about that problem. Both events, the Soviet refusal to engage in arms control negotiations and the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, mean the end of what we have been terming for more than a decade East-West detente, unless the Soviet Union corrects its opinion.

We all have been witness to the cynical appearance--as we know how--of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Bonn. At a time when Soviet preparations were made for the attack on Afghanistan, he spoke in front of the German public of the suggestion of the Soviet Union to achieve radical disarmament and that all arms ought to be reduced under international control.



Ladies and gentlemen, most people in our country did not believe Gromyko; not a few delegates of the Berlin SPD Congress were an exception. They thought that one ought to believe these words. These SPD people missed that Gromyko in his Bonn appearance had added in the same breadth, so to speak: We will remain loyal to our basic policy, which for us has been a living policy since the times of Lenin.

Ladies and gentlemen, there is nothing one could add to that. This is the starting position of Soviet considerations. [applause]

We must deal with the problem of why all this could happen. We must discuss it if we want to draw the right conclusions for our own actions. First, the Soviet Union has exploited directly and recklessly the vacuum of power left behind by the Americans after their withdrawal from Vietnam. The fact that broad parts of the world remained quiet with regard to the new expansion to Cambodia and Laos has certainly encouraged Moscow to reach out for Kabul.

Second, the years when the CENTO pact was fading away and was finally ended, the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the U.S. rejection of military help to Pakistan, the paralysis in America caused by the hostages taken in Teheran, the establishment of pro-Soviet regimes in Afghanistan, South Yemen and Ethiopia and the change of government that was in the offing in India created, from Moscow's point of view, a starting position for extending its sphere of influence so that it did not hesitate any longer to do so.

Third, the worldwide balance of power between the two superpowers in the past 10 years has been shaken to the advantage of the Soviet Union through territorial shifts of power and through the massive Soviet rearmament, particularly in the maritime field.

Fourth, everyone of us knows that the foreign political ability of action of the United States was often enough paralyzed in these past years for domestic political reasons.

Loewenthal says: America got into a position of relative weakness which made the Soviets less inclined to negotiate. The Soviet Union, from its point of view has acted uncompromisingly. It has taken up the fight for predominance. It is not prepared to renounce the political advantages it has achieved, and it is about to expand its political power territorially and on a worldwide basis. It has exploited the weak position of the West whose partnership is indispensable with regard to the aim of detente.

[DW?11816] Ladies and gentlemen, brought down to a simple denominator it means: The Soviet bills of costs and advantages indicated that the advantages and the future military possibilities in the direction of the Indian Ocean and the Arab Gulf would outweigh the actual disadvantages. The Soviet Union acted accordingly.

The problem we have to face is the following: What will be our answer in this situation, the answer of the free world? The world cannot just wait and permit the Soviet Union to commit that act without being punished for

it, says Jimmy Carter. And he adds: history may teach just a few obvious lessons, but such a lesson learned by the world at great costs is that an aggression, if not acted against, can become an infectious disease.

If one hears the speeches given by your circle, the SPD circle, if one were to believe them, the West would learn just one lesson from the events in Afghanistan: no relapse into cold war. You do not seem to be worried, ladies and gentlemen of the SPD, that the aggressor, the Soviet Union, also uses the propaganda formula "cold war" in order to polemicize against the measures that have been announced by the American President as an answer to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That is an old song that has been known for 10 years. Not the one who over and over again creates dangerous tensions, be it in Europe, the African continent, the Near, the Middle or the Far East is for you the significant "cold warrior" or enemy of detente, but the one who dares to call by its name the reasons for and the original activities that have caused the tension. [applause]

Real detente, the lasting detente we want to have, can be achieved only if the problems of detente are not hushed up or simply ignored, but frankly stated, discussed and eliminated. He who keeps quiet for the sake of detente, quiet about violence, the violation of human rights and oppression, in the end will leave it to the oppressor to say what will serve detente and what will not. [applause] He will over and over again encourage the oppressors to continue on their way of violence.

Ladies and gentlemen, many of us may have asked ourselves what would have happened if the Americans had attacked a neighbor state with five divisions, if the present chief of state had been murdered and if the aggressive troops had brought along his successor. It would have been simple to predict the reaction.

Where are the SPD voices today? Why are you quiet, colleague Wehner? Why do your comrades keep quiet, such as Mr Eppler, who warned NATO in December against provoking the Soviet Union? [shouts] Why does Mr Bahr not speak today of a perversion of thoughts? [lengthy applause, shouts] Why do the comrades keep quiet? [shouts] Where are the protests of Mr Albertz, Harry Richter, Collwitzer and others who were never too tired to demonstrate against the American action in Vietnam? Where are the international tribunals today where European socialists and communists tried to surpass each other in condemning the United States? [long applause, shouts]

Ladies and gentlemen, the Soviet Union has not forgotten how the West reacted in 1968 to the invasion by the Warsaw Pact states. We know that it was surprised itself about how fast the West, including us in the Federal Republic and most of all the West Europeans as a whole, took up routine work as if nothing had happened. When Moscow not even half a year later produced another suggestion for a European security conference from a drawer where it had been sitting during the CSSR crisis, it was Willy Brandt who was the first to take up that Soviet initiative. [shouts] In this way the Soviet Union did not even temporarily face the danger of experiencing foreign political damage for its bloody aggression.

You Mr Federal Chancellor in your initial comments on Afghanistan in Madrid and Paris supported the impression that the Soviet aggression was a regional conflict, a conflict that could involve first of all the Soviet Union and the nonaligned states and maybe also the interests of the United States. And then, Mr Federal Chancellor, you sent Mr Bahr of all persons as well as Mr Pawelczyk to Washington. [shouts] Mr Pawelczyk said there foolishly that Europe must be kept out of the Afghanistan conflict. It was not merely the fact that you were not the one to go first and quickly to Washington. What distance is indicated by this action with regard to our alliance partners, to our friends and the most important guaranteeing power of the freedom and security of the Federal Republic of Germany. [applause, shouts]

You Mr Federal Chancellor and Mr Brandt still have not understood that it is not a matter of saving destroyed detente illusions [shouts], but that it is a matter of safeguarding peace in the world, including our peace and our freedom.

Mr Federal Chancellor, what a provincial attitude you indicate in viewing international crisis. [shouts, laughter] How dangerously close have you come to the zone of political dreams. On the threshold of a power conflict between the two superpowers it is dangerous for our lives to see such regional crises as in the Middle East only from the point of view of maintaining German interests and from the point of view of detente illusions in Europe.

Mr Federal Chancellor, every one of us here in the hall knows that the big world powers are facing each other in the middle of Germany, in Berlin. Due to the partition of our fatherland, the division, we are existentially different from other states such as France, for example, whose stance is not significant for us in this matter. If you said, and this was a word I completely failed to understand, that the Spanish Government shared your attitude, the selection of the word indicates already how little importance you attribute to the events in Afghanistan. What does it mean in this connection to say attitude? I am under the impression in general that whenever you do not know how to go on--today's government statement is full of examples--you invent new terms which you will drop tomorrow like a sour lemon. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, what would we have said and done in the past 3 decades if the United States in various Berlin crises had adopted the standpoint: Berlin is a regional problem, that the Khrushchev ultimatum of 1958 was only a temporary problem, involving primarily the Germans? Mr Federal Chancellor, in your language it would be an attitude.

[BWZ11829] Ladies and gentlemen, what then? Have you forgotten how often the then ruling mayor of Berlin Willy Brandt went to Washington, Paris and London to point out the worldwide effects a Berlin crisis would have? Those who will demote today the events in Afghanistan to a merely regional affair must not be surprised if they are abandoned tomorrow to their own misery. The Americans will watch most carefully to see what we Germans and we West Europeans do now and today. [applause]

We welcome, therefore, the UN Security Council's clear condemnation of the Soviet expansion and the clear condemnation by the UN General Assembly. The states of the Third World will now watch exactly how the Western big power will react and how we support our American partner from Western Europe. Whether we act in solidarity, or whether we back out. We must act in such a way that we will not merely keep in mind our interests but also those of the Third World.

We of the CDU/CSU support explicitly the measures taken by the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Such measures must be of a long-term nature. [applause]

But, Mr Federal Chancellor, you and even more so your friends have complained often enough in the past about the lack of leadership by the American President. But now, when the President has made certain decisions, he is being charged with the suspicion of having overreacted. This is being done to evade our own responsibility. Where are these exaggerated reactions?

I think we ought to think less about the measures of the U.S. Government we cannot follow, we as the Federal Republic of Germany. We ought to think more about and discuss in public how we could demonstrate our solidarity with the Americans now. [applause] This involves the fact--and I would like to hear your opinion on it not in general terms but in a direct formulation--that the Soviet Union should not be able to count on other Western industrial states such as the Federal Republic to help torpedo the American measures.

Ladies and gentlemen, it means for us in plain words: If the American Government and the American policy for good reason arrived at the conclusion that technological developments and merchandise will not be made available to the Soviet Union, it would be absolutely impossible for us to have to say that German firms exploited this gap in the market. That may call for sacrifices also on our part, but I consider it completely impossible to leave the responsibility and the burden for the defense of freedom only to the Americans.

We believe and have believed that NATO must be viewed with regard to its worldwide significance. It would be a completely wrong and narrowminded interpretation of the founders of NATO if we were to see only its European component without seeing the possibility that NATO could be knocked out completely at the oil sources and oil countries of this world without a shot being fired in Europe, that was the background of these considerations. [applause]

Since there was talk of a common path, we foresee--and I will say it frankly--that in the framework of what the Americans will have to do on a worldwide basis a shift of burdens must take place also in Europe. We foresee, and we said it already at the budget debate in December, that this may possibly also entail higher financial sacrifices in connection with the defense contribution. Mr Federal Chancellor, I hope that you will make a statement on that issue in the near future. That will cost us sacrifices, I know that.



We as the CDU/CSU faction offer to share these burdens for the sake of detente. But you must have the courage to implement the necessary measures in your own faction. [applause]

Mr Federal Chancellor, the Federal Republic must form its detente policy according to the realities of Soviet policies. Mr Federal Foreign Minister, we have listened with great interest to your efforts aimed at a realistic detente policy. Why did you wait to say this so late, colleague Genscher, why did you not use this terminology earlier?

Three prerequisites are indispensable for a realistic foreign policy: the political-military balance, the indivisibility of detente and the balance between services rendered and services received in return. Imbalance does not lead to detente but to situations that can be used for blackmailing. Violence and detente rule each other out.

It was the Soviet Union that clearly rejected the policy of detente with acts of force in Afghanistan and its veto with regard to negotiations. It is now up to the Soviet Union to reestablish the prerequisite for detente policy by immediately withdrawing from Afghanistan, by showing preparedness to engage in arms control negotiations without setting preconditions, by its renunciation of manifestations to threaten with or apply force.

Detente policy must have no illusions with regard to the character of communism and the political-hegemonial intentions of the Kremlin leadership. Detente policy must be immune to the temptation to follow hopes or wishes rather than realities. And detente policy must not lead to covering up and ignoring the violation of human rights. Detente policy in treaties and agreements with the Soviet Union and other communist states must strive for agreement on the matter and not for agreement in words. Such a detente policy, colleague Genscher, indeed would be a basis for a common German foreign policy. But I must admit unfortunately that I see no basis for such a common policy as long as the government and its supporting factions, particularly the SPD, want to stick to a detente policy whose premise--as we have heard again today in this government statement--is illusion.

We must together prepare our own people for the future, a future that will demand sacrifices from us. I fear, Mr Federal Chancellor, that you have neither the courage nor the support of your own party to demand these sacrifices and to discuss them with the Germans in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is, therefore, time for a change in the Federal Republic of Germany. [strong applause]

CS0: 3103

## BREMEN DELEGATION TO GREEN CONGRESS LEADS ANTI-CP FIGHT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] At next weekend's constituent congress of the Green Party in Karlsruhe the Bremen delegation, the first to gain seats in a provincial assembly, intends to fight for a clear demarcation vis-a-vis the communists. The Bremen delegation in Bonn will have 10 members. Its spokesman, provincial assembly deputy Dinne, said it was a "vital question" whether or not the communists would succeed in their efforts to be allowed to work with and through the Greens. As regards the issue of dual membership, the Bremen people had early on succeeded in enforcing demarcation with the result that the provincial assembly election of 7 October last saw an alternative (communist) list entering the campaign in addition to the Green List. In Bremen the Greens managed to take the 5 percent hurdle, the alternatives got only 1.5 percent of the vote.

Dinne commented that the Bremen delegates hoped to have the "Bremen Green example" prevail at federal level also. "We want nothing to do with the communist groups who, under cover of the Greens, intend to invade the various parliaments." Though at federal level, as in Bremen, the Greens would lose 1-1.5 percent of the vote on the left, they would become a viable electoral alternative for many voters from the bourgeois camp only by such a clear demarcation. Dinne believes that it is quite possible to expect the result of the Bremen October election to be repeated at federal level, "or at least to show a similar trend."

Dinne reported that a "Land committee" of the Greens had lately reduced the flood of motions for Karlsruhe on the issue of dual membership to two opposing motions: The first states that dual membership in the future Green Federal Party should be impossible. The second motion maintains that the question of dual membership should be autonomously settled by the Land and district associations. The Karlsruhe constituent congress must agree with such a settlement. Bremen senior delegate Dinne said that a two thirds majority is expected for the first motion. Should dual membership prevail after all--against all expectations--Dinne thinks that the coming Bundestag election will witness the same phenomenon as Bremen: Two lists and two parties.



Pointing at their election success last October, the Bremen people also hope to have their example prevail as to subject matter. They hold that it is just as important to appreciate conservative environmental attitudes as the necessity for sociopolitical changes. The doctrine of sociopolitical changes must indeed be subjected to "a test in real life" such as was done repeatedly by the Bremen Greens (when some of them were still Social Democrats). Dinne admits "we had to permit some of our rotten (ideological) teeth to be pulled, which originated with an utopia," for example the "belief in total equality." Nor are fights about distribution the beginning and end, and the fetish of liberation by the working class is no longer on the agenda.

11698  
CSU: 3103

SPD'S EHMKE UNDERSCORES FRG SOLIDARITY COMMITMENT TO U.S.

DW210914 Bonn DIE WELT in German 21 Jan 80 p 3 DW

[Interview with Horst Ehmke, deputy chairman of the SPD Bundestag faction by Gottfried Capell, in Bonn--date not given]

[Text] WELT: Professor Ehmke, is it correct to say that there are hardly any differences between the government, the coalition and the opposition in the assessment of the situation in Afghanistan and in the Middle East at large?

Ehmke: Some CDU/CSU politicians have made remarks on the basis of which we had to assume that there are considerable differences in this assessment indeed. If I were to judge this solely by the speeches of the chancellor, the foreign minister and the Bavarian minister-president, then I would be inclined to agree with you that in the fundamentals the situation is being assessed similarly.

WELT: So if any common platform emerges, how could it be consolidated? What can come of the top echelon conference that is scheduled for this week?

Ehmke: To begin with this top echelon conference should not be emphasized very much. Willy Brandt was right when he welcomed the proposal of the Bavarian minister-President in the Bundestag and said that in a smoothly operating democracy it should go without saying that the government and the opposition get along, notwithstanding all differences of opinion about decisive problems. How much of a common platform might emerge from that depends on whether or not it will be possible to break up the highly sterile and rigid debate of the past several years. The Strauss speech might be an overture to the opposition's coming around to the platform of the Federal Government's policy in principle, just as Wehner did with his famous speech dealing with the treaties with the West. If the taboos of the opposition could be overcome it will be possible to have more fruitful talks even if different views are advocated.

WELT: With respect to the Middle East, the assessments differ about the participation in, or the support of, the U.S. sanctions against Iran and

and against the USSR. The formula that the sanctions must not be "torpedoed" and that it is necessary to abide by the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy] line might not be sufficient for the Americans.

Ehmke: My advice is to separate the case of Iran from that of Afghanistan. Though we are not facing isolated issues, these nevertheless are issues which must be judged individually. As far as the American leadership is concerned, it is facing two problems with respect to Iran: What instruments does it have to exert influence on Tehran? And second, and the longer it lasts the more difficult will it become: What does its own people, public opinion, have to say about this? We do not have the pressure of public opinion. It is our duty as an alliance partner to ponder jointly and in solidarity with the United States what can be done successfully and what good it will do. We must not push Khomeyni to the side of the Soviet Union, even if he were to be there only temporarily and for tactical reasons. Nor must we do anything additional that would divert the criticism of the Third World, which has been fully focused on the Soviet Union following the UN debate, to the United States. We must politically exploit the weak situation of the Soviet Union, which has subjected Afghanistan to its political influence in the past several years and then, out of fear of losing this influence again, committed an act of neocolonialism; we must not make the situation easier for the Soviet Union by doing something in the Third World which might tend to promote anti-American sentiments.

WELT: But you cannot visualize the Federal Republic participating in possible U.S. sanctions beyond mere toleration, or can you?

Ehmke: This should not be discussed much in public. If one considers this internally and with great care and coordinates it with the allies, then one ought to do it. A discussion which merely arouses expectations that it cannot live up to later is only harmful. What can be done must be internally prepared and then put into practice, notably in coordination with our European allies and in coordination with the American allies who are under entirely different pressures from their public opinion than are the European leaders.

WELT: Will these crises cause an increase in the German defense budget by a real 3 percent vis-a-vis 1979, as was originally agreed on within the framework of NATO?

Ehmke: That will have to be examined. We should not be so rigid regarding percentages. Rather we should see that the necessary things are done. Since a general agreement has been made in the alliance, one ought to have a second look at it.

WELT: And how about increasing development assistance?

Ehmke: We have said that the European Community will intensify its co-operation with the Gulf states. The Federal chancellor stated that we will

continue and increase aid to Pakistan and that in 1980 we will continue our aid to Turkey, for which we started a special action last year. We will have to cope with additional demands in this field in which the Federal Republic really can achieve something on a worldwide basis--namely, regarding economic assistance, technical aid and development aid in general. That will involve Asia as well as Africa. The West as a whole must give considerable thought to the division of its forces. The main military burden must remain with the United States on a worldwide basis because it is the nuclear superpower. We all must make our contribution on the economic, social and political stabilization of these Third World countries to immunize them against overthrows and outward influence.

WELT: Would there be any significant military investments because of the Middle East crisis if we increased the military budget by a real 3 percent?

Ehmke: We are not a nuclear power and we are not a big military power. The problems of a military balance within a global framework are first of all a matter for the United States as a superpower and as the leading power of the free world. We must make our contribution to the joint defense of the free world in Europe. What we have achieved in this field is quite something. In the past years we have invested a great deal in equipping the Bundeswehr, particularly in the field of antitank arms. With regard to the question of whether the Afghanistan situation will have special repercussions on equipping the Bundeswehr, my answer is no.

WELT: I do not mean just the kind but also the quickness in modernizing our equipment.

Ehmke: I think that our programs are developing nicely and that there is nothing that ought to be changed now.

WELT: Do you think that in addition to increasing development aid as a whole some shifting ought to take place by promoting certain crisis areas more, such as Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, India and certain African areas?

Ehmke: That must be examined in every individual case. India, for example, gets most of the development aid anyway. As regards Pakistan, for example, we never discontinued our development aid in contrast to the United States. In doing this, however, one must also bear in mind the involved countries' capability to absorb the aid. As regards Portugal, for example, we made considerable funds available after the fall of the Salazar regime and once the attempt of the communists to take over had been warded off. But the country was technically and organizationally unable to absorb the funds. This is an abstract concept; it is a question of implementing effective aid practice.

WELT: In any case, additional expenditures will have to be decided on in connection with this crisis. How will they be financed? Do you see the possibility of increased debt or will this influence tax breaks, the tax package that has been envisaged for 1981?

Ehmke: The Federal finance minister must assess the extent of the additional demands we must face. Then the question will come up as to how such means will fit into the overall 1980 budget and into medium-term financial planning.

WELT: So, for the time being you are ruling out its influence on the tax package?

Ehmke: That ought to be examined also.

CSO: 3103

## KUWAIT OIL MINISTER TELLS LAMSDORFF HE WANTS STABLE POLICY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Jan 80 p 12

[Text] On the occasion of Federal Economics Minister Lambsdorff's visit on Thursday last the government of the oil state Kuwait strongly advocated a stable oil price policy. Oil Minister Sheik Ali al-Khalifa al-Sabah said that price jumps and the split of the oil market into free and official prices damaged not only the industrial nations; it was also less than useful for the producer countries. On the other hand the consumer countries could not expect the producer states to freeze crude oil prices motivated only by a sense of responsibility to world economics. The oil countries needed genuine price increases, not improvements in nominal earnings which were undermined by the dollar's loss of purchasing power. If success were to be achieved in raising prices steadily rather than abruptly, the consumer countries would still be under sufficient pressure to encourage energy conservation and the use of substitute energy sources.

Kuwait would like to join as many as possible of the other producer states in order to control such a price policy by means of flexible production. At the moment the country produces 2 million barrels of crude per day. Added to this are 300,000 barrels from Kuwait's share in the production of the neutral zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In 1979 the daily volume produced amounted to an average of 2.2 million barrels. It is in the interest of Kuwait to stretch its oil reserves so that, in the words of Khalifa al-Sabah, this raw material may represent the bridge to the country's further economic and social development. Up to now Kuwait has produced more than it needed to obtain the appropriate revenues.

Finance Minister Abdul Rahman Salim al-Ateeqi points out that it is becoming increasingly difficult to invest the surpluses except for domestic priorities such as water supply and electricity generation, education, social welfare and transportation.

For the second quarter of this year Kuwait has set a target of 1.5 million barrels of oil daily. At the same time it is intended not to lower the production volume abruptly but to take market conditions into account. Khalifa al-Sabah expects that the market will sag from spring onward.



Kuwait also assumes that demand will decline due to recessive trends in most Western industrial countries, and that supplies from the North Sea and Mexico are going to increase. At today's high prices, it is reported, oil stockpiling is becoming more risky as well as more expensive. From this market constellation the Kuwait Government concludes that prices will tend to get softer though, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, it does not expect a general decline. The Kuwaitis predict a swing in the pendulum for the free prices on the spot market. Khalifa believes that the official OPEC prices will be maintained. Free prices will probably approach the official prices within only \$1-2 per barrel. Due to the cautious approach of oil buyers this trend has in fact already started.

Like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait appears willing right now to conclude long-term delivery contracts with German oil companies. So far single shipments have been the rule. The oil minister welcomes cooperation with the Federal Republic whose oil market is distinguished by the fact that it is highly competitive. Khalifa told reporters that the German economics ministers have always maintained free prices for oil. That is, he says, the only way to speed up adjustment to a rational use of oil and other types of energy.

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CSO: 3103

NEW BOOKS GIVE HISTORY OF PARTIES IN SOUTHWEST

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Jan 80 p 8

[Review by Hermann Rudolph of the books "Die CDU in Baden-Wuerttemberg und Ihre Geschichte" [The CDU in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Its History], edited by Paul-Ludwig Weinacht, 400 pages, DM29.80; "Die SPD in Baden-Wuerttemberg und Ihre Geschichte" [The SPD in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Its History], edited by Joerg Schadt and Wolfgang Schmierer, 371 pages; "Die FDP/DVP [German People's Party] in Baden-Wuerttemberg und Ihre Geschichte" [The FDP/DVP in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Its History], 344 pages. Published in the series "Schriften zur Politischen Landeskunde Baden-Wuerttembergs" [Essays on the Political History of Baden-Wuerttemberg], Vols 2, 3 and 4. Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1978 and 1979, DM29.80 per volume]

[Text] Despite various efforts, party research in the Federal Republic still leaves a great deal to be desired. We are bound to note a persisting lack of empirically complete or at least empirically oriented studies, though admittedly the point at issue is less classical sociological investigation than the historical tracing of party development on the basis of interviews and the utilization of available data. Also still outstanding are summary analyses whether of crucial phases in party development or of general descriptions; it remains a disgrace that the only critical-analytical review of a party in the Federal Republic was published in England--Geoffrey Pridham's "Christian Democracy in Western Germany." There are no German contributions which are neither partisan nor doctrinaire. That circumstance represents a considerable deficit with regard to current history and political science, especially in a state which is truly a "party state" defining this term simply as a descriptive value not as a constitutional interpretation.

This fact alone draws our attention to an undertaking which has just been concluded: A 3-volume history of the Baden-Wuerttemberg parties, inspired and probably largely subsidized by the Baden-Wuerttemberg Land Center for Political Education--the first complete regional history of the three parties: CDU, SPD and FDP/DVP. It deserves our respect, and not only because at last politics at Land level have been taken seriously, not patronized as provincial concerns. It merits attention because the inclusion of the origin of the three parties makes large sections of the three volumes genuine

contributions to regional history. In other words: By the medium of party history they vividly show up those historical peculiarities which have led to the emergence of the southwest as a region, that is the scene of an indigenous political culture within the framework of general political party history, and still help to distinguish it.

The results of these remarkable efforts necessarily differ in quality. That was unavoidable in any case, because the work had to be distributed among several authors. Due to the pursuit of holy proportionality which necessarily dominates an institution such as the Land Center, it is not entirely free either of a slightly apologetic tinge because the authors are more or less obvious followers of the parties whose histories they are writing. Still, this does not by any means detract from the achievement of this regional history. On the contrary, I am inclined to claim that the books indeed show up the issues in their proper light. The authors have at all times remained matter of fact, more so than we might have expected in the prevailing party political climate. They do not hide their sympathies; actually these sympathies nourish the interest in their subject matter while never allowing them to degenerate into undue partisanship. There is only one exception--the contribution on the CDU's effect on the Federal Republic of Germany, evidently colored by the author's involvement in the internal tensile tests of the Union.

In general, therefore, we obtain a colorful and deeply etched image of the political and party scene in the southwest. We can watch the parties regional emergence and, especially, the change in their assumptions, which has often meant a quick leveling and yet includes a continuing tradition. Among the most interesting and vivid passages is the history of the liberals in the FDP volume, which perfectly sketches their wavering between old liberal stubbornness, democratic popularism and the suction effect of nationalism. Another example is the recall of the sterile era of the Baden grand coalition of liberals, democrats and social democrats prior to 1914, one of the most amazing incidents in German party history--and forgotten almost totally. Weaknesses tend to appear where regional history is written with undue emphasis on generally history--and yet it is no accident that the recital of the SPD's history at times does not quite avoid this danger--, or when party history is content to outline the personal maneuvers of coalition politics. The latter happens most of all--and again this is probably no accident--with respect to CDU history. That party has imprinted itself on the Land as no other has done; but the story of the SPD and FDP tells us much more of what have been the real preoccupations of Land politicians. Oddly enough this applies even to the very crucial school issue (which is hardly mentioned in the CDU history but given its proper significance in the FDP volume). Still, in view of the situation of research and reporting these are minor objections to a praiseworthy undertaking. By tackling it the Baden-Wuerttemberg Land Center has pounded in a widely visible scientific-journalistic milestone and established valid criteria.

## BRIEFS

**AFRICAN STATES COOPERATION--Bonn--**According to Federal Foreign Minister Genscher, the Federal Republic will pursue a "farsighted" African policy to foster a closer partnership between the African states and the West. Speaking in today's Bundestag debate on Africa, Genscher stressed that these states must be shown that the "natural partners" of the Third World were not the USSR and its allies, including the GDR, and that the Western democracies offered them a partnership based on equality and mutual respect. Cooperation was also necessary with those African countries which wanted to free themselves from an already existing embrace by communist states. Genscher said that the main tasks in relation to the countries of Africa were the strengthening of their independence and self-reliance, the creation of economic and social stability by increased development aid, and support for their search for their own identity. Even the last remaining problems in South Africa like apartheid should be resolved by peaceful means. Resources must not be made available for war, armaments and military aid, but only for Africa's peaceful development. [Excerpts] [LD181304 Hamburg DPA in German 1141 GMT 18 Jan 80 LD]

**LESS SOVIET NATURAL GAS--**The Soviet Union has cut back its natural gas deliveries to Finland from 3.3 million to 2.5 million cubic meters daily. No reason has yet been given for this step. It is assumed in Helsinki that the cut-back is the result of Iran's failure to meet its obligations to the Soviet Union. Some major Finnish customers are reported to be in difficulties already and to contemplate a partial conversion to coal which the country imports mainly from Poland. [Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Jan 80 p 13] 11698

**COMMENTS ON SAKHAROV EXILE--Moscow/Frankfurt--**The exile of the Soviet dissident and nobel prize winner Andrey Sakharov has led to worldwide protests. Government spokesman Armin Gruenwald said in Bonn that as one of the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act the Federal Government expects the USSR to remedy this violation of the right to freedom of speech and conscience. SPD Chairman Willy Brandt said he is taken aback, but expressed the hope that the exile of Sakharov will not be the beginning of further reprisals. [Excerpts] [LD232110 Hamburg DPA in German 1716 GMT 23 Jan 80 LD]

SCHMIDT RECEIVES FORMER CHANCELLORS--Bonn--On the eve of his talks with opposition leaders, Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt received former chancellors Willy Brandt (SPD) and Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) for talks on the international situation in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At the chancellor's invitation former Federal President Walter Scheel, former Federal Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder (CDU), and the current foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), attended tonight's discussion. The crisis in the Middle East will be the main topic at the chancellor's meeting tomorrow with the CSU and CDU chairmen, Franz Josef Strauss and Helmut Kohl, and the chairman of the CSU group in the Bundestag, Friedrich Zimmermann. Federal Foreign Minister Genscher and Defense Minister Hans Apel have also been invited. No statement is expected tonight about the meeting. [Text] [LD231956 Hamburg DPA in German 1919 GMT 23 Jan 80 LD]

USEFULNESS OF EUROPEAN-ARAB TALKS--SPD Chairman Brandt, like Foreign Minister Genscher, recommends that the Federal Republic first of all make a contribution to the consolidation of Turkey in order to counteract the Soviet policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan. In addition, Brandt supports activation of the so-called European-Arab dialog. It is an incontestable fact that Turkey needs help, but it is difficult to give such help in a sensible way. The Turkish foreign minister said just a few days ago that his country will not take part in NATO sanctions caused by Afghanistan. If Turkey is to receive greater help, it ought to commit itself to greater loyalty vis-a-vis NATO. It will be even more difficult to improve the Western position in the East with the help of the European-Arab dialog. Such talks so far have only helped to upgrade the "Palestine Liberation Organization," which supports the Soviet Union in the Afghanistan crisis. Some Western diplomats fear, for good reason, that the European-Arab talks would only be useful for Moscow's friends in the East. [Text] [DW241005 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Jan 80 p 8 DW]

CSO: 3103



## LEADER OF STALINIST-CP WING BOASTS FOREIGN PARTIES SUPPORT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Nov 79 p 10

[Article: "Sinisalo's Interpretation: Fraternal Parties of Finnish Communist Party Support Taistoites"]

[Text] In TIEDONANTAJA, the organ of the Taistoite wing of the Finnish Communist Party, Taisto Sinisalo gives one to understand that foreign fraternal parties of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] do indeed support the views of the Taistoite minority in the internal conflicts of the SKP.

In today's issue of TIEDONANTAJA Sinisalo answers Chairman Aarne Saarinen's and First Secretary Arvo Aalto's recent anti-Taistoite speeches.

Last week Saarinen stated that more and more foreign communist parties are beginning to wonder what indeed are the conflicts within the Finnish Communist Party.

Sinisalo gives his own interpretation of the stand taken by fraternal parties regarding conflicts within the SKP: "The stand of the fraternal parties is common knowledge to all party organizations and members. It has been brought up many times. It has also been written and stated in joint communiques and statements made by the SKP and its fraternal parties. As far as I know all the fraternal parties have declared their unreserved support for the decisions of the congresses of the SKP and the policy line outlined by them. The fraternal parties feel a deep concern as a result of difficulties in the SKP and especially now with the aggravation of the internal situation. The attempts to bring about unity in the SKP have received and will continue to receive the support of the fraternal parties."

In an interview published in TIEDONANTAJA Sinisalo stated that it is especially dangerous to underestimate the dangers connected with the present situation. According to Sinisalo the leaders of the party's majority have presented an open threat to the principles of building unity.

Sinisalo also talks about government policy and states that the great majority of the SKP membership does not support current government policy. According to Sinisalo the Taistoite Diet members opposing it without a doubt represent

the "main policy line and programs of our movement, the election platform of the SKDL [Finnish Peoples Democratic League], and the promises given to voters".

Sinisalo points out that in SKP activities collectivism is nearly an unknown concept. For example, the government's budget proposal and other important government policy issues are resolved elsewhere than in the party leadership, states Sinisalo.

Sinisalo blames the violation of regulations on the party's majority, which according to him has begun to carry out a program of cooperation with the bourgeoisie on the basis of a so-called historical compromise and has compiled its doctrine outside of the party organization.

In criticizing current government cooperation Sinisalo also points out that the party membership was never once asked its opinion about participation in the government.

10576

CSO: 3107

## NEW CONSERVATIVE PARTY SECRETARY ENHANCES MODERATE IMAGE

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 30 Nov 79 p 68-71

[Article by Tuomas Keskinen]

[Text] The Conservative Party takes care of its internal problems in a democratic manner. The chairman decides first and proposes afterwards. Dissatisfaction is eliminated by candy and reproaches. The Conservative Party has become the Suominen family.

The party has been living a post-Holkeri era, the era of Ilkka Suominen, for about half a year.

It is still a popular question in the political circles: Who leads the Conservative Party? And it is still a popular answer that Harri Holkeri does. The big election winner has become such a powerful figure.

Although it is known that Holkeri would like to participate in his party's affairs, especially in its international affairs, the above answer is definitely wrong.

It is clear that Harri prepares himself for the difficult role of a broad-minded and fair bank president. His goal may even be to participate in the presidential game of the members of the Bank of Finland if "the interest of the fatherland" so requires. Harri is his party's godfather.

At present, it is Ilkka Suominen who leads the Conservative Party.

During his leadership, some new expressions have appeared in the party's terminology, some others have disappeared from it.

The word "cooperation" has become a leading phrase when combined with either "ability," "willingness" or "direction." The Conservative Party's leadership has given the party, an old party with ability, willingness to cooperate.

With some exaggeration that ability can be called, for example, a desire, a desire to be in the government. The Conservative Party would not be healthy if it did not want to be in the government after 13 years.

When the Conservative Party is part of the government or when it is allowed to be, is a question frequently asked. At present, a typical answer from the party is this: "After the other parties have become as capable of cooperation as the Conservative Party."

Harri Holkeri raised high the threshold for the party to get into the government:

He stated repeatedly that the Conservative Party would go into the government only through the front door.

After World War II, the party has not entered even once into the government in a normal manner, through the front door. The Conservative Party's presence in the government has always been under unusual circumstances.

Ilkka Suominen has never paid much attention to the word "front door." That may, indeed, be a sign of ability to cooperate.

Under Holkeri, the Conservative Party became a pro-Kekkonen party in the 1978 elections. Under Suominen, the party supported President Leonid Brezhnev's disarmament proposal early on. The party is also competing in foreign politics.

#### Shifting Lines

In domestic policy, Suominen's tactics seem to be a cautious shifting to the left, step by step. He is taking his party as far to the left as it can possibly go without splitting it off from its rightwing members.

The party office's pocket calculators have probably figured out that this method will guarantee the highest number of votes for the Conservative Party. Also, the visible growth in the ability to cooperate is a political factor.

The situation on the right side of the political field appears so peaceful now that the Conservative Party could easily shift its own center beyond the Social Democrats' rightwing.

Fear has already drawn even the Center Party's radicals into the Conservative Party. The Center Party's conservative members have never fitted in.

At present, Finnish domestic politics seem to be drifting without direction.

Anything can be expected from the Communist Party's majority; the Social Democrats are fumbling in their search for a new line and are moving to the right in fear of the Conservative Party, just as the Center Party is. The Conservative Party is moving to meet the others.

Nobody knows where the nation is going in the 1980's.

## Trade

The newly-elected party Secretary Jussi Isotalo said that the Conservative Party was more united than ever before in this decade.

That is what the situation looks like, from the outside. Tuure Junnila was not reelected to parliament and Ilkka Kanerva has been tamed with promises of increased influence.

But Isotalo knows well the wave of dissatisfaction that resulted from his candidacy. However, the question was not only of the election of the secretary but old grudges and tactics also surfaced.

Jussi Isotalo, "Democratically" nominated by Chairman Suominen for party secretary, raised widespread rebellion in the field. The organization leader received unconditional support only from the leaders of the Satakunta District which was his own district and also that of the party chairman.

The party secretary question was dealt with at length under these circumstances. The majority was against Isotalo, but for different reasons.

Rantaloma Co.'s managing director, Juhani Kivela, was nominated as candidate by the district of Keski-Suomi and also supported elsewhere but not everywhere.

It is worth mentioning that the parliament group's chairman, Pentti Sillantaus, was known to support Kivela.

On the morning of the election day, most of Isotalo's opposition had joined forces behind Jarmo Virnavirta.

At the same time, bargaining was going on to secure Isotalo's election. A known concession by Suominen was a promise that the position of the party secretary would be limited to a term of four years.

That is how Virnavirta was sold out.

The deal was primarily decided by the leaders of the Satakunta District including Ilkka Kanerva. Was Kanerva's motive a hope to be rewarded or a desire to prevent the promotion of a contemporary fellow politician?

The proposal to make the position of the party secretary one of a limited term already started to disintegrate in Hyvinkaa after the election of Isotalo. The chairman of the Satakunta District, i.e., Suominen's own district, was opposed to it and the matter was put to vote. The proposal to make the position one of a limited term won and a resolution was proposed. It will have to be seen whether it is ever carried out.



A term of four years seems strange. A party conference is held every other year and the party chairman's position is always automatically at stake. So why not the position of the party secretary if it is desirable to make the position one of a limited term?

### Big Day

Jussi Isotalo, 32, has a business degree. He has a wife but no children.

He is an experienced organization worker: secretary of the party's Satakunta District, secretary of the Youth Association as well as member of the Conservative Party's Central Bureau.

Sunday, 25 November 1979, was Jussi Isotalo's big day.

That day he entered into an elevator with its starting point high up but one not easy to go down in. Isotalo's position is now secure for nearly 6 years even though the party secretary's position may be given a limited term.

At the party conference, the election of Jussi Isotalo is routine business. History will tell that he was elected unanimously.

A knock with a gavel, the chairman's welcome speech and then the party secretary's own, well-rehearsed speech followed by flowers and a hug. So much for that.

In the hallway I asked him how he felt.

Nothing special, was the answer.

Jussi Isotalo received his important position with appealing humility. He praised the criticism directed against him as pertinent and educational.

Jussi Isotalo did not start to lead the Conservative Party's powerful divisions with fanfare. The choice of his style appeared correct. The propagandists of the competing parties, who had already started to belittle him in advance, may be in for a big disappointment. They will meet a tough adversary. Jussi Isotalo will surely be able to grow with his job.

However, the new party secretary's first task is likely to be the elimination of the controversy within the party caused by himself. Hyvinkaa was left with more than a handful of bitter party workers and appointed representatives; that could not be hidden by statements of unity or "sincere" congratulations.

If Jussi Isotalo in the tradition of a systematic organization worker makes a list of his adversaries, the list will be long.

## Suominen Urges: Bourgeoisie Should Start Presidential Negotiations

[Question] Why did you stubbornly insist on having your own candidate for party secretary?

[Answer] Only to prove that I will keep my word unless there is something to prove that I am wrong.

I considered him to be suitable for the position.

[Question] Due to this, will there remain some differences within the Conservative Party?

[Answer] No, there will not.

[Question] Is it true that tough negotiations were held for weeks on end?

[Answer] Yes, but in smaller circles. There the matter caused less sensation than an outsider could imagine.

[Question] In your speech you criticized two parties, the Social Democrats and the Center Party. Has the Conservative Party's chairman forgotten to criticize SKP [Finnish Communist Party]?

[Answer] I have generally considered it unwise to criticize other people's deeds. I am trying to present our alternatives.

The opposition has to keep the things the government did or did not do at least in some proportion, for example, the self-praise that Virolainen has engaged in.

On the other hand it is alarming if the nation allows itself to be bluffed by the Social Democrats' superficial self-criticism, and that the party, with the help of socialist ideology, is able to correct blunders caused in this country by that same socialist ideology.

[Question] Is the Conservative Party shifting to the left?

[Answer] No, it is not. The Conservative Party is a moderate, conservative party.

The area of political decision making is very narrow in Finland. All the parties have to propose an almost similar solution.

[Question] If the increased support of the Conservative Party and its ability to cooperate are in conflict, which will the party choose?

[Answer] They are not mutually exclusive. The party must strive for both.

These goals will not be in conflict until the Conservative Party is in the government. At that time, we have to keep both aspects in balance.

[Question] Is it too early to discuss the presidential question?

[Answer] I think that the bourgeoisie parties should pull themselves together and at least seriously consider different alternatives as well as start discussions on cooperation in a positive manner.

I do not discard the idea that Veikko Tavastilla presented to promote national unity. However, considering the reactions to that idea we have to see if the negotiations proposed by him have a chance of succeeding.

[Question] Many people are concerned about the fact that the bourgeoisie does not seem to have a popular candidate like Koivisto. How do you feel about it?

[Answer] That is a valid concern.

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CSO: 3107

## CP CHAIRMAN DEMANDS RETURNS TO STRICT PARTY DISCIPLINE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Oct 79 p 6

[Text] For the last 10 years the Finnish Communist Party has been deeply divided, but it could now perhaps be facing the possibility of internal settlement of this dispute. Last Saturday party Chairman Aarne Saarinen declared in a lead article in the party's major newspaper that the division must come to an end. He demands that the party's hardline minority faction give way and follow the decision of the majority.

Saarinen explains that 10 years of experience have provided a wealth of material for him to draw conclusions from. Since there have been no improvements despite repeated attempts to iron out the differences in internal discussions, Saarinen now sees no other way out than an overall return to a strict adherence to party discipline. This discipline assumes that decisions are followed regardless of whether they have been reached unanimously or through voting.

The Communist Party has been split into two factions for the last 10 years. The minority group, which often has been branded "Stalinist," has formed its own parallel organization within the party and advocates a line in terms of practical political matters which stands in sharp contrast to that of the majority. To state an example, the minority does not accept the Communist Party's collaboration in the government and its eleven members of the Riksdag often oppose government proposals. The democratic-communist group in the Riksdag has a total of 35 members. The fact that it has not come to a complete separation is probably to a large extent due to the attitude of the sister party in the Soviet Union. They often tell Finnish communists to try to restore the unity within their party lines. At the same time it seems as though each faction has its own special friends in the Soviet Communist Party. Generally it is thought that an open split within one of the largest communist parties in the Western world would look terribly bad. Therefore, the latest party congresses have been thoroughly prepared in order to present a good front.

Now Aarne Saarinen seems to have had enough of this division in his party. However, he says nothing about how he hopes to be able to restore the respect for party discipline which he demands. His article in KANSAN UUTISET is practically an ultimatum, even though he has said he does not really want to come with threats. The immediate aim seems to be that the next party congress should provide a turning point in the internal affairs of the party. This congress is to be held in a year and a half.

The party's minority sees Saarinen's move as another factor which will further decrease the possibilities for party unity. Minority leader Taisto Sinisalo hopes that Saarinen's purpose was not to pose an ultimatum. He still believes it is possible to bring about better unity through discussions and analyses of the various attitudes within the party. According to Sinisalo the differences of opinion do not concern the party program or basic goals, but pertain only to the ways in which this program and these goals should be carried out practically.

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CSO: 3109



## KOIVISTO GOVERNMENT HAS WEATHERED STORMS WELL

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Nov 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Government Cooperation"]

[Text] Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto's government, which has been in session for a half year, has so far handled its tasks better than what one could have expected from its slow start. It has made a sufficiently large number of decisions -- including relatively large decisions -- in which the parties have attempted to push through their own demands even by threatening to endanger government cooperation. However, no threat to be taken seriously has been presented within this government.

Also relations between the Government and the Diet seem for the most part to be in good shape. Indeed, political conflicts between ruling factions have arisen in certain agricultural issues, such as the obligation to announce transactions in the forest industry, but they have been relatively few. Most of the conflicts have occurred between the government and the opposition.

The greatest threat to government cooperation was presented by SDP Chairman Kalevi Sorsa's recent emphatic speech, in which he criticized the Center Party and the Communists for the fact that they "together attempted to push the Social Democrats into a corner" in various phases of the Kemi River conflict. He saw similar trends in other aspects of government policy and warned of a threat to the base of government as well as leftwing cooperation.

Reasons for discordant notes can be found from here and there, including the suspicions among ruling parties or party leaders that someone is "conspiring" behind their back. Some of the timely subjects are projects concerning political appointments as well as the slow progress of the so-called soil law in the government, the administrative dispute at the intermediate level, and so on. Differences are emphasized with even a certain purpose in mind because of the local elections.

A multiparty government is understandably not able to function without conflicts, even less so now that they are fed by internal conflicts in the Center Party and among the Communists. But no significant political cause for dissolution can be seen within the government anymore than in the serious dissension between the ruling parties. This gives reason to hope that the government will be able to concentrate on the forthcoming winter's economic policy.

10576

CSO: 3107

## SOVIETS 'READY' TO AID IN MINING PROJECT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Nov 79 p 30

[Article: "Soviet Union Ready to Exploit Ore Deposits in Kainuu"]

[Text] The Soviet Union is ready to assist the Finns in exploiting nonferrous metal deposits located in Sotkamo-Kainuu. The Soviets also want to increase purchases of agricultural products from Kainuu in order to expand border area trade.

In the near future the Outokumpu Corporation will begin a study on the concentration method of Talvivaara's nickel, copper, and zinc deposits in Harjavalta.

The exploitation of Talvivaara's deposits in cooperation with the Soviet Union was proposed by that country's trade representative M. V. Gubanov in Kajaani at a seminar dealing with economic cooperation between the two countries.

Gubanov justified his proposal by the fact that the Finns are constructing the Kostamus project on the Soviet side of the border.

"Why not also think about a large joint construction project on Finnish territory. Most recently the Soviets have built an atomic power plant at Loviisa together with the Finns."

The Soviet Union has considerable experience in the finding as well as exploitation of nonferrous metals, stated Gubanov "and in this we can be of assistance to the Finns."

The metal content of the Talvivaara deposits in Sotkamo are comparatively small, but there is a lot of ore and it can be quarried as an open pit mine. The Outokumpu Corporation has begun a study of the concentration method, which is relatively difficult since the ore is mixed in with a black slate. As far as is known the company intends in the near future to decide on an experimental concentration in Harjavalta.

The Talvivaara rock contains an average of only 0.27 percent nickel, 0.15 percent copper, and 0.55 percent zinc.

#### Iron Works in Kostamus

According to certain sources the Soviet Union is planning to build an iron works in connection with the iron ore mine in Kostamus. This plant could possibly use ore from Sotkomo as an additional item for processing.

The Soviet Union is also interested in exploiting the apatite deposits in Sokli, stated Gubanov. The reports by Rautaruuki concerning the profitability of exploiting this ore will soon be ready. Kemira, however, still needs additional samples and, therefore, the test runs on concentration will still have to be conducted in the first part of next year.

"It appears that it is not worthwhile for Sokli to exploit this ore on a purely commercial basis, but national economic points of view are yet to be weighed," stated Counselor of Mining Helge Haavisto.

#### More Butter to the Soviet Union

Trade representative M. V. Gubanov also announced that the Soviet Union is prepared to buy more agricultural products from the area of Kainuu. This trade for the Finns would primarily consist of butter and powdered milk.

The expansion of agricultural trade would occur within the framework of border area trade. Therefore, the Finns should find suitable products from the selection of Lenfintorg, the Soviet Union's border trade firm, stated Gubanov. He urged the Finns to study the areas in which agreement can be reached on subcontracts and joint production using Soviet minerals and semifinished products.

The Soviet Union would like to have greater certainty in the future with respect to the exports of their machinery and equipment to Finland. Gubanov stated that Soviet organizations could participate in Finnish projects by delivering machinery to power plants, mines, and concentration plants, for example.

He admitted that Finnish enterprises have the most and longest experience in the construction of various construction sites in the Soviet Union.

#### Negotiations Being Sought

Counselor of Mining Kauko Rastas stated that negotiations on the next phase of Kostamus should be initiated as soon as possible.

"In Svetogorsk we have already painfully experienced the fact that the work of the first phase is already completed and it has become necessary to begin the work of the second phase almost from scratch. To begin this project from scratch again raises its price and increases the time needed for its completion," stated Rastas.

He hoped that negotiations on the second phase of Kostamus could begin with the Soviet Union at the next meeting of the joint economic commission in the beginning of December.

If negotiations do not commence by the beginning of next year, Pastas fears that this large project will have to be dismantled in the interim. Since negotiations according to his estimate last at least 2 years and since the construction timetable has also fallen behind, there is no time to defer.

Pastas estimated that the competitive ability of the Finns is now in a better position than it was earlier.

In the corridors where the seminar was held there was in several connections entertainment of the concept that the Finns could continue to work at Kostamus even after the mining industrial combine is completed. In the future Kostamus will be delivering pellets to Rautaruuki in Raahе.

Both Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen (Center Party) and Labor Minister Arvo Aalto (Communist) considered the concept to be possible.

"However, there have been no official negotiations with the Soviet Union. Because of such a new system several issues will have to be clarified," stated Vayrynen.

According to Aalto the idea has been brought up in several connections. It has been proposed by both sides.

"It would first require a framework agreement between the states, after that enterprises could mutually agree on the use of a labor force," he stated.

The Soviet Union has several such projects in its border areas where workers from a neighboring country cross the border every day to go to work. Those who have promoted the idea in Kainuu propose that the Finns could live in Vartiоs on the Finnish side of the border and could daily make the 40 kilometer trip to Kostamus. They would be on Rautaruuki's payroll and it could reach an agreement with the Soviet firm on how their wages would be compensated.

10576

CSO: 3107

## OFFICER COMMENTS ON 1980 DEFENSE BUDGET SHORTCOMINGS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Dec 79 p 2

[Commentary by General Staff Lt Col Juhani A. Niska: "National Defense Appropriations: The Portion of Our GNP Expended for Defense Is Europe's Second Smallest"]

[Text] The proposed appropriations for military ground defense in next year's budget amount to about 5.2 percent of total government expenditures. With the funds granted, the armed forces will complete the tasks assigned to them in the 1974 law. Among others, constant, round-the-clock watch over and protection of our territorial inviolability are required as well as training of all personnel, General Staff Lt Col Juhani A. Niska, the head of the General Staff Planning Division, writes.

In comparison with Europe in general, our defense expenditures are particularly low. Regardless of their military policy positions, other neutral states generally feel that they require considerably larger investments in military ground defense.

The Defense Ministry administration has been presented with an income and expenditures estimate for 1980 of 2.574 billion marks. Of this, 2.545 billion will be used for military ground defense expenditures. This sum does not include industrial and commercial operations conducted by the Defense Ministry.

All of the administration's main-entry expenditures will go up by 24 percent in 1980 in comparison with the previous year's original income and expenditures estimate. The rate of increase is, however, an apparent one, since the 1979 budget did not, for example, include additional trade with the Soviet Union which had been budgeted in the supplementary expenditures estimate. If we deduct the previously decided on supplementary purchases and training equipment procurements from the 1980 proposal, the increase in expenditures comes to 10 percent, as against an overall budget increase of 12 percent.



## Armed Forces Employ 20,000

Examining the details of the defense expenditures proposal, we note that 750 million marks are to be used to pay the salaries of personnel. The armed forces employ about 20,000 people at the present time. When we also include personnel paid under other titles, the sum paid out in salaries is actually close to a billion marks. The armed forces need to permanently employ 240 technical personnel and about 1,000 enlisted men and women, among others.

One-ninth of the proposed sum (just under 300 million marks) is to be used for obligatory military service maintenance expenditures. That amount will pay for 10 million days of full care, which also include medical care and daily allowances for recruits. A hundredth (about 20 million) is to be used for special training expenditures.

About one-eighth of the appropriations (about 300 million) are property expenditures. With these funds, about 350,000 cubic meters of new buildings will be erected and buildings comprising over 10 million cubic meters of space to be heated will be maintained.

About 1.2 billion marks will be used for maintaining daily armed forces operations and defense capability. Of this, 340 million will be used for equipment operation and maintenance, not quite 500 million for basic procurements, just under 310 million for equipment renewal and about 40 million for other expenditures.

To handle their daily assignments, in addition to missiles and aircraft, the armed forces operate, among others, about 150 ships, 4,000 motor vehicles — which are driven over 30 million km in a year — hundreds of radar devices, communications equipment and various kinds of combat and engineering equipment. These all require maintenance, worn and obsolete equipment has to be replaced and surveillance and training must be constantly maintained.

## 806 Million Marks for Military Equipment Procurements

Taking into account the increase in costs between January 1976 and January 1980, the amount appropriated for military equipment procurements, 806 million, conforms to the Second Parliamentary Defense Committee recommendation. Significant points are Mig-21-bis and anti-aircraft missile equipment, Hawk training fighters and deliveries that produce employment for the docks. Requisition authorizations granted to replace equipment now in use that has become obsolete account for part of the appropriations.

Other appropriations will be used to procure special equipment needed for troops in Northern Finland, to procure communications equipment (among other things, domestic field radios), mapping and air-target towing equipment and to replace motor vehicles. The new requisition authorizations will come to 42 million marks in 1980. Foreign exchange rate payments, among others, will account for 85 million.

Among others, the budget includes as a new expenditure a proposal to increase the number of reservists subject to a second term of field exercises by 3,000. This measure — and continuation of the same — is indispensable if we consider it from the standpoint of our territorial defense policy. It also conforms to the defense committee recommendation, even though it should have gone into effect in 1977. The increase in expenditures represents about 20 percent of the calculated annual saving produced by the reduction in the number of recruits during 1976-1980.

### Significant Shortcomings

In examining next year's equipment expenditures, we must remember too developments that have taken place since the wars.

In practice, existing equipment dating back to the last wars has become obsolete. After the wars, basic procurements were not initiated until the mid-1950's. In the 1960's the so-called H-program (emergency program) was instituted. We were able to complete that procurement program.

The next development program, the so-called K-program, was only 38-percent completed. The so-called PV-program instituted at the end of the 1960's was never begun. Thus when the First Parliamentary Defense Committee began its deliberations the basic procurements backlog was a quite significant one.

The committee's basic procurement program for 1972-1976 contained primarily procurements to serve our territorial surveillance capability. The committee's appropriations fell 300 million marks short of the mark, corresponding to about a year's worth of basic procurements. Expenditures accounted for from 1.21 to 1.34 percent of the GNP.

The Second Parliamentary Defense Committee is in the process of making its recommendations for 1977-1981. The committee has recommended an outlay of 2.3 billion January 1976 marks for military equipment procurements. The committee has reached a decision whereby an effort will be made to preserve our surveillance and defense capability and to replace obsolete systems.

This will not lead to a proper increase in material readiness. For example, the anti-aircraft missile system to be procured will replace obsolete, heavy anti-aircraft guns. The committee's recommendation to set up a brigade at Sodankyla indicates that it recognized the importance of ground forces as a preventive factor.

The development of military ground defense capability along with the training of personnel and procurements of military equipment is a particularly long-drawn-out affair. For the above-mentioned reasons, significant shortcomings have arisen in many branches and particularly among the ground forces. Under normal circumstances they can be eliminated but, when a crisis erupts, it is much more difficult and in part even impossible.

Independently of day-to-day changes in the situation, the long period of time involved serves as a condition for us to in practice be able to gain and maintain for our country an indispensable foreign confidence in our security policy line.

#### Defense Expenditures and Recommendations

In the light of the 1980 budget proposal, we can examine the 1977-1980 appropriations situation as compared with committee recommendations.

Expenditures for salaries have been somewhat excessive even though recommended increases in personnel were not in all respects achieved. Special expenditure appropriations for the maintenance of obligatory military service and training are practically at recommended levels. Military equipment basic procurement and renewal appropriations will be slightly below the recommended amounts.

Expenditures for operation and maintenance of equipment have been significantly lower than those allowed for in the recommendations. The 1980 deficit will be about 100 million marks, or on the average one-fourth of overall needs. This means that our potential for surveillance, defense and training systems now in use cannot be exploited to its full extent.

Armed forces property and other expenditures will slightly exceed recommended levels. This is particularly attributable to a rise in heating costs and expanded employment. Defense expenditures accounted for from 1.38 to 1.41 percent of the GNP in 1977-1979.

Generally considered, in terms of going prices overall expenditures have annually been from about 60 to 90 million marks under recommended levels, in accordance with which it is estimated that they account for 5.35 percent of government expenditures. The 1980 deficit will be about 100 million. Thus in light of the 1978 committee deliberations as well as the budget proposal, the likelihood of a big deficit budget is unfounded.

#### Comparison with Other Countries

The share of the GNP accounted for by defense expenditures gives us a picture of the government's use of funds for military purposes. A direct comparison with other countries' defense expenditures does not, however, in itself give a proper picture of the situation. One reason for this is the extremely low level of our departure point and another is each nation's own needs and present levels of equipment.

The list of military expenditures incurred by the big powers (about 5-14 percent of the GNP) includes procurements of nuclear weaponry, ICBM systems, long-range bombers, nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers for global needs, among others (compare SALT negotiations).

Simultaneously, they maintain and develop mid-range missile and assault capability and, in addition to defense troops, also troops capable of operating in enemy territory, air and naval forces.

With the aid of their military appropriations (about 3.5-6 percent of the GNP), the big industrialized nations share in military alliance expenditures and maintain limited nuclear strike capability (England, France, among others) and powerful air and naval forces as well as ground forces pools organized in accordance with the big powers and equipped with highly advanced armor and artillery missiles.

Nations outside these alliances invest from about 1.2 percent (Austria) to 5.2 percent (Yugoslavia) of their GNP in defense expenditures. Finland's percentage is Europe's second smallest. Actually, according to some estimates, Austria, which has no navy — no more so than Switzerland (expenditures amounting to 1.9 percent of the GNP) — may spend more than Finland.

#### Sweden's Expenditures 4 Times As Much

Per capita, for example, the Norwegians invest 3 times as much as the Finns in defense and the Swedes nearly 4 times as much. We really cannot complain about the size of our security insurance premiums.

Judging by European standards, our country's defense expenditures are extremely low. Regardless of their attitudes toward military policy, the other neutral states feel the need for investing generally significantly larger sums in military ground defense.

In general, the attainment of given levels of training and defense equipment costs us the same as it does others. The development of a credible and preventive defense capability implies sufficient funding in addition to the existing will to defend ourselves.

In peacetime too, to the important role of security policy in terms of defense measures and their dimensions — which foreign powers are no doubt constantly evaluating — we must add foreign confidence in the fact that we are conducting a neutral foreign policy, desirous of peace.

In today's world, getting the relative level of our defense expenditures to better correspond to the tasks assigned to the armed forces lessens no nation's belief in Finland's desire for peace; rather it increases confidence in our efforts and ability to steer clear of foreign entanglements and thus reduce any danger of conflict beforehand.

#### Finland Is Part of a Whole

The Second Parliamentary Defense Committee asserted: "In developing and maintaining its military ground defenses in peacetime, it is important for Finland to create a defense capability aimed at stubbornly defending our country in situations that can be gauged beforehand. As the need arises,

this can be achieved through the application of YYA [mutual aid and cooperation] agreements which benefit both parties to the agreement."



Such a capability, which under the best of circumstances would spare the nation destruction through war, can be created on a long-term basis with the aid of defense budgets. With their help we can recruit and train personnel and provide them with the necessary equipment to operate with. This can be accomplished with moderate economic resources because defense systems are always cheaper than offense systems.

Domestic industry is capable of and can produce the defense equipment that corresponds to our needs. As a nation that adheres to a policy of neutrality, we can procure from outside the country that equipment which for various reasons it either does not pay to procure or cannot be procured in Finland. It can be procured from those countries which offer us the best terms, which is a significant advantage.

Finland is a part of Northern Europe and through it the entire whole of European military policy. In terms of benefit to Finland, there can be no undermining of the Northern Europe — including the Arctic and Baltic areas — security policy situation.

Finland must firmly continue to develop its preventive defense capability as a part of its peace-seeking security policy. In this way we will best serve — aside from ourselves — the interests of all the other Arctic states as well. Against this background we must construct and evaluate both our present and future military ground defense budgets. We will have to make the pertinent decisions ourselves. And we too will have to assume the consequences.





Key:

1. Percentage of GNP represented by defense expenditures
2. GDR
3. Yugoslavia
4. Sweden
5. FRG
6. Norway
7. Denmark
8. Switzerland
9. Finland
10. Austria
11. Per capita 1979 defense expenditures
12. Source

11,466

CSO: 3107

## 'LE FIGARO' WEIGHS ALTERNATIVES OF FRENCH RESPONSE TO AFGHAN EVENTS

LD181135 Paris LE FIGARO in French 16 Jan 80 pp 1, 3 LD

[Article by Paul-Marie de la Gorce: "Controversy Over Afghanistan"]

[Text] In connection with the Afghanistan affair, French policy has given rise to a controversy in which two schools of thought, two interpretations and two analyses confront each other.

From Edmond Maire to the traditional opponents of French foreign policy and including Francois Mitterrand, who has recovered the tone of voice in which he once condemned France's decision to withdraw from NATO, and even through more unexpected reservations voiced by certain Rally for the Republic [RPR] members, a school of thought is taking shape to demand that a more decisive and more categorical attitude be adopted. It appears that what is wanted is a response to a major threat, by means of counteraction on a scale commensurate with this threat, but falling short of war. And all Western countries should, it seems, participate in such counteraction. Care should be taken to prevent any fissure however narrow opening up between Europe and America; the Soviet Union should be condemned in a similar manner and in similar terms by all concerned and similar retaliatory measures should be adopted and, if possible, similar economic sanctions too.

Supporters of this school of thought must surely be aware of the possible economic consequences of such policy for France, its external exchanges and its international relations. However, they believe that what counts is responding to Soviet action by mobilizing all the adversaries of the Soviet Union and stepping up hostile acts which would make it clear that if Moscow were to advance any further, the response would be even harsher and more threatening to its interests.

In any case, they believe that embargo measures with respect to agricultural and food products will prove effective since the USSR will either have to face serious supply difficulties or increase its investments in the agricultural sphere to the detriment of its industry and armaments or be unable to go on helping its poorest allies who need essential products

most--countries like Vietnam, Kampuchea, Angola, Ethiopia and, especially, Afghanistan. It is generally admitted--albeit tacitly as a rule--that sanctions would probably have damaging effects for Western economy but it is believed that the Soviet Union would be hurt even more badly.

Right from the beginning, the government's analysis has been completely different. It explains the government's initial reaction. And even though some official statements were later made with a view to answering the expectations of critics of French policy--in which task they were only partly successful--they have obviously failed to resolve the existing contradictions between the attitude chosen by France--and, for different reasons, the FRG--and the attitude which the United States wanted to see adopted and which Great Britain has in fact adopted.

Well, what sort of analysis is it?

But to begin with let us ask whether the United States intended to react militarily to Soviet intervention. The answer is "no." It appears that Washington did not even consider this possibility. The conclusion to be drawn from this was clear: the Soviets would remain in Afghanistan.

Was it thus necessary, as the Americans wanted, to take economic sanctions? Experience suggests that they are not effective. Before the war sanctions against Italy because of Ethiopia came to nothing. Closing the Franco-Spanish border in 1946 did not bring Franco down.

Rhodesia, under sanctions applied by the United Nations and thus the whole international community, experienced a period of great prosperity. More recently, the main allies of the United States affirmed that they would not take over U.S. purchases of Iranian oil after the embargo in response to the hostage question.

Ten days ago the two leading British oil companies, Shell and BP, with their government's agreement signed new contracts with the Iranian company not only at higher prices--about \$30 a barrel--but exceeding previous agreements since they provide for 50 percent profit-sharing by Iran in the profits from refining these exports. Naturally the Japanese will adopt the same line and there is no reason for other companies not to follow them nor that they should be blamed for it.

The crux of the matter must not be hidden: economic weapons can cut two ways. Already the natural effect of Washington's embargo on Iranian oil has been to increase the price since the United States has now bought on other markets. Next, the halt in U.S. cereal exports to the USSR will lower their price on the world market and will increase still further the compensation that the EEC--in practice all of us--will have to shell out to farmers for any amount exported. The Americans will seek to sell elsewhere the technology, machine tools and equipment that they will no longer be selling to communist countries. And the international recession can only have a depressing effect on the Western economy.

In this kind of question--and the facts quoted are a stern reminder--what must count are national interests. France must defend its own interests--nobody else will defend them for it. In recent years its foreign trade has only been balanced or nearly balanced by its profit from trade with the Third World and socialist countries. There cannot be a moment's doubt that any place lost or abandoned will be occupied sooner or later by others. Moreover, is it clear that Soviet ambitions will be better contained by aggravating the West's economic crisis? Those making this analysis--above all the French Government--have not concluded that nothing is to be done. On the contrary they must act on the most important ground, the political one. One of the major results of the Afghan problem has been the censure of much of the Third World towards the Soviet Union, and even a new hostility to it.

This is particularly true of most of the Middle East states, either because they are geographically close to Afghanistan or because they wish to show "Islamic" solidarity with the Afghan rebellion. In fact, to quote the expression used by spokesmen, this is not so much an East-West crisis as an East-South confrontation. This is a new factor which must be exploited.

If this is the French Government's intention, if it is prepared to take this path without giving the impression that it is secretly giving way to the opposite theory--which would strip it of all credibility--and if it intends to use all its means of political and economic action, there are grounds for approving its choice. Foreign policy is a sphere which is devoid of pity. It cannot be based on either emotions or fine words.

The best solution does not lie in economic sanctions which would harm France and Europe first, nor in empty gestures in connection with the Olympic Games or cultural exchanges. It lies in directing, consolidating and exploiting the reactions of a large number of nonaligned countries to the Afghan affair by strengthening their desire for and ability to show independence, especially in the Middle East which is the region most directly concerned of all the international crisis.

It is there that France can play a major role. Its authority lies in the fact that it sets an example as far as independence is concerned. It is better able to act than the United States, which was for a long time suspect in the eyes of many countries in the region, especially because of its preferential support for Israel, and this is particularly true since France continues to follow a policy distinct from U.S. policy. To do this France does not need to abandon or dilute its foreign policy. Quite the reverse: It must highlight the character of this policy.

CSO: 3100



REPORT ON SPEECH BY PCF'S ANSART IN EC PARLIAMENT'S AFGHANISTAN DEBATE

LD230857 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 17 Jan 80 p 9 LD

[Unattributed report: "Imperialism Is Threatening Detente"]

[Excerpt] Strasbourg, 16 Jan--[PCF Politburo member and EC Parliament group leader] Gustave Ansart made the following statement during the European Assembly debate on the situation in Afghanistan:

"We are now living in a world which has changed radically over the past few decades--a world characterized by the rise of new ideas and of socialism. It is a world in which hundreds of millions of men aspire to eat their fill and to live happy and free at last.

"Scarcely 2 years ago Afghanistan rebelled against a feudal power and installed a new government.

"Like Afghanistan, many peoples have been liberated or are trying to liberate themselves from obscurantism and colonialism.

"The United States and its allies do not accept these aspirations in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia. To recover their lost positions they are interfering in the lives of peoples in many forms, not hesitating to use force.

"It must be stopped--this repeated interference which is jeopardizing detente.

"The French communists for their part have always fought for the sovereignty and freedom of peoples, for their right to choose their future freely and for noninterference in their internal affairs.

"However, these essential principles governing international relations have no foundation unless they are based on a balance of strength sufficient to deter any imperialist venture.

in return from the Soviet authorities that they conform on this occasion to normal standards of behavior; participation of all the countries recognized by the ICC; a liberal policy of granting visas to potential spectators as well as to all professional journalists; and distribution of the Western press in Moscow during the games, even though the Soviets, contrary to the Helsinki Agreement, are not allowing this at the present.

CSO: 3100

## PSF'S ATTITUDE TOWARD RECENT WORLD EVENTS DERIDED

LD151459 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 10 Jan 80 pp 1, 8 LD

[Article by Rene Andrieu: "Imperial Ideology"]

[Text] The attitude adopted by the French Socialist Party toward recent international problems throws new light on its responsibility for the collapse of the union of the left in 1978. Whether with respect to the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe or the situation in Kampuchea, Iran and Afghanistan, it has constantly appeared, despite the tone assumed, as essentially and strictly taking its cue from Washington's theses.

When the American leaders decided to deploy 600 new nuclear missiles in Europe, Francois Mitterrand justified this initiative without hesitation even though it gave a dangerous new impetus to the arms race. "We do not want to see any imbalance between East and West," he stated. "Since experts take the view that Pershing missiles are necessary to insure a balance, we support the idea."

In other words, since (American) experts have put forward this argument it is bound to be justifiable. It is of no importance that it has been contradicted by innumerable statements by NATO leaders--from Carter to Helmut Schmidt--stressing the superiority of the Atlantic Pact military forces over Warsaw Pact forces. The socialists' immediate reflex is to agree with Washington. In the National Assembly, socialist deputies refused to support a vote of censure and furthermore Francois Mitterrand achieved real success among rightist benches by fiercely attacking communists and warmly supporting Atlantic policy.

The situation in Kampuchea? The Socialist Party supports the government's maneuvers aimed at getting a coalition consisting of Sihanouk and Pol Pot's friends into the saddle again. Even though such a venture shows no great promise, it nonetheless is an indication of an orientation. In any case, it was a socialist--Claude Cheysson, a member of the European Commission in which he is in charge of "relations with the Third World"--who took the initiative with respect to a suspension of EEC grain exports. In the absence of any other he plans to use the "food weapon" against Afghanistan.

In Iran, where a huge popular wave in support of national dignity and against imperialism is gaining strength, the Socialist Party apparently sees nothing except the foam. It demands the release of the U.S. Embassy personnel but relegates to the background the shah's crimes and U.S. responsibilities for the creation in Iran of a bloody regime of terror.

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has given the Socialist press an opportunity for outbidding the rightist press in invectives against...the French communists. Claude Estier takes up arms against us in defense of the United States which--if he is to be believed--is as white as the snow of Afghan mountain tops. It appears that "L'HUMANITE has entirely misrepresented the situation" by asserting that Washington "has fanned tensions" in that region of the world (this would indeed be the first time ever). The training camps for rebels in Pakistan, and the money and weapons which the rebels receive from the CIA--everybody talks about this except Estier who sees in it all only gross slander and repeats the same old story about our unconditional support for Moscow. While insisting--obviously, in all frankness--that he is not a man to use such arguments.

A conclusion must be drawn from this brief survey. There is no important international problem which Francois Mitterrand and his friends do not see in the same light as the European right and Washington. The joint program which emphasized the need to aim at disarmament and detente and to pursue a policy independent of military blocs has definitely been abandoned. In the light of the policy pursued by the socialist leaders today it is understandable that they could have seen it as a strait-jacket yesterday. In fact, looking beyond any dissimilarities between various situations, you can perceive the weight of Atlanticism and imperial ideology in their attitude toward European missiles, Kampuchea, Iran and Afghanistan. With reference to Khomeyni, you can notice a revival of feelings which in the past made a socialist leader compare Al-Nasir with Hitler because An-Nasir was bold enough to nationalize the Suez Canal.

"The preservation of the Atlantic Alliance cannot mean acquiescence in American strategy," it is stated in the socialist draft resolution which is to be submitted to the national convention next weekend. It is regrettable that this statement of principle, which is aimed at pleasing militants, is so brutally belied by the party's daily practice.

CSO: 3100

## CARTER'S U.S. FOREIGN POLICY CHANGES VIEWED

LD151331 Paris LE FIGARO in French 11 Jan 80 p 2 LD

[Dispatch by Charles Lanbroschine: "From Utopia to Realism: A New Carter"]

[Text] Washington--Defense Secretary Harold Brown's visit to China confirms that henceforth the United States and China have common strategic objectives and that Carter could stop maintaining the equal balance between Beijing and Moscow. Thus he is perhaps ready to play "the China card."

The reversal regarding Pakistan has been more clearcut. Last March the White House suspended all military aid to the Islamabad government suspecting the latter of wanting to arm itself with the atomic bomb. Now the President is prepared to put before Congress a plan to deliver arms to Pakistan.

Carter, who had inaugurated his mandate by ordering the repatriation of some of the troops stationed in Korea, is today planning to send the GI's to bases in the Middle East or the Horn of Africa. Finally, it is probable that the United States is going to try to reshape its relations with its traditional allies.

Israel (at all events after the November 1980 presidential elections) will find itself subjected to new pressures to resolve the Palestinian problem. Faced by the risk of revolutionary contagion because of Iran, such a ruling would clearly constitute the best means of stabilizing the whole region.

These wide-ranging initiatives point to a strategic plan which greatly exceeds the economic reprisal measures decreed against the Soviet Union. In fact, Carter is abandoning the moralizing crusade on which he had founded his diplomatic credo for 3 years to resume with cold realism what he had so strongly criticized in Henry Kissinger.

In 1977, at the inauguration of the new administration, the obsession with competition with the USSR was to yield to the need for rapprochement



with the Third World. The battle for human rights was to constitute the very basis of this new philosophy and of relations between states.

Not only as regards Moscow but, also--so as to afford a better chance for the North-South dialog--with regard to its "friends": Argentina, China and the Philippines...America, the world's first democracy, was going to practice what it preached. Washington was counting on opposing nuclear proliferation by ostracizing Pakistan as well as South Africa and would no longer consider the arms trade except as an exceptional diplomatic instrument.

#### USSR the Prior Concern

Having become a "subversive" power by choosing the side of the oppressed against the oppressor, America is affording itself the capability of succeeding on two fronts, foreign and domestic. Zbigniew Brzezinski declared for foreign consumption:

"Our message is revolutionary, for it is henceforth the United States which is in history's mainstream." For home consumption, Vice President Mondale insisted: "The Americans are finally going to have at their disposal a diplomacy which will warm their hearts."

From the Kissinger-style "realpolitik" Carter is now taking up again the idea that the USSR is to be Washington's prior concern. From the once-planned crusade he retains the conviction, however, that the present multipolar world is too complicated to be reduced to a simple confrontation between Washington and Moscow. The whole problem consists precisely in knowing whether, in the words of former Assistant Secretary of State Frederick Dutton, the United States can show itself capable of "playing a game of chess on several planes at the same time."

A warning from Dutton, who recently confided in a CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR journalist: "The Americans' instinctive reaction would be to sign a new alliance treaty. We like concrete things. We like to simplify things. Now, it would be dangerous to enlist the Persian Gulf countries in an East-West battle."

In essence, the United States must favor the appearance of an Islamic front, but must not take command of it.

This is the same worry which concerns certain of Washington's allies when they question the advisability of sanctions against Iran. While the Americans want to intensify the pressure in the hope that, in Teheran, the moderates will win out against the radicals, numerous experts assert that such a policy will, on the contrary, result in uniting the Iranians against the United States. The advice of the experts: "Turn the spotlights off the current situation and wait until the Soviet tanks in Afghanistan do the work for you," that is, until the Iranians discover that the enemy is Moscow and not Washington.

Carter's moralizing naivety shows through again. Thus, in a recent television interview, he remarked: "I have learned more about the Russians in 1 week than in 3 years." Nevertheless, one must recognize in the President that, in the past, he has known how to accumulate trump-cards which are very useful now.

The Camp David agreements and the rapprochement with Africa have shown that the United States was not always the opponent of the world's damned. The modernization of the U.S. armed forces, especially with regard to the European nuclear theater, and the harmony with Beijing have lessened the impression that Washington had chosen withdrawal.

Provided, once woken, it shows itself equally subtle, America certainly has the means to be no longer a "Gulliver tied down with string."

CSO: 3100

## INDUSTRIAL FIRMS EYE EMBARGOED U.S. CONTRACTS IN USSR

LD231323 Paris LE MONDE in French 22 Jan 80 p 6 LD

[Dispatch by Daniel Vernet: "Moscow Intends To Show Its Desire To Pursue Cooperation With Paris"]

[Excerpts] Moscow--Franco-Soviet cooperation is continuing as if nothing had happened in Afghanistan: National Assembly Chairman Chaban-Delmas arrives in Moscow this Monday, 21 January, for a 10-day visit at the supreme Soviet's invitation. This visit has been planned since last fall.

Indeed, cultural cooperation is continuing normally. The meeting of the joint Franco-Soviet committee for the cinema which was held in Moscow last week ended with the signing of a 1980-1981 draft agreement making provision for the joint production of historical films and scientific documentaries.

Economic cooperation could even be boosted following the retaliatory measures taken by President Carter. After the mediocre results of these last 3 years in the sphere of industrial contracts, French business circles were quite worried about the possible development of Soviet-American relations a few months ago. They feared that after the ratification of SALT II the Senate might lift the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which poses obstacles to U.S.-USSR trade, and that Washington might grant Moscow most favored nation status. The opening of Soviet borders to American companies would have worsened competition conditions and, with the help of the American economy's prestige, European and especially French companies were in serious danger of finding themselves on short rations.

This fear has been temporarily removed. Industrial circles think they will be able to take advantage of the ban placed on American firms by the Carter administration on giving advanced technology to the USSR. In 1978, when the U.S. President banned the sale of a computer to TASS as a protest against the trial of dissidents, International Computers and Honeywell-Bull immediately prepared to win the deal. The French are in a good position for several major deals: the big contract for building an aluminum complex at Sayansk in Siberia, which is worth over FR3 billion, is likely to be lost by Alcoa--the American competitor of Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlman--which has long been in line for it; the construction of a silicon sheet mill by Aramco (the contract was signed on 18 December) could be reconsidered and the Soviets could once again turn to Creusot-Loire.

However, there are still two drawbacks: on the one hand, in view of its internal economic problems, it is by no means certain that the USSR will acquire a large amount of Western technology over the next year and, on the other, it is possible that the embargo imposed by President Carter could be extended to U.S. licenses acquired by European enterprises.

CSO: 3100

## ANTICOMMUNIST 'HYSTERIA' IN FRANCE HIT

LD161059 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 14 Jan 80 p 6 LD

[Article by Paul Laurent: "Lies! Lies! Lies!"]

[Text] With reference to events in Afghanistan, we have witnessed in the past hours an outburst of fury amounting to hysteria against our party and its secretary general by forces ranging from the right to the Socialist Party. All pretexts are deemed good enough to caricature and completely distort reality and conceal the point of the question.

There have been many revealing examples of this manipulation of facts. Take the case of the fuss which followed Georges Marchais' appraisal of Pierre Joxe. But where has Pierre Joxe's initial step been mentioned in all this? Through the intermediary of the French Government and just before Georges Marchais' appearance on television, a socialist leader sent Marchais a provocative telegram in which he insulted Marchais by questioning his personal courage. And Georges Marchais was supposed to thank Joxe for this! This is a distortion of facts which has, in addition, made it possible to conceal the real and essential content of our secretary general's television interview.

This also applies to the theme of our "alignement" with Moscow, which has been harped on to such an extent that people have been numbed by it. Not a word has been said about the fact that the communique issued at the end of the Moscow meeting is, in the eyes of French Communists, completely consistent with their 23d congress. Nor has a single word been said about all the points in Georges Marchais' television statement which confirmed in every respect the affirmation of the PCF's independent positions.

As for alignment, there has only been one and it has indeed been real. I refer to a complete alignment, throughout recent days, by the Socialist Party and Giscard d'Estaing on the positions of American imperialism and its leader Carter. <sup>™</sup> is the limit: at the very moment when the joint Mitterrand-Giscard anticommunist front has reached its peak, the communists are being accused of doing the union of the left a disservice, now we have seen everything, as they say.

If you add to all this the stories about what is supposed to be happening in the PCF ranks--the journal DU DIMANCHE, for instance, sees us in its dreams in dire difficulties--you will have added the final touch.



Unfortunately, for those who have been getting so excited, all this has nothing to do with reality. Throughout the country communists in large numbers have been supporting their party's leadership and have staged a counteroffensive against lies, austerity and unemployment and in support of peace, disarmament and internationalist solidarity. Both in the world and in France a retreating, crisis-ridden imperialism is trying to rewind the old springs of anticommunism in order to weaken our party. Once again the workers will thwart these efforts.

CSO: 3100

## EUROPE SEEN FACING SOVIET DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE

LD161501 Paris LE MONDE in French 15 Jan 80 p 1 LD

[Editorial: "Mr Brezhnev and Europe"]

[Text] Are the Soviet leaders surprised by the vigor of American reactions to the Afghanistan invasion? Had they seriously underestimated Mr Carter? Had they gambled on the hesitations and uncertainties of a president whose first years of office have been marked by doubt, many about-turns, and a certain inability to define and then apply a policy?

One can justifiably ask oneself these questions reading Mr Brezhnev's declarations published 13 January in PRAVDA. Officially it is an interview with the Soviet Number-one, but one can be sure that the terms of the answers, like those of the questions, were carefully weighed. Leaving aside the improbable explanations put forward once more to try to justify the Soviet intervention, the general secretary's remarks confirm the USSR's surprise at Mr Carter's sanctions and, undoubtedly too, at the condemnation of the "Kabul coup" by the totality of European capitals and a good number of nonaligned countries.

The intervention in Afghanistan, Mr Brezhnev emphasizes, not without false naivete, does not however affect "U.S. national interests or security..." "Allegations that the Soviet Union has expansionist designs on Pakistan, Iran or other countries in this region are lies," the general secretary adds again.

The concern arising from Mr Brezhnev's words is understandable. In a few days the Kremlin has succeeded in strengthening a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement which did not seem clear a few weeks ago, in compromising definitively, no doubt, the ratification of the SALT II agreement, in considerably lessening the tension between Washington and Islamabad, in deeply antagonizing the West European countries, in worrying a great number of Third World nations, in complicating Soviet-Iranian relations and above all in accentuating the U.S. "patriotic revival" already started by Ayatollah Khomeini.

This is a balance which is more than "totally negative" to which we must not forget to add the cost--financial but above all human--of the military operations in Afghanistan. It is customary to say that there is no public

opinion in the USSR. This is only partly true: We can be sure that the return of coffins from Afghanistan will create deep unease among the Soviets.

Faced with such results, it is normal for the Kremlin to try to go on to the offensive diplomatically. Western Europe, from this point of view, seems the most appropriate place to launch an overture, to make people forget the Afghan invasion, to drive a wedge into Atlantic solidarity and to try to prove that detente is still current. This is why Moscow has taken care to concentrate its attacks until now on Washington and to spare the European leaders, "guilty" nevertheless of having condemned the armed coup in Kabul. Thus Mr Brezhnev, switching the responsibility, accuses the United States of using events in Afghanistan as a pretext for compromising detente. Thus the general secretary's declaration in PRAVDA ends with a call to Europeans "to strengthen security and develop peaceful cooperation on the continent."

Manifestly, we are at the beginning of a diplomatic campaign which is bound to intensify in the days and weeks to come. Mr Carter has realized this, having just sent his assistant secretary of state to encourage the Europeans not to yield to the new Soviet line. There will be nothing left for a deeply embarrassed Europe but to find its place on this new chessboard.

CSO: 3100

## EDITORIAL CRITICIZES ALINEMENT WITH U.S., FRG

LD151027 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 10 Jan 80 p 1 LD

[Editorial by Roland Leroy: "Duplicity Prevails"]

[Excerpts] "The French people, especially Giscard, are not as far away from Washington in many spheres as they would like to make other people believe. The chancellor (that is, Schmidt) and the French president can appreciate Americans in the way they deserve to be appreciated--positively." This is how the West German financial newspaper FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG commented yesterday on the announcement of a meeting between Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing.

At the same time, in the United States, President Carter mentioned his telephone conversation with the French president to justify the anti-Soviet measures which he has recently adopted.

And yesterday morning the cabinet met. Just like the statement by the Elysee spokesman, the official communique was markedly biased against the Soviet Union.

The Bonn-Elysee 'convergences,' which were emphasized by Giscard d'Estaing at the end of a long meeting with Helmut Schmidt, are especially alarming because they go hand in hand with a declared desire to seek common "European" positions instead of preserving France's freedom of action.

When the foreign minister stated last week that "France makes it a matter of principle not to use its trade relations with other states for political ends," he spoke wisely. Everything indicates that this wisdom was motivated by the weight of realities.

Unfortunately the recent cabinet meeting, the Schmidt-Giscard meeting and the Carter-Giscard telephone conversation have shown that a grave danger exists.

At any rate, Mr Francois-Poncet has not repudiated the EC decision to stop humanitarian aid, even including food supplies, for the people of Afghanistan.

[Jean] Lecanuet and other loyal servants of American imperialism are participating in a large-scale anticommunist attack. There are several reasons for this relentlessness, which is a result of the desire to strike blows against us because we defend workers and whose aim is to justify the notorious social "consensus." We have stated this before and we will refer to the subject again.

Furthermore, it is a manifestation of an attempt to bind our country to Mr Carter's irresponsible and extravagant promises, made to catch votes, and to ventures to which these promises could lead.

We denounce the prevailing duplicity. We wage a fight against it. It is in the interest of neither France nor peace to support the dangerous policy pursued by the United States. On the contrary, it is in the interest of France and of peace to pursue an active and independent policy of friendship with all peoples and to make proposals in support of disarmament and peace.

CSO: 3100

## UDF DEPUTIES DISPUTE PCF COVERAGE OF CAMBODIAN EVENTS

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 8 Dec 79 pp 96-97

[Statement by Francois d'Aubert, Gilbert Barbier, Pascal Clement, Francois Leotard, Gerard Longuet, Alain Madelin, and Jean-Pierre Bloch, all French Democratic Union [UDF] members of Parliament, upon their return from Kampuchea: "We Accuse the False Witnesses of Kampuchea"--passages between slantlines published in boldface].

[Text] We have returned from Kampuchea. We must speak. Having seen there what we have seen, we accuse the French communists who were sent by their party to the Vietnamese occupation forces of perjury.

And when we speak of French communists, we do not allude only to Roland Leroy, director of HUMANITE, who on 29 October gave written assurance of his active solidarity with the pro-Vietnamese regime. We are speaking also of the fellow travellers received in Khmer territory while Dr Kouchner and the crew of the boat "Ile-de-Lumiere" were turned back and treated abusively by the Kampuchean agency SPK [expansion unknown].

We deny that these people are objective witnesses.

After the campaign organized by the UDF on the theme, "Thirty Days for Kampuchea," we decided to go to the scene. Seven of us. As a parliamentary delegation. We had been told we would see nothing. Some maintained there was nothing to see. Others, that one could see nothing, that all movements were controlled by the Vietnamese occupation forces, and that no real contact with the population was possible. But to travel as an official party does not necessarily mean accepting the staging--or refusing to look into accountability.

When we boarded our plane for Saigon, we were the first French, non-communist members of Parliament to go to the People's Republic of Kampuchea. A chauffeur and limousine were waiting upon our arrival--not for us, but for a female physician who is a member of the Communist Party. Anomaly? No, routine government welcome. The seven French members of Parliament were welcomed by their consul general.



We remained in Saigon for one evening, and we had not been expected by the security services, since our transit had been improvised at the last minute. Thus we were not put under proper surveillance: such are the lapses in a bureaucracy.

An atmosphere of occupation already weighed on the excapital city of South Vietnam. It was enough to walk around and say, "French," to bring smiles. On several occasions we were approached. Children scurried to look out for patrols for the Vietnamese with whom we exchanged a few words. People slipped us letters furtively.

Here is, word for word, the testimony of a Saigon father: /"I ask myself what I could do for them/ (his family). /It's better to let someone die than to see him suffer without being able to do anything for him. You will think that I am cruel, but what is the point of prolonging the misery?"/

Another witness: /"Only the children of highly placed families or 'heroes' are accepted into the university. Academic grades are not based on the work of the degree candidate, but on what is contained in his security file...."/

This closed system rejects those on the fringes: we took notice of groups of Eurasians, not recognized by the regime by virtue of their heredity.

This is what we saw on the streets of Saigon in a 3-hour period. Our presence did not pass unobserved: the next morning, in front of our hotel, several dozen people were waiting for us to try to pass us letters.

At Phnom Penh, our arrival was expected.

Several well-nourished children were waving red flags and scarves (less for us than for the Soviet ambassador who was debarking at the same time). Our hosts were waiting with seven vehicles, seven chauffeurs, seven guide-interpreters. A tour organized to the finest detail. An itinerary meticulously prepared. The only itinerary, the one given to all foreign visitors. It is spread out over 4 days: 1. the prison; 2. the orphanage; 3. the Seventh of January Hospital; 4. a province; 5. the pharmaceutical industry; 6. the textile industry, etc.

Nobody is fooled by this artificial tour. At Solidarity Hotel, where most foreigners are accommodated, the "tour" was the target of jokes: /"Which way are you taking it?" "We started with the prison, how about you?"/

But if no one is fooled, why accept this mockery?

We seven Frenchmen refused. With the utmost tact.

The first day we betook ourselves, as expected, to the orphanage. To see and hear the little girl, henceforth morbidly famous, who does several times a day her little mime and song number, a sort of gory children's counting

rhyme in which she tells (in gestures) how her father and mother were slaughtered in front of her by the Khmer Rouge, how her brothers were massacred and her sisters too, how... And the little songstress: /"The children under the regime of Pol Pot wore the excrement of animals.... When they were sick, the doctors did not treat them.... Now we are striving to build our new country...."/ Sweet little voice, sweet little song, it is the song of totalitarianism. The massacres of yesterday, invoked by the despots of today. Propaganda.

To /see/ the reality, one must escape the beaten path.

One morning, one of us did it.

At dawn, Alain Madelin went out into the streets of Phnom Penh. Meeting the stares of Kampuchians he passed. To the first: /"Good morning...."/ To the second: /"Good morning...."/ To the third: /"Good morning...."/ The third answered: /"Good morning."/ He stopped. A timid dialog was begun:

/"You can talk?"

/"No."

/"You are watched?"

/"Yes."

/"If you want, we could walk side by side and talk a little..."/

Thus we learned that day that the /bo-doi/ [translation unknown] Vietnamese had opened fire on the Khmer soldiers who wanted to distribute UNICEF relief supplies to their compatriots, in spite of the orders of the occupation authority. That other /bo-doi/ had killed several people who had tried to force the door of a warehouse full of medical supplies...

We had to take risks.

Our guides had perforce become accustomed to our spirit of independence.

Three of us would go out into the streets, separate quickly, then just as quickly turn back. Or we would get out of our vehicles without permission. That sort of thing. Since Alain Madelin's initial escape, Kampuchians had started to prepare letters in French, letters that came to us in the shadows. They said: /"The Vietnamese prevent us from cultivating our ricefields. They even lay mines in them."/ Or: /"The Khmer people are being destroyed in the territories occupied by the Vietnamese. The people are still starving. The Vietnamese have imposed a new so-called democratic regime, but it is a deception. The Khmer people continue to die. The Vietnamese have plundered the rice and the seeds. We don't have the right to cultivate our own land. They keep the rice for themselves and send it to Vietnam...."/

And this note: /"I want to be helped from this miserable and unhappy life that I am finding each day...save me."/ That was a child, and he asked to be forgiven for his poor French.

The reality in Kampuchea is not just the barbed wire of Phnom Penh. Nor just the broken and abandoned houses which vegetation is beginning to take over. The reality of the Kampuchea of the pro-Vietnamese "collaborators" is also the stadium of Phnom Penh.

With its cloakrooms.

Where one can see, like the pathetic graffiti of Drancy in 1943, messages inscribed by prisoners who could tangibly feel death approaching. This inscription was dated July, 1979. Six months after the "liberation" of the capital by Hanoi's army.

Khmer Rouges yesterday, pro-Vietnamese Kampuchians today, the methods are the same. Cruel. Consider this well: Heng Samrin, the current president of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, commanded the 4th Division of the Khmer Rouge in the east of the country, in the worst days of the Pol Pot regime...

We rest our case. The Vietnamese have sequestered the rice in order to establish an implacable control over the country. To rule by the systematic manipulation of scarcity. That is the reason they refused all direct humanitarian relief, under the wretched pretext of /"poor state of communications." /What everyone knows, however, and what French television showed last Friday, is that it is enough to announce, /"Somewhere there is rice,"/ for the populace in an instant to get organized and go looking for food by whatever means, like an immense procession of ants. So terrifying is famine.

It is impossible not to see what is happening in Kampuchea.

One must be blind not to discern Vietnamese propaganda, in its cold impudence, its argumentative cocksureness.

When Pham Van Dong, the Vietnamese prime minister, declared in Phnom Penh on 18 February 1979 that, /"historical reality has shown the proof of the powerful vitality of the militant solidarity and the fraternal amity between Kampuchea and Vietnam;"/ when the Khmer agency SPK replies, /"We sincerely thank our Vietnamese brothers who have shown extreme discretion; we are even more grateful to the fraternal Vietnamese people and their armed forces which at the required time stopped the war at the border by inflicting decisive counterblows...,"/ and when one knows that what is being talked about is an orderly military invasion; one has the most dramatic example possible of Stalinist "block language."

The French Communists who work there know this better than anyone.

At Solidarity Hotel we met them.

We discussed with them.

Jean-Pierre Bloch confronted them with their bad faith.

They didged badly, responding without succeeding in hiding a certain shame. A shame of perjury. The Khmers themselves know very well who these Frenchmen are and why they are there. It is not to these/friends/ that the poor of Phnom Penh confided their despairing letters. It is likewise not these /friends/ who gave their dollars to Khmers to enable them to escape this hell. As for ourselves, we kept no currency. And the need was infinitely more than our too meager offering.

For 5 years, the French communists have unceasingly lied--or fooled themselves--about the drama of Kampuchea. On 15 April, 1975, the Central Committee of the PCF declared: /"Kampuchea sees its hour of liberation."/ On 7 May Rene Andrieux rejected all warnings about the Khmer Rouge and titled his editorial in HUMANITE: /"Poison."/ On 18 May, the communist daily proclaimed: /"There has indeed been a blood bath in Kampuchea. But it took place before the liberation of Phnom Penh/ (by Pol Pot) /and it is the American leaders who bear responsibility for it."/

Today, a 90-degree change of course. HUMANITE last 29 January: /"Phnom Penh, a dead city. A nightmare spectacle: from the first hours after the entry of the Khmer Rouge, what should have been a liberation became a drama. Several hundred thousand people gone, the houses, the schools, the hospitals emptied, a sort of absolute scouring, total."/ The word "refugees" was no longer put in quotation marks, and suddenly it is realized there were massacres. Because today the admitted horror of the Pol Pot regime can be used to justify the installation of a Vietnamese dictatorship in Kampuchea. Jean-Emile Vidal, in HUMANITE last 14 February: /"The new regime must rely on the good will of the volunteer youth. The people's committees are in place and are seeing that the basic needs are met."/ These neighborhood committees, which control the political organization of Phnom Penh, are appointed, and include one member of the local pro-Vietnamese Communist Party, a townsman appointed by the Communist Party member, a pro-Vietnamese Khmer soldier, and a soldier of the Vietnamese occupation force. Jean-Emile Vidal, again, on 3 December in HUMANITE: /"The Kampuchean people are endeavoring to raise themselves up with their bare hands from the material, social, and psychological ruin...They have chosen peace with their neighbor/ (Vietnam,/ mutual respect, independence, and territorial integrity...Nothing is more important than to get rice to the Khmer people, and there is an urgent need for medicines."/

Perjured testimony. "Block language." At the moment when HUMANITE appeared, perhaps other Kampucheans were being slaughtered in front of the bars of a warehouse of provisions or a shed full of medicines.

A proverb, from the epoch of Angkor, when the shadow of the jungle was rising over the Khmer empire, forewarned: /"One day our people will have no choice but to be devoured by the tiger or swallowed by the crocodile."/ The tigers of Pol Pot have disappeared into the great forest. The crocodiles of Pham Van Dong have arrived.

## LEFT RADICAL MOVEMENT MOVES CENTER-LEFT FOR ELECTIONS

## Strategy for 1981 Elections

Paris LE MATIN in French 4 Oct 79 p 3

[Interview with MRG Chairman Michel Crepeau]

[Text] Leftist radicals will nominate a candidate for the 1981 presidential election. The decision was basically made several months ago and will be ratified during a congress to be held early next year. It is possible that it will be up to the movement's chairman, Michel Crepeau, to defend leftist radical colors in the first primary. The La Rochelle mayor and deputy does not hide the fact that his decision will depend on the choice to be made by the PS [Socialist Party] in nominating its candidate: Michel Rocard or Jean-Pierre Chevenement, he says, "That is not the same thing." The MRG [Movement of Leftist Radicals] will also propose, for the sole leftist candidate in the second primary, a platform to include limiting the number of nationalizations to three or four.

LE MATIN: The MRG has decided to nominate a candidate for the 1981 presidential election. When will he be nominated?

MICHEL CREPEAU: I believe that a strategy should be chosen before choosing a candidate. The choice of a strategy first involves an analysis of the political situation. That is what we did all summer long; we were very inconspicuous because we thought a lot. We find ourselves in a situation similar to those which we experienced before May 1958 and May 1968. In other words, the calm which sometimes precedes the storm. Everything in this country is still unpredictable, which means that it is still very possible for the left to beat Valery Giscard d'Estaing if it wakes up in time and if it manages to do what is necessary.

A second observation is that the tactics adopted in 1965, 1973, 1974 and 1978 enabled us to make a good showing but never to win the elections. When tactics



fail three times, it is really necessary to ask whether they shouldn't be changed.

LE MATIN: What tactics do you propose instead?

MICHEL CREPEAU: The MRG is important only if it can serve some purpose. If it simply merges with the PS, it serves nothing. On the other hand, if it can make it possible to mobilize the seven or eight percent of the votes that will enable the left to pass the 50-percent mark, then it will serve some purpose. Giscard has understood this very well. That is why he is stepping up his maneuvers of enticement or seduction. Our political role in the coming weeks and months will consist of submitting proposals which should enable the left to give a different content and dimension to the coalition. Because the coalition continues to be necessary. But it will of necessity be different from what it was before 1978. The joint program is behind us and I believe that the French left consists of factions which are too diverse to be credibly rallied around the same platform. I would also add that there is a new awareness among certain ecologists. I specifically say among certain ecologists, since ecology is a pretext for many.

To win the next time, and I am convinced that it is still possible, the left will have to rally around a platform of limited ambition in the second primary: about 10 reforms jointly accepted and awaited by all leftist forces, a platform that can be implemented in 6 months and which, without really achieving socialist goals, will nevertheless make it possible to unblock French political life. To give a few examples: assuring plurality of information, substantially reducing the most glaring inequalities, limiting nationalizations to three or four: Dassault, iron and steel, data processing ... In other words, a somewhat Mendesian approach. A few simple reforms to be accomplished within a certain period, after which it would definitely be necessary to consider dissolving the National Assembly so that political parties could reassume their roles and establish an intermediate policy for this country. The MRG is preparing a manifesto to this effect.

LE MATIN: Do you have any preferences concerning the choice of the socialist candidate for 1981?

MICHEL CREPEAU: It is not our place to express an opinion on the choice of the Socialist Party's candidate. But we will not be able to disregard it in making our decision.

LE MATIN: Thus there may be a good and a bad socialist candidate?

MICHEL CREPEAU: It is for the PS to say who is a good or bad candidate for it. But the cards will not be played by the left in the same way, depending on whether the PS chooses this or that candidate. The political chessboard will not be the same, depending on whether the Socialist Party chooses a candidate who defends this or that platform. Michel Rocard or Jean-Pierre Chevenement, that is not really the same thing.



LE MATIN: Who would be the MRG's best candidate?

MICHEL CREPEAU: We will see when the time comes. It will be the party's officials who will decide.

LE MATIN: With an MRG candidate, aren't you afraid of causing the socialist candidate to fall behind the communist candidate?

MICHEL CREPEAU: For the 25 years that I have been in politics, I have fought to put the noncommunist left ahead of the PC [Communist Party]. But if the socialist candidate is not capable of beating the Communist Party by himself, he has no chance of being elected. On the other hand, it is very important to recover the electorate disappointed by Giscard, and also an electorate that is leftist but which does not want too strong a dose of nationalization and government control. It is very important to proceed so that this electorate will return to the left, for that is the path to victory. Since we have a two-primary election, it is good that the left is adapting its strategy to it this time.

#### Center-Left Realignment

Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Oct 79 pp 1, 12

[Article by Noel-Jean Bergeroux]

[Text] Eighteen months before the next presidential election, the debate is already crystallizing around specific issues. The center-left electorate is the subject of the greatest attention of many groups. This was observed over the weekend with the decision of leftist radicals to run their own candidate and the determination shown by Valois radicals to reassume their freedom of expression with regard to the majority and the government.

Mr Jean-Thomas Nordmann, a speaker at the (Valois) radical congress, pointed out this obvious fact on Sunday: "We are in the preparation period for the presidential elections." But this is an obvious fact which he was probably the only one to express so clearly during the proceedings of the congress, but a fact which dominated the political debates of the weekend, as it will dominate all others until the spring of 1981.

Henceforth we are no longer at the stage of considering general strategy but rather, indeed, of planning election tactics regarding specific aspects of the battle. It was more particularly the center-left which was the meeting point of considerations and speculation this weekend. For that is precisely where the voters who will make the difference are to be found. The race for the center-left has begun.

The first entry in this contest: the MRG (leftist radicals). Mr Crepeau's party has long hoped to embody the aspirations of moderate opposition opinion,

but this ambition has often been frustrated by its weak means and its disadvantaged situation in the shadow of the PS. This time the leftist radicals have taken the plunge.

By deciding to nominate their own candidate for the presidential election, they have gone beyond--at least for the time being--the taboos of the socialists and their own timidity. An MRG representative in 1981 should, they think, receive the votes of a center-left hesitant to vote socialist in the first primary and to encourage such votes to be transferred to the PS candidate in the second primary.

The socialists protest: "Your candidate," they say, "risks having the communist candidate beat us in the first primary." The leftist radicals reply: "You have told us enough times that we represented nothing, when we asked you for nominations at the time of the European and parliamentary elections, not to be afraid that we suddenly represent something in the presidential elections! And if the PS is reduced to needing us to overtake the PC, it is because it is very poorly prepared."

It should be noted, however, that this approach is not perceived so clearly by all of Mr Crepeau's friends. Surrounding the La Rochelle mayor is no lack of men less certain than he of the need to "break with capitalism" and thus to assure a contribution of decisive votes for the socialist candidate in the second primary. Those men also appear to be determined to proceed with a leftist radical candidacy even if Mr Rocard should defend the colors of the PS in 1981.

Now in the case of this latter possibility, Mr Crepeau would instead be among those who would consider an independent campaign by the MRG to serve no purpose. Thus it is conceivable that behind the argument of the leftist radical candidacy, certain persons expect a regrouping operation of the center-left after the presidential election, only one step away. Even if that is a very marginal argument.

At the Europe 1 Press Club on Sunday, to some extent Mr Rocard himself took the position of standing by for Mr Mitterrand, in the event that the first secretary of the PS, against all likelihood, should not wish to try his luck in 1981. But also for later ... The Yvelines deputy's pejorative remarks about "Goulag" and the "shameful, scandalous results of certain variations of socialism," as well as his insistence to emphasize everything that distinguishes his party from the PC, testify to the importance which he attributes to the electorate in question.

Regrouping of the center-left and reunification of all radicals: these topics were brought up and discussed throughout the proceedings of the Valois congress in Paris on Saturday and Sunday. But there, the ultimate goal was the opposite. The question which had to be answered was: How can the center-left electorate be channeled toward Mr Giscard d'Estaing? The answer of Valois radicals is found in the very content of the speeches delivered during the debates: by dissociating the party from its majority partners, by giving a more aggressive

tone to its criticism and proposals, by appearing to break with accommodation and unconditional support.

In that respect, the speech of the man who is to succeed Mr Servan-Schreiber as chairman of the Valois group was significant. You would have thought that you were listening to an opposition speaker at times. Mr Bariani almost questioned the "analytical faculties" of the chief of state, derided presidential arguments concerning the end of the consumer society and urged his friends to "firmly and permanently reclaim their total freedom of expression" with regard to the government. Center-left voters are not caught with pro-government honey. And in the case of discussion, the delegates to these proceedings contributed their share.

The motivating forces of a presidential election are not the same as those of a parliamentary election. The goal is no longer to find in each constituency the person or persons who will best embody a coalition, but to conduct a national campaign for one man by establishing the best links between him and the various electorates. In this sense, the UDF [French Democratic Union], a structure very specifically adapted to elections of the parliamentary type, is much less suited for a presidential race. The radicals who refused on Sunday to consider it to be anything other than a "limited liability company" --when it was not a "prematurely aging starlet" or an "accordion"--were probably not very far removed from the arguments which may prevail in the Elysee Palace in this regard.

Candidate Giscard d'Estaing must not appear as the color bearer of one political group, but as the man capable of embodying a meeting of diverse opinions. Let some of his troops pursue the right and others hold the center-right, while we, the radicals say, will move to recruit the center-left. And therefore, let us be outspoken again and let us not skimp on coloring the opposition. Therein lie the traditional centrist ambiguities: leftist language and rightist voting, further confirmed by the care taken by Valois leaders to have it understood that although the UDF is bearing the cost of the operation, it is nevertheless not being expelled from the brotherhood.

A rivalry is beginning to develop at this stage between, on one hand, the radical party's leaders who, like Mr Prouteau, favor a center-left regrouping going beyond the scope of political groups and, on the other hand, those like Robert Fabre, who is remaining uncommitted for the time being, perhaps hoping to get into the game when it moves into the final stage (the former MRG chairman also made a point of saying on Monday morning that he had not, like his friends in the FDR [Federation for Radical Democracy], "rallied the radical party" and that he retains his "total independence").

Will the "Giscardian dream" (Mr Crepeau's expression) of a central group campaigning under its own colors take shape before or after 1981? The question is being asked. The ambition of the chairman of the Movement of Leftist Radicals, like that of Mr Rocard, is certainly to keep this from happening, as these two leaders are aware of the need to dissociate themselves from language with Marxist leanings. Mr Mitterrand has not yet made a decision on the latter

point. Perhaps he will do so on Tuesday evening in the presence of the socialist militants of Paris.

#### Excerpts from 79th Congress

Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Oct 79 p 12

[Article by Noel-Jean Bergeroux]

[Text] The 79th congress of the radical party concluded on Sunday, 14 October, in Paris with the--expected--elections of Mr Didier Bariani, a Paris deputy, as chairman and Mr Jean-Pierre Prouteau, secretary of state to the minister of industry, as first deputy chairman of the party. Mr Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, chairman since 1977 (as well as from 1971 to 1975) did not ask to be reelected. These proceedings, which showed the determination of Valois radicals to reclaim their "total freedom of expression" with regard to the government, were also distinguished by the return to the radical party of former Valois members who had left the MRG, as well as Mr Robert Fabre at the same time. The Federation for Radical Democracy has actually decided to "join" the radical party. It was represented at the congress by Mrs Jacqueline Thome-Patrenotre, Mr Guy Gennesseaux and Mr Manuel Diaz among others.

The delegates assembled in the meeting rooms of the Hotel Intercontinental late Saturday morning listened to the report by Mr Didier Schuller and Mr Jean-Pierre Pierre-Bloch on human rights. Mr Schuller denounced the "new right," in his opinion the sign of a "rebirth of obscure doctrines" and a "revival of conservative thinking cloaked in a scientific, biological and geopolitical mantle."

On Saturday afternoon, the congress heard Mr Bernard Ollagnier (Yonne), Mr Paul Sabourin (Poitou-Charentes) and Mr Michel Durafour, former minister and Loire deputy, who said: "We have chosen the UDF. The real problem is finding out how we will move it toward the center-left." He added: "We must depart from this bastard government, half-presidential and half-parliamentarian. We must head in the direction of a real presidential government."

Following Mr Jean-Paul Benoit, general secretary of the Republic and Democracy clubs (established by Mr Jean-Pierre Prouteau), who called for a "new social consensus," Mrs Brigitte Gros devoted her speech to the matters of unemployment and the fight against inequality. Noting that "elitism has never been" the sister of Mr Servan-Schreiber in French society, she concluded: "The radical party is a pivotal party. It was in 1973 and 1974 and must continue to be. Let's not allow ourselves to be pushed around."

Mr Andre Rossinot subsequently pointed out that a delegation of the Federation for Radical Democracy was present. It included Mrs Jacqueline Thome-Patrenotre, Mrs Christiane Bellanger, Mr Manuel Diaz, Mr Guy Gennesseaux, Mr Michel Soulie, Mr Patrice Gassenbach, Mr Claude Saret, Mr Sampiero Quilici and Mr Jean-Pierre Mattei. The radical delegates applauded the friends of Mr Robert Fabre.

Mr Didier Bariani then spoke, stating in particular: "The right, that is, the powerful conservative trends running through the families of thought of the majority, convinced that it owes the 1978 victory to its own virtues, feels no need to question itself and believes that it has received from the nation a new lease, which it assumes to be confidence. Forgotten are the promises made in moments of anxiety! Now it is simply a question of preserving the most advantages for the longest time ..."

The general secretary further stated: "The government's cold severity inordinately and unjustly affects certain social classes, particularly wage earners and most of all those on salary. And then some measures are flatly detestable."

He then commented on relations between the UDF and the radical party: "We are aware that our relations with our partners are not satisfactory and that they must be redefined. Which clearly means that, in my opinion, both in relation to them and government policy, we must firmly and permanently reclaim our total freedom of expression."

"Some of us would like to go even further and abandon the UDF. But I believe that it deserves neither this exceptional honor nor this indignity. For me, the UDF is a limited liability company; we must share in it with loyalty but without indulgence, not because we are alike, but out of agreement concerning the key issue, the type of society, without giving up the right to be ourselves."

"To those who want to abandon it, I say: that is the easiest thing, but the most irresponsible. A party is not led according to personal wishes or settlement of scores. I will not sacrifice the interest of the party for several days of publicity. If we want to do without partners, let's first have a credible strategy of substitution and an overall plan of society capable of mobilizing a broad section of public opinion. Absence is never a good policy; when we aren't there, things go on anyway without us."

"The other left must not be a left of cooperation, but a left of negotiated participation with the government. From now on we will no longer be the left of endorsement or the alibi left for anyone. With regard to the opposition, I say that nothing is more ominous than those advances, those winks, those smiles which the right periodically makes to men and women of the left, hoping to entice them; public soliciting is a bad method ... People must not be asked to deny themselves. New plans must be formulated with them--together. Radicals must prepare for this."



"The right's great dream is of a socialist party that would take part in affairs by abandoning its platform and its reason for being--by forgetting about being socialist to some degree. The goal of socialists is certainly not to tailor a left for the government, with just the necessary amount of protest but with an adequate sense of good manners so as not to indecently hamper the action of the president. The public must not be misled; the Socialist Party will participate in the government one day only if a large part of its proposals are taken into account ...

"The case is similar for opposition radicals--they have to stop talking about reunification in public--they must go about it discreetly with respect for each other, agreeing basically on new plans through tactical appeals to people."

Mr Jean-Pierre Prouteau described the main features of the program which he wants to carry out within the party: to make the Valois group a "reunified, autonomous party capable of being represented by 40 to 50 deputies," embodying "a new republican left, the other left," and with a "radical political plan" in 1980, based on the manifesto and being able to use the center-left rally as a springboard.

The secretary of state believes that "the new social consensus" must satisfy the necessary conditions of "cooperation among social classes," participation and "solidaristic duty." He referred to Leon Bourgeois and Pierre Mendes-France and wished for the emergence of a "new republican society" resulting from "reform of republican government," business reform, "cultural reform" and "social reform."

With regard to the UDF, Mr Prouteau stated: "We must never lose sight of the fact that the tactics of parties have been changed by the rules of the Fifth Republic, which reinforced the need for an election coalition."

He added: "Radicals will be unbending on opposing the confederal status of the UDF and rejecting any merger of components into a unified party, as well as respecting the individuality of UDF constituents, at the level of the confederation's democratic operation as well as with regard to the balance of nominations in the various elections."

The afternoon session ended, since the room was practically empty of the 500-odd delegates. Speaking in succession were Mr Philippe Delpech, who stated: "It is sad to have as head of the government a man who spends his time saying: 'That is the fault of ... , that is the fault of ...' "; Mr Mr Corentin Calvez, a member of the Assembly of European Communities; Mr Frederic Lung (Vosges); Mrs Anna Posner (Paris); Mrs Germaine Borcelle (Cher); and Mr Pierre Salette, who wondered "whether Didier Bariani and Jean-Pierre Prouteau will one day be able to say no to Valery Giscard d'Estaing."

On Sunday morning, 14 October, the congress heard Mr Bernard Bourdier (Orne), Mr Pierre Cueille (Loire-Atlantique), Mr Dominique Franzini (Corsica),



Mr Michel Contard (Vaucluse). The last speaker stated: "Let the UDF quickly incorporate our proposals, otherwise like a prematurely aging starlet, it will see its role reduced to that of a simple branch of the republican party."

The following speakers were Mr Patrick Epron (Gironde), Mr Pierre Simon, former grand master of the Grand Lodge of France, and Mr Claude Martin (DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments-Overseas Territories]). Mr Andre Rossinot pointed out that "the basic truths of the manifesto are the cement uniting all radicals." Mr Olivier Stirn, secretary of state, thinks that the radical party must be united to regroup "not only social democrats, but also all socialists hostile to joint action with the communists."

Mr Nordmann: The UDF is an Accordion

Mr Jean-Thomas Nordmann noted that the country is in a period of preparing for the presidential election. He believes that the MRG candidate, at the time of that election, "will take votes away from the socialist candidate" and that the radical party must be "independent in expression without being isolated in the election." "The UDF is a framework," he added, "it is not an end in itself. It is a flexible instrument of variable geometry. At certain times it can support us. At others [at the time of presidential elections] it must not eclipse the expression of different factions. It is a kind of accordion that must learn to stretch or contract according to the melodic vicissitudes of political life. It must not be an alibi for our timidity or our silence." Mr Nordmann moved that Mr Pierre Brousse be elected honorary party chairman. Following Mr Yves Galland, chairman of the Paris federation, Mr Guy Genesseeux spoke in the name of the FDR, comprised of the friends of Mr Robert Fabre, and said that he was satisfied with the tone of the speeches which he had heard during the congress. "A larval conservatism must not be continued," he said, "the radical party has not joined a religion by supporting the UDF ... Mr Barre still has confidence in his theories, but he no longer has the confidence of the French people."

While the final speakers were talking, the voting began for the chairman and first deputy chairman of the party. No one except Mr Bariani and Mr Prouteau announced their candidacy for these two positions. The results are as follows. For the chairmanship: voting, 690; blank or void, 129. Mr Bariani, 561 votes. For the deputy chairmanship: voting, 686; blank or void, 100. Mr Prouteau, 586 votes. Mr Bariani seemed to show a certain amount of irritation in noting that Mr Prouteau received 25 more votes than he did. He assumed the rostrum and brought the congress to a close, addressing the delegates as follows: "You have endorsed the other left, thank you! You no longer wish to endorse inertia, egotism, reaction and conservatism, thank you! You have decided to totally reclaim your freedom of expression with regard to our partners and the government, thank you!" Finally, the new chairman assured Mr Servan-Schreiber, absent from this congress and outgoing chairman, of the esteem and respect of the radicals as well as of his "unfailing friendship."

The 79th congress of the radical party ended on Sunday, 14 October, at 2 pm.

## Texts Adopted

During the proceedings of the 79th congress of the radical party, several motions were carried. Here are some excerpts:

Reduction of Inequalities--The radicals demand: "A new adjustment of inheritance taxes, totaling exempting small estates, and a moderate declarative tax on private wealth, not affecting productive capital ... The establishment of joint management structures at all levels of business, including work groups, with the participation of salaried workers on the board of directors of large companies ... Real decentralization of power and authority."

Seat of European Assembly--"The congress is eager to express its will to fight with all its might so that the French Government and other governments of the European Community will unequivocally make the final decision to establish Strasbourg as the seat of the European Parliament."

Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy--"The radical party reaffirms the natural and basic right of women to freely dispose of their bodies and of the number of pregnancies ... It calls for a vote in favor of revising the law to provide for interruption of pregnancy, with public agencies being obliged to allocate financial and material means for real information."

Support of FDR for Radical Party--A "joint political declaration" of the Federation for Radical Democracy and of the radical party was adopted at the close of the congress. Among other things, it states: "The crisis is total. Economically, morally and politically, it affects all social classes. This challenge requires a new response ..."

"Another left is emerging. Against conservatism and dogmatism. For freedom and the development of the individual in an open society, despite government intervention and its technocratic centralism. To assure economic recovery, to give life to initiative, to see that the right to be different is respected and to preserve the quality of life. The other left must take up the challenge and be the rallying place of all those who want real change. The other left will be the means of liberation of citizens."

"On this Sunday, 14 October 1979, the Federation for Radical Democracy has decided to join with the radical-socialist party."

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CSO: 3100

## NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FINANCE COMMITTEE PASSES 1980 BUDGET

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Jan 80 p 7

[Article by P. J.]

[Text] On Thursday, 3 January, the National Assembly Finance Committee passed the overall proposed budget for 1980, by a vote of 17 (RPR [Rally for the Republic] and UDF [French Democratic Union]) to 5 (PS [Socialist Party] and PC [Communist Party]). Robert-Andre Vivien (RPR), chairman of the committee, observed that the votes cast in committee are not binding on political parties when the proposed budget is taken up in a public session.

Speaking in the morning, Jacques Marette (RPR) said that he personally felt that in view of recent events, the budget under discussion is completely outdated and has only a theoretical value. Furthermore, Marette emphasized that the measures drawn up on Wednesday in the Cabinet meeting are along the lines of proposals made by the RPR during the first examination of the proposed budget, proposals later rejected by the government. Marette went on to say that given this abandonment of the powers of Parliament, he would henceforth abstain from any vote in budget discussions.

Marette's view was shared by Laurent Fabius (PS), who said that the evolution of the economic situation makes the proposed budget outdated before it is even passed. Roger Combrisson (PC) recalled that for the same reason, his group already asked that a new budget proposal be submitted to Parliament. He stated that the hypotheses on which the proposed budget was based date from last summer and are therefore outdated and that the decisions made by the Cabinet constitute implicit recognition of this fact.

Combrisson joined with Fabius and Marette in asking that the prime minister be heard by the committee, in keeping with Vivien's proposal. Emmanuel Hamel (UDF) did not deem such a hearing necessary since, he said, the prime minister had every possibility of giving all relevant information at the time of the budget presentation in a public session on 7 January.

Vivien asked for a meeting with Raymond Barre, who arrived at the Palais Bourbon late in the morning. In response to a remark made by Marette, the

prime minister stated that the measures taken by the government do not result from "surrealism," but from "the most total realism." Barre said that following the decisions made in Caracas by the oil-producing countries and studies made by the government in the final days of 1979, it has become apparent that the average cost of France's oil will go from \$13 to \$26 a barrel and that the "oil bill" will amount to 199 billion francs in 1980, compared with 50 billion in 1979. The prime minister said that the government decided to pass this entire increase on to the consumer.

Barre summed up the measures taken by the government relating to the financing of the EDF [French Electric (Power) Company] and support for productive investments. He stated that the social measures adopted by the Cabinet will be financed by the government and for that purpose, included in an amended proposed budget, with the corresponding resources coming from the increased yield of the added-value tax on oil products.

In this connection, the head of the government protested against "demagogic statements." He emphasized that the domestic tax on oil products had not been raised since January 1979 and that the increase in the yield of the added-value tax is being used for social purposes. He confirmed that the taxes to which oil companies are subjected are to be studied by a committee, which will make its report to the government in March.

#### No Modification

In response to Fabius, who was astonished that the government did not expect to modify the proposed budget in order to take into consideration the radical change in economic factors since it was drafted, Barre said that the economic conjectures had been drawn up while awaiting serious decisions concerning the price of oil. Consequently, he said, there is nothing, for the time being, to justify any modification of the conjectures. He indicated that if such a thing appears to be necessary, the 1980 budget will be changed during the fiscal year by amended budgets. But in order to do so, he emphasized, it is first necessary to have a budget. The measures taken Wednesday by the government do not imply any modification in the proposed budget submitted to Parliament, Barre said, inasmuch as those concerning productive investments have no effect on the budget because it is a question of the opening up of bank credits.

In addition, the prime minister refused to make any commitments on the future situation of the job market. "You are asking me to commit myself on 1985 figures," he told Fabius, "but I refuse to be ridiculous." Barre then added: "We must adapt ourselves to all the variations in the international situation and create healthy, lasting jobs." He refused to "make conjectures that will be exploited for demagogic purposes." "Personally," he said, "I do not commit myself on any figure."

Barre also said that inasmuch as the Constitutional Council had held that the government did not resort to Article 49, paragraph 3, of the constitution as many times as it should have, in the initial examination of the proposed

budget, he reserved the right to act accordingly in the days to come. It is expected that the prime minister will commit the government on the first part of the proposed budget as early as the end of the general discussion on 7 January. In this way, he would cut short the examination of amendments filed by the opposition. The government would then ask for a block vote on each of the budgets constituting the second part of the draft budget, which would also have the effect of excluding from a vote amendments not to its advantage. The government's responsibility could also be involved when the entire proposed budget is voted upon.

After the prime minister had been heard, the committee proceeded to take a rollcall vote, at the request of Fabius, in order to decide whether or not to continue its examination of the proposed budget. The vote was positive. In the afternoon, the committee passed the credits and Henri Ginoux (UDF), reporter for the veterans budget, came out for adoption of the credits, contrary to what he had done during the first examination of the budget. Francois D'Aubert (UDF) was unsuccessful with his suggestion that in the youth and sports budget, the committee should reserve its vote on credits for the Olympic Committee in order to protest the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan.

At the time of the examination of health credits, the committee passed, by a vote of 17 (PS, PC, RPR, UDR) to 10 (RPR and UDF), an observation presented by Fabius against the collection of health insurance assessment from pensions. This measure was contained in the bill on the financing of Social Security which was passed by the National Assembly last month, after Barre committed the government to the proposal.

On 28 December, the Finance Committee passed Fabius' amendment on the first part of the proposed budget, an amendment tending to institute a gradual tax on corporate capital. When it came to a vote, the committees approved all credits in the second part of the proposal, except those for radio and television, on which the Cultural Affairs Committee reserved its vote, and those for our cultural, scientific and technical relations, which were rejected by the Foreign Affairs Committee.

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CSO: 3100

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

PCF'S RADIO INTEREST--The PCF, which is very interested in the network of local radio stations used by the CGT, is looking into the possibility of developing them with the technical help of the PCI. [Text]  
[Paris LE POINT in French 7 Jan 80 p 27]

CSO: 3100



## PCI'S LEDDA ON EUROPE'S ROLE IN CURRENT WORLD CRISIS

LD240919 Brussels LE SOIR in French 17 Jan 80 pp 1, 3 LD

[Article by PCI Central Committee member Romano Ledda: "Italian Communists, Europe and Peace"]

[Text] Why does the PCI so urgently propose a European initiative in the present international situation? Why does it stress to insistently the role that the whole of Europe can adopt, as well as the EEC and the old continent's leftwing and democratic grouping? What kind of initiative does it propose, and to what end?

The first answer to these two questions is contained in the PCI's assessment --and not only the PCI's--of the dramatic character of the international situation. It is not one of "catastrophe" or a purely emotional reaction but, on the contrary, an assessment borrowed from a concern which can be synthesized thus: we are faced with probably the most acute and certainly the most widespread crisis in the whole system of international relations since the end of World War II.

There is no comparison with the past. The great international crisis from the cold war to Cuba (the 1962 missile crisis) endangered the world but they had behind them a working international relations system--a certain world stability--and, to use a shabby journalistic express, an "order" corresponding to the fundamental tendencies emerging at that time.

But today? Today diverse factors accumulate and overlap against the backdrop of an underground movement and an instability sparing no one. The old "order" has collapsed and there is no new one yet.

Whole peoples (billions of people) no longer want to live in hunger, backwardness and underdevelopment. They are pressing for a solution to these problems without being given an adequate response; indeed, the gulf between developed and underdeveloped is widening with the birth of an even poorer fourth world. North-South relations are thus becoming decisive.

The absence of a solution contributes strikingly to increased tension; it is not chance if regional crises develop to become less local and more general. In addition, U.S.-USSR relations have gone from an imperfect detente to a period of cooling off, followed by deterioration and confrontation, until they are now courting collision.

It is time for more for a trial of strength than for dialog. The view that each great power has of the other is marred by suspicion, fear and insecurity. Isolation, containment and fortresses besieged are once more fashionable terms.

Thus the fresh prospect of a new arms race, which we hope may be avoided. With the present stage of technological development that would mean, in effect, a new qualitative leap and the increased threat of nuclear conflict.

Thus the ever increasing insecurity which makes all feel threatened and encircled and resort to rearmament.

One does not have to be a Marxist to understand what this means. Pope John Paul II, by no means a Marxist, said: "The production of increasingly costly, powerful and sophisticated weapons demonstrates the readiness for war." That is, the readiness to provoke it and risk that at any moment, anywhere, in one way or another, someone could set in motion the terrible machinery of widespread destruction. (UN speech, 2 October 1979).

Finally we are in fully world economic crisis, with trade wars, monetary upsets, inflationary pressure and struggle between the great Western industrial zones to corner markets and resources. The countries of the East, in their turn, are fighting serious economic difficulties which, even if they succeed through differing ways and characteristics, will again pose urgent questions.

These three factors (to which others could be added) might seem distinct from each other, but even a superficial analysis shows their interdependence: the energy question is the clearest proof by virtue of the problems and tensions it creates.

All this might seem to take us far from Europe, but we do not believe that. How can one resolve this complex crisis with a bipolar logic which no longer corresponds to a multipolar world? It is impossible in the traditional view of the correlation of forces, which sees the world only as zones of influence of the great powers.

And this is not only impossible but serious: the Afghan intervention, severely censured by the PCI, is the outcome of that view which creates risk, fear, mutual distrust and insecurity.

Thus we must smash this spiral of action and reaction, suspicion and retaliation, this logic and outlook pushing the world toward cold war. And Europe can do it, because its material interests (depending on raw material producers) and political interests (it has stood to gain from detente) push it toward peace and international cooperation. Let us not ask Europe to act "against" anyone but "for" everyone.

The first, most immediate aim is to keep open the door to dialog, and to prevent an obstinate series of measures and countermeasures between the United States and the USSR. But this aim cannot be separated from a wider vision giving the two great powers a new space and security (the opposite of their isolation) by resuming detente, which is without any practicable alternative.

Giving detente a new breath of life and new dimensions means linking the great problems of East-West and North-South relations. This is Europe's important role if it is to assume its real function in a world no longer Eurocentric.

CSO: 3100

## COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FOLLOWING PCI-ALGERIAN FLN TALKS

LD180939 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 13 Jan 80 p 16 LD

[Unattributed report: "PCI and Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) in Agreement"]

[Text] Rome--At the FLN's invitation a PCI delegation, led by Directorate and Secretariat member Senator Gerardo Chiaromonte and composed of Central Committee member and foreign section chief Antonion Rubbi, Central Committee member Napoleone Colajanni, Deputy Cecilia Chiovini and L'UNITA journalist Giorgio Migliardi, visited Algeria from 5 through 11 January.

During its stay the PCI delegation was received by FLN coordinator Mohamed Salah Yahiaqui and Minister of Energy and Petrochemical Industries Belkacem Nebi.

The political conversations between the PCI delegation and the FLN delegation--led by Central Committee member and International Relations Committee Chairman Sliman Hoffman and composed of Europe-North America Subcommittee Chairman Boubekour Ogab; FLN International Relations Committee member Deputy Ahmed Kesri; Deputy Boudjemaa Haichour; and the national secretary of the General Union of Algerian Workers, Mohamed Ohaa--took place, according to a joint communique, in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding.

"This meeting," the communique continues, "permitted an exchange of information on the situation in the respective countries and on the parties' activities and also provided the opportunity for a thorough examination of the international political situation.

"Both parties expressed their deep concern at the aggravation of political tension on the international plane--a tension which is threatening world peace and whose specific and bloody manifestations often take the form of conflicts in developing countries; while on the other hand it always constitutes an opportunity for imperialism--which has been undermined for over a decade by a deep economic crisis--to oppose the people liberation movement and threaten the peoples' independence and economic development.

"Both delegations are convinced that the struggle for the total decolonization of countries still under foreign domination, the acceptance and implementation of a policy of the people's self-determination, observance of their sovereignty and political options on the basis of the principles of noninterference and nonintervention, support for the Third World countries' legitimate demands to facilitate their rapid and harmonious development and their effective participation in taking decisions on which mankind's future depends, are further fundamental principles which must form the indispensable political foundation for the quest for and realization of a global and lasting peace.

"In the belief that the anarchy which characterizes the present world economic system is becoming an increasing source of conflict and constitutes an incentive to an escalating arms race, the two parties maintain that the priority objectives for the world's progressive and democratic forces remain the struggle for a real policy of global and general disarmament, for the establishment of a new world economic order capable of effectively remedying the injustices deriving from historical inequalities in development between the Third World and industrialized countries.

"The two delegations," the communique continues, "examined the prospects for cooperation between the European democratic and peoples' forces and the Third World progressive forces, in building a new international economic order.

"Within this framework, the convergence of political efforts between the Third World progressive forces and the West European democratic and peoples' forces and the indispensable solidarity which the developing countries' workers are entitled to expect from all European social forces in general and from the European working class in particular must move in the direction of the realization of a policy of dynamic cooperation based on observance of every country's independence, on equality and equitability in exchanges in the mutual interests.

"With special reference to the Mediterranean basin, where a state of tension still reigns following the continuation of conflicts which can only be resolved by accepting the free exercise of the peoples' will for self-determination, the two parties emphatically reasserted their full solidarity with the people of the Western Sahara and the Palestinian people and with their sole legitimate representatives, the POLISARIO Front and the PLO, which are waging, together with other African liberation movements, a brave and determined struggle against foreign occupation forces.

"To this end the two delegations expressed their desire to promote and support every initiative likely to strengthen the security and sovereignty of Mediterranean seaboard countries and are also determined to support a policy of peaceful and fruitful cooperation among the region's peoples.

"The two delegations stressed the importance that they attach to the development of friendly relations between the Italian and Algerian peoples

and to economic and political cooperation between the countries. The two delegations stated their shared satisfaction with the good relations which exist between the parties and expressed their desire to develop them further. To this end they signed a cooperation and exchange program for 1980. At the end of the political conversations," the ~~communique~~ concludes, "the PCI delegation invited an FLN delegation to Italy. The invitation was accepted."

CSO: 3104



## PERTINI CRITICIZED ON TOUR OF SOUTH

Messina GAZZETTA DEL SUD in Italian 10 Nov 79 p 17

[Article by Stelio Vitale Modia: "Pertini in Contact With Siciliana Reality--Chief of State Yesterday Started Island Trip From Palermo"]

[Text] Palermo. Dispensing with pomp and ceremony, quite in contrast to the strict program at Quirinale palace, President of the Republic Sandro Pertini yesterday, as in the past, during his first 3 days on his visit to Sicily, almost traumatized the local establishment with a speech addressed to the delegations from Belice Valley which was destroyed 12 years ago by a tremendous earthquake and which is still in the same shape as it was then. This was a speech delivered with unique candor, an "unpolitical" address, far from the formalism customary on those official occasions.

This brief address was perhaps the high point yesterday at Palermo, along with a meeting with about 150 students in the auditorium of the Botanical Garden. After his solemn arrival at Orleans Palace, President Pertini was received by regional government leaders and then went to the city hall to meet the "mafia widows" and the delegations from Belice. In the great hall of the government palace, the head of state listened to the parish priest of Santa Ninfa, don Vito Nardin who read to him an appeal, the umpteenth appeal addressed to those in power by the earthquake-struck towns. There was only one microphone and one loudspeaker in the big room. The television of RAI-TV [Italian Radio Broadcasting and Television Company] and private broadcasting stations had been left outside.

This was to be an informal meeting, without any frills or fancy phrases. So it was. And this is because don Vito Nardin spoke quite bluntly in addressing the President of the Republic, reproving him for not visiting Belice Valley. "It seems now almost necessary," the priest added, "for political personalities who represent the people in Italy to have to be stimulated continually to remember their tasks. In the history of Belice, this is a recurring theme. Although there has been considerable sensitivity on some occasions, the complexity of the problem calls for a major effort. The people of Belice today keep wondering whether they must wait longer for help from the nation as a whole in order to complete the reconstruction of their homes and to start some sort of work in the area."

After underscoring the great desire of the people of Belice to live and work in order to rebuild their homes and their communities, Fr Nardin recalled the episode of Francesca Fontana, a mother and housewife who committed suicide after having lost all hope of getting a home any time soon.

"Mr President," the parish priest of Santa Ninfa concluded, "What is the ministry of public works waiting for when it comes to adjusting the contribution to the real costs? Is it waiting to be denounced for failure to act, for negligent homicide? In the name of human rights, in the name of democracy, in the name of the victims of the earthquake and the aftermath, Mr President, do your part to stimulate the immediate updating of the contribution and the requested solution of the other problems."

Pertini did not mince words here in replying to the parish priest of Santa Ninfa and he was quite explicit on some points. Since this is an exceptional document, it is worth reporting, word by word, what the President of the Republic said in replying to the appeal of the earthquake victims of Belice.

"You visited me 5 years ago," the chief of state began, replying to Fr Nardin and, "I recall that you came to me, when I was president of the Chamber of Deputies, together with don Riboldi. Now, 5 years is a long time. Look, I speak to you here with my heart full of concern and, I would also say, with much pain. Throughout these years, I have been asking for a solution to the problems presented to me. But these problems have not been resolved.

"You are a shepherd of souls," Pertini continued, "and therefore before condemning anybody, you must have Christian understanding. I understand the irritation and also the indignation of the citizens of Belice Valley. But, dear brethren, during those years, since you came to me, the situation has developed in a precipitate manner and has gotten worse in a very preoccupying fashion. At that time we did not yet have the wave of terrorism which has swept over Italy. At that time we did not yet have that vast army of unemployed, with 600,000 young people and 1.5 million senior citizens. All of these problems have piled up on the desks of the ministers and the prime minister. I am not giving you a justification for this now. Only an explanation. I would have come to Belice. It was on my schedule. I would have come to Santa Ninfa. But I received requests from another 12 or 14 communities in the valley. If I had gone only to Santa Ninfa, I would have been discriminating, which is not my custom.

"Look," Pertini who spoke off the cuff then said with great spontaneity, "I only make the promises I can keep. And I promise you that I will come some day when I am not tied to a program of official visits to Palermo, Catania, and Messina, that Sicily which is so tormented and so loved. I will come after having taken action along the lines you all have been requesting me to act. I cannot do much. My powers as President of the

Republic are not very vast and I must be careful in taking certain actions so far motivated by a spirit of solidarity and humanity toward the people and not by any other intentions, in violation of the Constitution. I must therefore proceed cautiously because sometimes I do something and then they tell me I did it badly. I am talking to a priest and I can therefore recall how Christ was cursed all of his life. Look, I am not a believer but the figure of Christ must always be present in any man's mind who wants to live his life humanely and with dignity. And the word of Christ is eternal for me."

President Pertini revealed that he really tried to do something after having received the invitation to visit Belice and that he also got prime minister Cossiga interested through a letter to which the chief executive replied as follows on 7 November: "Dear Mr President, on the occasion of the trip to Sicily which you have planned for the next several days, the dramatic problem of Belice will certainly also be brought to your attention. In this connection, I would like to inform you that it is my intention and that of the administration to try everything in order definitely and satisfactorily to resolve this tough problem in the shortest possible time. I have already heard the various requests from the representatives of the people, as you can see from the attached report, and I have tried very hard to satisfy the most urgent requirements within the strictly indispensable time frame. Please accept my sincerest regards, etc., etc."

"And, along with the letter," Pertini then continued, "he sent me your memorandum whose essential points, Reverend, I am well familiar with: Adjustment of the government contribution for the reconstruction of the first home, total expenditure for the real construction cost to be borne by the state, completion of primary utilities, further financing for public expenditures, for low-cost housing, and for detailed restoration plans, incentives for social-economic rebirth.

"Now we have learned--that is, I and my chief collaborator, that is to say, my right-hand man, without whom I could do little, that is, secretary-general Maccanico--that 600 billions have already been set aside under the ministry of public works; these are things that involve the entire nation, not just parts of it. Now, why has that money not yet been used?" Pertini asked this question at this point but immediately came up with the answer. "Because it was necessary to adjust the price, such as it was at that time, to the price, such as it is today, when it comes to building houses. Well, the ministry of public works must speed up its efforts, that is to say, it cannot fall asleep on this job. I will do what I can, but, dear Reverend, do not make me commit a mortal sin against the Constitution. Look, even though you may think that you are dealing with a nonbeliever, I want you to know that you are also dealing with a Christian."

Pertini then continued, making reference to his friendship with Pope John Paul II. "Look, Reverend, he then said, "I have a relationship of

friendship with a man whom you hold in high esteem, as I do. And he gave me his friendship even though he knows that I am not a believer. He gave me his friendship because he realized that I am a human being, just like he. And his words resound in my heart, as mine resound in his. I recently had a very friendly meeting with this personality who occupies the highest office in the Catholic Church. A luncheon given by him for me privately and a conversation which lasted 3 hours. This episode has been commented upon in various ways. Some were moved by envy and jealousy. These people were wondering how he could have invited a nonbeliever and not the rest of us who have always..." (At this point Pertini was interrupted by laughter and long applause).

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CSO: 3104

## PERTINI TOLD OF SALIENT PROBLEMS AS HE TOURS SOUTH

## President Not Told Facts

Palermo L'ORA in Italian 9 Nov 79 p I

[Text] Dear Mr President, there is always a risk of running into hired mourners, hat in hand, happy over promises and fancy speeches. As our correspondent Mario Farinella wrote yesterday, we expect something different from you; we expect that minimum words necessary to feel that you are a friend and a traveling companion on our journey toward the hope which is not yet dead.

These notes, written by more or less famous individuals, we hope will help you, upon your return to Rome, to reflect upon the things you have seen and heard in a neighboring land, in an old land which has not always gotten the kindest and most generous treatment from the Italian government.

You, Mr President, know us. You know L'ORA and you know that our newspaper is certainly the closest to your old militant membership, your ideas, your battles against prepotence and privilege. You know therefore whom these materials for reflection come from and what the spirit behind them is.

Please accept them then as simple notes which do not claim to constitute a document on the state of the island but only a memorandum for the future.

Now, some questions. You will undoubtedly already have heard some of those questions during your journey but other problems perhaps will not be raised even during the meetings in Sicily. And we, the chroniclers of a complex and contradictory reality, want to present them to you.

Your journey comes at the end of a difficult year for Sicily and for Palermo which saw its streets running with blood, some of its institutions tainted by the presence of corrupt and prepotent individuals, reaching such a state of degradation as to bring many people to despair or, worse, to indifference.

Your mere presence on the island will serve to give the people back their confidence, to enable so many citizens to take heart again, citizens who have not yet recovered from all this, the militants of the left who, although disappointed, have not disarmed.

You know only too well that Sicily is not only the home territory of mafia violence but that it is the mother of men such as Salvatore Carnevale who gave his life in order not to have to bow his head. And that is not supposed to be a eulogy of heroism although the "common folk" are not lacking in courage--and that is what they call the old socialists here. If nothing else, then at least in order every day to face a harsh reality with little satisfaction.

Dear Mr President, this is the time of Resistance in Sicily.

#### Roots of Distrust

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[Article by Giuseppe Giarrizzo, dean of literature, University of Catania]

[Text] Among the many emblems with which the Sicilian leading class decorated its own shield during the last century, one of the most tenacious is that of "Sicily which is in the lead," a kind of fatal virtue of island society in its endeavor to make up for so much lost time through solutions or initiatives which are designed to anticipate or inaugurate national processes. We have had everything here: The Thousand and the Sicilian fascists, truth-in-literature and the theater of the paradox, regional autonomy and milazzism, the center-left and the "autonomist agreement." It is no surprise that a myth of this kind should arise. But we are astonished by its strong hold and its ambiguous application: Today we still are faced with the reform of regional government, the hidden economy, even the mafia; everything is brought up to reaffirm a boast which is not only a poor refuge of disappointed haughtiness but which also is an easy alibi for evasion and mistakes. Bitter reality teaches us a different lesson which is the lesson of the devastating effects, upon Sicily's condition, of premature experiments which are then not properly supported within the broader national context.

And, ever since the Sixties, we have been aware here of the crisis of autonomy. Instead of analyzing it and trying to repair the situation, we preferred to embark upon new experiments in a leaky boat: And now we realize, quite belatedly, that this crisis was and is a territorially and culturally defined aspect of the national "crisis of governability," of the vicissitudes of a system of government which at the same time blocked the functioning of the institutions and their reform.



The reform of regional government, which was launched with so much difficulty is bound to be a contribution to the improvement of institutions and the reform of the state. And, if the latter do not progress, then the effort made in Italy, overcoming resistance and involving vast social sectors, will in the end be downgraded to a response in terms of red tape and regulations.

Next we have the hidden economy. But the presence in Italy and in the South of a specific and widespread managerial system, which during periods of stagnation or transition tends to take the place of the disappearance of production sectors or sustains the drop in employment, cannot be elevated to a creative response by civilian society with respect to the absence of a public power which, fluctuating between flight from the land and ecological terror, allows the decline of production structures and skilled manpower.

This new version of the ancient art of muddling through is not enough when it comes to coping with the lack of confidence in the capacity of those in power to plan and launch the development of the South. A hidden economy which does not emerge can give us a measure of the capacity for resistance of the social fabric and it is certainly not an alternative to our failure in achieving development here.

This brings us to the mafia. Does it still make sense to look upon Sicilian society as the specific breeding ground for a kind of organized crime which now has models of organization and behavior that were developed and tested on an international level? Sicily, which imports crime, has paid and is paying dearly for its powerlessness which is inherent in the current system of government, when it comes breaking the vicious circle of "corrupt politicians--police--terrorists--organized crime." The roots of the mafia are no longer to be found in Italy. The cultural and social isolation of the island mafia calls for radical action with respect to the national political-financial establishment that sustains the mafia.

The emblem of "Sicily which leads" is certainly wrong. It can be wiped away although that will not right away absolve the ruling class which used it extensively and this can be done if we want to avoid the cumulative effect of our difficulties added on top of those of the rest of the country.

Those who are responsible for representing and guarding the country's unity will recognize the right of the Sicilians to know that the conflict between culture and backwardness--which in Sicily is more acute than in other parts of the South--is destined to find sterile refuge in an umpteenth illusion of being in the lead again or, if the national responses are speeded up in terms of time, of seeing the island's men and institutions involved in a position fashion. Experience proves that any delay in correctly tackling government reform produces centrifugal responses, a desperate search for a way out even if it is covered up with ancient prestige.

## Mafia Siege

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[Article by parliamentary deputy Aldo Rizzo]

[Text] We are not among those who would like to assign the president of the republic the task of filling the void due to the inertia of other government authorities and taking the place of an administration whose inability to cope with the serious problems besetting the country is becoming more obvious every day.

Knowing President Pertini we are convinced that he is the first to maintain that temporary job registers--regardless of whether they involve the head of state or the chief justice--cannot characterize relationships between the institutions of a sound democracy.

But it is a fact that the citizens, in view of the administration's inertia, are looking with hope and confidence to this president of the republic, to Sandro Pertini, whose figure is a reliable point of reference for all those who believe in the values of justice and democracy.

And it is in this spirit that the Sicilian citizens received the visit of the head of state to Sicily; it is with these feelings that we attract his attention to the serious situation which the island is experiencing because of the further deterioration deriving from the presence and the criminal actions of the mafia.

We know that crime is a problem which, because of its seriousness, has assumed nationwide dimensions. As for the rest, recent events, such as the slaughter at the "Le Streghe" restaurant in Milan and the bloody raid on the "Cardarelli" Hospital in Naples, show that Italy is being scourged not only by subversive violence or the mafia.

Common crime, both organized and unorganized, in changing its techniques and the arrogance of the terrorist commandos reached particularly alarming levels, showing that there is no consideration whatsoever for human life, even the lives of those who, by mere chance, happen to be involved in criminal action.

But, although the crime problem involves the entire country, it is even more serious in Sicily because of the consequences connected with the revival of mafia crime.

The mafia has come back to besiege our provinces. The homicides carried out against Boris Giuliano and Cesare Terranova only represent the tips of the iceberg of violence which is mostly submerged and which does not come out because of the silence of the victims.

The economic crisis, the stagnation of production, the poverty of the vast strata of the Sicilian population--these have broadened the leeway for the mafia which, for many people, has become a necessary step in getting a job or making a living. Extortion and forced hirings are constantly increasing and lately the public treasuries have been opened to the reach of the mafia. Acts of corruption, of embezzlement of public funds or grabbing orders by members of the mafia or through mafia--these are plain for anyone to see and the record of these past several months is full of such examples.

Day after day we record the defeat of the law, the defeat of the state, whose powerlessness seems more and more evident all the time in spite of the effort being made by the forces of law and order. Fear and terror keep spreading. Civilian society draws back and, consequently, the mafia can increase its hold. It is necessary as quickly as possible to stop this sort of thing before the situation gets even worse because the waste caused by mafia violence--especially the losses involving the ways the citizens act, think, and feel--these are not easily repaired. It is necessary to restore the strength and dignity of the state, to restore the values of democracy and liberty which today are heavily compromised in Sicily.

The job we now must tackle calls for the commitment of a broad range of political forces, the mobilization and the support of the entire nation, the collaboration of all government authorities.

And it is with an awareness of all this that we ask president of the republic Sandro Pertini to become the interpreter of the urgent need for a housecleaning and renewal which is so strongly felt by the Sicilian people; we ask him that, using the constitutional prerogatives connected with his high office, he urge the other government agencies to do their duty, since it is not admissible for the people of Sicily to have to continue to live in misery, unemployment, amid the bitterness of unemployed young people, the mafia cancer, as if this were a divine curse.

#### Sicily Without Government

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[Article by Giacomo Galante]

[Text] It is due to the good will of the most responsible among the community council members of Palermo that you, Mr President, were received this morning at Aquile Palace by a mayor with full official powers.

But, if you allow me to be quite frank, it would certainly have been much more in keeping with the trouble that the government of this city is now having if you had found an administration in the midst of crisis, which as a matter of fact it has been in for many months.

Palermo is the mirror--a somewhat distorting mirror because it only brings out the sickliest aspects--of an ill which afflicts democracy on this island and compromises its credibility. The nongovernment of the region and of the local administrations, the various economic agencies; the poor and even wasteful use of hundreds of billions and the squandering of that tremendous heritage represented by the ingenious vitality of the Sicilians--that is what we see here.

Behind this preoccupying image, which the institutions in Sicily create, there is however the arrogant seizure of public powers and their subservience of interests of groups and factions.

Something which elsewhere is considered the very foundation of civility is still considered desire and hope here.

The students will tell you for how many years they and the generations before them have been waiting for the communities and provinces to build not only efficient but also sufficient schools for them; you will walk through clean streets only because you are there. But if you could take a closer look, if you could look beyond, you would see the old sections of Palermo and Catania still wrecked by war and full of inevitable ancient misery while the regional government and the local administrations hold hundreds of billions unused in the banks; services of which the public only knows their name, often run by a bureaucracy which finds its identity in the protection of its power. A large portion of our coastline--source of wealth for the tourist industry--was destroyed by savage land development and land renting. Consider, if you will, Mr President, the case of Gela and Augusta which are now close to ecological disaster, according to the experts.

There are still thousands of Sicilian families who live in hovels; going to the hospital for us often implies the same risk as going to war.

In recent months, we have been telling our readers about the big and little robberies which cause so much indignation and the prevarications which are so disconcerting. Within just a few days, two Palermo administrators went to jail; and what happened to regional public works advisor Cardillo humiliated the Regional Assembly.

But the thing that worries us most, Mr President, is the realization, day after day, that the Sicilians are reacting with ever greater indifference, alienated from a government which does not act like one.

## Government Remote

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[Article by regional president Santi Mattarella]

[Text] The visit by the president of the republic to Sicily is not and cannot be something formal. We are all familiar with the gifts of profound humanity in president Pertini which he displays with great dignity from his high office. There is therefore no doubt that his decision to visit Sicily is not a casual one, nor will it remain an isolated event; it is instead an important political fact and it is evaluated as such.

We all know that Sicily is going through a particularly difficult and uncertain time. Every day, the region, which constitutes the point of reference for all social, civil, economic, and cultural life on the island, gets appeals and reports on this or the other critical situation, from Belice to Mazara del Vallo, from Licata to Sciacca, from Milazzo to Augusta, and many other population centers which are experiencing an extremely harsh economic crisis whose consequences are felt quite clearly wherever the structures are weakest. On top of this difficult situation we have had other extremely severe concerns recently, regarding the revival of the mafia phenomenon and of violence which on the island carried out a series of preoccupying crimes also directed against faithful civil servants. This has forced us to step backward on the road toward a Sicily that would be revitalized also in terms of its image, while public opinion and the press do not always fully grasp the significance of the efforts which we are making today toward the renewal of the island and its levels of civil life.

We will express all of these concerns of ours to president Pertini who certainly, with his strong sensitivity, is already familiar with them and has already studied them. However we must stress that the national community as a whole, the government agencies, have not always come up with adequate responses to the dramatic events on Sicily. The autonomy charter was the correct response which the new republican and democratic Italy provided for postwar Sicily. We remain the faithful and jealous guardians of that charter but precisely because of that we are the advocates of a real spirit of unity for the republic and its institutions. This spirit of unity however cannot be viewed from one angle only; it must be viewed from the center, with coherence and concreteness, otherwise there will be a decline in the value of our autonomy toward unacceptable forms.



There is a vast management, agricultural, cooperative, and labor union effort underway in Sicily today and there are production situations which demand a credible response in terms of progress. Along with the entire South, Sicily has made noteworthy progress on the road of homogenization with the rest of the country; but that does not mean that the problem of the gap between the income of the most highly developed regions and the other regions remains the central problem for the entire country.

We also have large numbers of unemployed but live-wire and alert young people in Sicily who will certainly attract the attention of president Pertini who has such an open mind when it comes to the younger generation. We must ask those young people to commit themselves actively also in order to isolate and once and for all defeat violence and the mafia.

I am therefore convinced that the visit of president Pertini--whom we wanted to come to Sicily and whom we greet as a symbol of the ideals of the Resistance and Constitution to which he made such a strong contribution, is a very high political signal which comes from the highest authority of the state in the direction toward a decisive change in terms of the attention of the state and the national community toward Sicily and its problems.

#### Right to Autonomy

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[Article by Sicilian Regional Assembly President Michelangelo Russo]

[Text] Pertini's presence in Sicily is the highest evidence of the profound bond which he, in his various responsible positions, has managed to maintain with our people. It is now 15 years that another head of state, the Hon Segni, came to Sicily. Many things have changed in the meantime and many others have remained just as they were, unless there were outright signs of evident deterioration. But, frankly speaking, in a situation such as this one, we do not want to come up with a more or less detailed list of our problems.

Instead, we want to present a basic question addressed to the sensitivity of the head of state: Is it possible, is it thinkable that we should today still be witnessing a distorted interpretation of the original significance of Sicilian autonomy, of the motivations behind it, of the commitments that sprang from it? Ours is not an abstract petition of principle; we demand the constitutional right of seeing historically expressed the very reasons which are still present and which constitute the foundation for Sicilian autonomy.



It--and this is the main point here--was designed as part of a more general pattern capable of connecting the aspirations for liberty and self-government of our people with the project for unity which the national democratic forces pursued right after the disaster of the war with a view to the real unification of the nation and the renewal of Italian society.

The recognition of Sicilian autonomy as a matter of fact represented an anticipatory and qualifying factor in what the final definition of the character and the nature of the democratic state was supposed to be--the state that would be based on autonomy and on the participation of ever vaster masses of "sovereign-subject" citizens. The "gain"--recognition of the system of autonomy--thus was a positive fact not only for Sicily but for the entire institutional life of Italy.

But why was this "project" not completed even though it was fully in line with the Constitution of which the charter is an integral part? Nobody can fail to note that it was the break in 1947, the breakup of the understanding among the antifascist forces, which stopped this process.

The problem that once again comes up today quite forcefully therefore is the problem of returning to the revitalizing and unifying intent of the Constitution, starting with a historically correct consideration: Italy will not be able to progress if the South keeps falling behind.

When--in repeating the request of my predecessor, the Hon De Pasquale--I, together with the Council of the President, invited president Pertini to come to Sicily, I told him that his journey to our region would, at one time, have signified an act of positive attention to our autonomist system, an act of authoritative sensitivity toward the South, with Sicily taking all of the heat. I therefore think this is how the visit of the head of state to Sicily will be interpreted.

It would certainly have been stupid to fail to realize how irreplaceable, in this context, is the role of the political forces that are expressed in our Constitution and in our charter. I think that the seriousness of the crisis today--which comes on top of and further aggravates the historical conditions of underdevelopment in the South--objectively pushes us toward a broader and general agreement, capable of fully recovering the spirit of unity and unification which was so high at the dawn of the Republic.

## Violence Scored

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[Article by Alberto Stabile]

[Text] The city that welcomes the president of the republic today still reveals strong and painful signs of a tragic season of violence. We are not here to recall facts and figures which now almost daily express the new wave of crime, nor the names or titles of persons who were struck down because president Pertini certainly is fully informed on this situation (How many times, during his first year in office, did he have to send his by no means formal condolences to the families of mafia victims?).

In other words, we are in the midst of the acute phase--one of many phases constituting the problem--with a pathology which has now been afflicting our social body for decades and ages to which we doubt that the best remedies have as yet been tested.

There has been--and this cannot be denied--a long and distinguished succession of famous clinics around the patient's bed (The first investigation on the Sicilian rural areas struck with poverty and swept by brigandage, goes back to the initial period after unification and recalls the stories of Sommino and Francheti; the latest one, the Antimafia investigation, ended only 4 years ago); but when the time came to pick the best antidote and to prove its effect with the determination called for by the seriousness of the situation, we witnessed improvised omissions and unjustified absences.

Just as the conclusions of Sommino and Francheti, so clearly oriented toward the economic recovery of the Southern population groups, the principal if not the only condition to defeat violence, remained a dead letter, so were the recommendations of the Antimafia investigation never even discussed. This is a story which seems to be repeated in its full negative force, in other words, nobody ever learns any lessons from them.

Certainly, we are no longer in the age of brigandage. This city, this land are no longer separate provinces. Prosperity, the economic growth of the nation perhaps did touch Palermo and Sicily more than any other Southern region.

But there is an unharmonious development here, a rather diffuse prosperity which exists along with pockets of shocking poverty that continues to put up with an promote mass emigration, moonlighting, child labor exploitation, the decline of the environment, the absence of serious forms of solidarity and social advancement. With its violence

and its shortages, Sicily in substance, looks to us like a small-scale but faithful reflection of a social undertaking that was not completely carried out. That undertaking however was so admirably designed in our Constitution. And we must, first of all--mafia or no mafia--work toward the implementation of that design.

#### Belice Still Shaking

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[Article by Santo Stagno, Mayor of Roccamena]

[Text] Mr President, before the earthquake hit Belice valley, the area was shaken in terms of its economic and social conditions ever since Italy was unified. The losses during those years after the earthquake cannot be charged to the people of Belice who can only bewail their consequences.

We are not asking anything impossible but we are asking the following quite realistically: (1) Indexing for the homes on which construction was started; (2) Completion of urban development projects; the primary ones and the secondary ones, which are indispensable for decent civilian existence in our communities; (3) Restoration of the old historical downtown sections which can be repaired through the restoration of the old infrastructures that were left in a state of abandonment even decades before the earthquake.

We do not want the urban fabric of our communities to be broken up; we want the engineering solutions to recreate inhabited and well-integrated centers.

We want our workers, especially our peasants, our craftsmen, our merchants, our small and medium businessmen in the various production sectors, and especially our young people to have job opportunities, chances for growth, human and cultural advancement, within a context of integrated economic development based on agriculture.

We do not want to have our agricultural products taken away from us, we do not want to be deprived of real possibilities of increasing our output; this is why we want a well-planned action which would stress the upgrading, processing, and sale of the typical products of our rural areas.

We want to safeguard our environment and our resources together with our environmental and cultural assets.

The people of Belice and especially the community of Roccamena are not addressing the president of the republic like a boss, in an effort

to get him to involve other bosses; instead, they approach him as the guarantor of the democratic and republican system so that reforms and steps might be taken which would enable our communities to govern themselves and to be the real protagonists in their own human development.

### Traditions Being Killed

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[Article by Antonino Buttitta, Dean of Literature, University of Palermo]

[Text] Sicily is no longer Sicily. Its cultural identity has been swept away by the powerful wind of savage and tertiary development. Just a few decades ago, the island had a culture of its own which, with minor variations from one place to the next, looked uniform in terms of its expressive and ideological structures. This was the result of centuries of history, of a slow and progressive effort, of gifts and innovations, of absorption and selection. In summary, a continuous revision effort to which--through outside contributions--the various nationalities that followed each other either in populating or simply ruling the island, in turn made their contributions. A history full of suffering and conflict had produced the almost miraculous condition of its homogeneity.

The cultural panorama today has been radically upended (certainly not in contrast to the natural one either). It did not come to this just within a few years and as a result of what we call "progress." The latter has not touched the island, however, in its positive aspects. We have not had any noticeable transformation of production systems here, as happened elsewhere. But that is not the cause of the profound change in the social-cultural fabric. Here we might think of the island's economy most important sector--agriculture; we have had some really substantial changes here only for the past few years through the timid introduction of mechanization, the effective destruction of big estates, and efficient harvesting plus more intensive use of water for irrigation.

More than in these processes of transformation, the pattern of change must be found in the arising crisis, in the decline, and in the disappearance of traditional production activities following the flight of the people from the island's inland areas; the heavy and rapid concentration of population in the major urban centers with a pathological explosion of the tertiary sector; the change in cultural models due to the ceaseless bombardment from mass communications media.

We have been living through an ethnocide without realizing it, without a single cry of protest. When one allows the deterioration of a work of art, when one destroys a monument (as happened entirely too often)

then there is always at least somebody who raises a justified and indignant protest. When, on the other hand, we destroy an entire culture, especially if it belongs to peoples or classes in a dependent position (and that is true in our case!), then you not only do not have any protests at all but people even call it progress. The loss of a heritage of extraordinary expressive wealth and identifying value for example is considered an element of progress and I am talking here about our dialect (in other words, our language) and its replacement by a shrunken code of speech which is called "standard Italian." This is not progress; it is as a matter of fact a crime which harms humanity by depriving an individual of his culture. A man's identity is not made up only of his physical features but also of his way of thinking and being, in other words, of the entire complex of his way of behavior. His identity, in other words, the reason why he is not just a serial number, is the sum total of physical and cultural features. If we deprive individuals of the latter, we deprive them of their human dignity. This is what is happening to us now. Every day, we are losing a piece of our culture and all we can do is lament its absence.

#### Poets Silenced

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[Article by Franco Scaldati, Actor and Director]

[Text] At Palermo / the poets no longer sing / the musicians no longer play.

It is a city / which is slowly coming apart / its songs / its music / are distant echoes / which only the poor hear / but the poor keep dying.

I ask that the poor live.

I ask / that the rich die.

Thus / the poets and the musicians / will be able to intone / their songs / and their music / dedicated to life.

#### Free-Whirling Visual Arts

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[Article by Giuseppe La Monica]

[Text] There is no such thing as the regional politics of the visual arts; or, more precisely, it exists in an episodic and disorganized fashion; the practice of public structures on every level is divorced from the vast and profound requirements of the context and of its



cultural growth and it is instead tied to factors which are often "oblique." Exceptions are only too rare. Still, the community, provincial, and regional council members could do much and they could do it much better: They could, for example, take some steps which would, concretely and democratically, support artistic production, in the broadest possible fashion throughout the territory (thus discarding procedures which have prevailed so far); and they could support large-scale cultural initiatives, divorced from various brands of colonialism and aimed at an in-depth and rigorous updating.

This, in summary, is a "Southern" issue--and a Sicilian one--also for the visual arts.

Pertini's visit can constitute an opportunity for a petition for a change and his moral authority can be a stimulus here--obviously, of course, if it is not frustrated by the hidden authoritarianism of decades-old authorities.

#### Cultural Vivacity Not Enough

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[Article by Guido Valdini]

[Text] While the industry of culture, in a large part of Italy, has managed to open some paths for itself in the area of government financing--sometimes very generous, at that--the myth of the enlightened intellectual and the mirage of lean, desultory public gifts which, in a somewhat vulgar fashion, are referred to as being "welfarish." This is not a good myth, nor is it even a desirable mirage. Certain unheard-of forms of waste of the cultural industry in the North, instead of concerning themselves with quality and discovering new talent or simply more dignified operators--in the end only influence tastes and create fashions to make the public consume. And since it does not want any gifts or tips, Sicily is not interested in any phenomena of cultural gigantism set up by the political establishment.

Here in Sicily we are much more modest; we are poor and not pretty, with some colonial threat of tourism smuggled in through culture, recently discovered by some astute politicians. But here in Sicily we have cultural vivacity. And very often, in addition to a few high-sounding names known by everybody, it is entrusted to obscure and underground operators whose highest virtue is their sense of shame and their higher tolerance limit, tired as they are of seeing their own work crumble in the desert of expectations unfulfilled. Thus the man of the theater in the end winds up as a banker while the painter becomes a schoolteacher and the writer turns into an accountant.



To give you an example, let us take the field of the theater where the Region--in the absence of an organic law--today, every other year, or so, with confusing and sometimes treacherous criteria, distributes some small change. The result: Too many dogs for one and the same bone; and the less mangy ones then have something to eat for a few evenings. Although controlling the proper legislative instruments, the Region is just about paralyzed by all this opportunity!

Thus, imagination and ideas withdraw in good order; in Sicily we are soon going to close the door behind us; we invented our own "private theater" quite some time ago. Something similar, in substance, although with slightly different shadings, is true of the movies, music, the visual arts, etc., which have been abandoned to the privations of a situation without guidelines and resources; big undertakings, lost among internal infighting and the inevitable deficits, no hope of any real new inventions. The indifference, ignorance, and indolence of the politicians, the conformism of the few public structures, legislative inertia, the remoteness from the best centers of cultural enlightenment--these entail the risk of creating a ghetto, without any nationwide resonance with regard to anything that is interesting and excellent and that may still be produced in Sicily. The sufficiency of the cultural industry of the North does the rest.

Now, Mr President: More than words or money spent without any constructive result, offensive only to the taxpayer, Sicily wants support, initiatives, schools, and structures that will upgrade, stimulate, and provide new confidence for its intellectual capacity; and it is not really necessary for listless academicians or distracted politicians to have a voice in this matter because--as you know only too well--basically, producing culture is not absolutely necessary but turning out bad culture is highly damaging.

#### Cultural Decline

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[Article by Gioacchino Lanza Tomasi]

[Text] The first visit by a president of the republic to Palermo, which I can remember, was the one by Giovanni Gronchi. The president was received in Butera Palace and, for the occasion, they used a different route. Certainly, a president of the republic could not reach his quarters by going through dilapidated Butera Street. And, for the benefit of the guest, a scaffolding was erected and covered up with canvas to hide the gutted wing of the palace, facing toward Santo Spirito Square. At that time, about 25 years ago, I was almost daily at 28 Butera Street where Giuseppe Tomasi, from Lampedusa, lived and where I live now.

While that theatrical scaffolding was removed after the festivities were over, Butera Street today, as yesterday, is not in any condition for any triumphal receptions; heading from my house toward the seacoast, I can see the desolate land, consisting of the wreckage of the historical downtown section, with a dirty and smelly amusement park, a few prefabricated houses, and trailers, a place of prostitution and dead-end streets, as well as the Square of the Vow (a work of art which one certainly must not speak well of) and, finally, a parking lot.

Today it would no longer be enough to put up a big sheet of canvas along the oceanfront to recreate a theatrical illusion and the president will no longer stay here.

A quarter of a century did not pass in vain. The law, the requirements of the master plan--these were defeated by the spontaneous barbarism of underdevelopment. I believe that it died without ever seeing the promised land: Urban renewal, a beautiful city by the seaside.

Now, I belong to a generation which did try to do something. In our field, music and musicals, we did have some opportunities. The International Weeks of New Music during the Sixties were a point of international reference and the Big Theater of Leopoldo De Simone was not what it is today; the party in power, or better still, a current in that party, has approved Francesco Agnelli as the president of the symphony orchestra of Sicily and made the undersigned the artistic director of the Big Theater.

But somehow we were an awkward group of people and there was no room for us in public affairs, even though they had to do with culture. But room was there, it is there, and it will have to be there who so loudly promoted the administration elections under the slogan "Palermo is beautiful--help us make it more beautiful."

Today we offer to the president of the republic, for his consideration, the wreckage of the historic downtown area, the collapse of Zisa, the termites of Monreale, the vast ruins of the 18th-century towns; we offer him a sordid annual record of murder and we also offer him the almost total impunity of the murderers (45 trials for every 100 corpses). It is also said some of the big-shots in this most beautiful city ride around in armored automobiles, wearing flak vests. The autumn of 1979 was not devoid of surprises and did stimulate our expectations. The gang war keeps spreading and we ask ourselves for whom the bell will toll and how many times.

"These are rough times, Your Excellency!" Indeed, rough times, Mr President.

## Ignorance in Government

Palermo L'ORA in Italian 9 Nov 79 p III

[Article by Michele Perriera]

[Text] I do not believe that Pertini should be depressed over the list of our troubles. In his own way, he has led an exemplary life and he has arrived at an age where one is inclined to dream even more than little children.

On the occasion of Pertini's visit, there is something that will be asked of the others, that is, those who--out of skepticism or resignation or pathetic opportunism--allow themselves to be governed by legalized ignorance and prepotence. Those persons--who do not believe in the reality of dreams and in the pleasure of changing the patterns of power--are reminded here that the candor of that old man would not be so pathetic if they would not allow the most cunning and malicious political obscenity to remain in power.

Those persons are reminded that the advance of culture is felt where resignation ends and where insubordination against the ruling logic begins. Where that which appears impossible is always and over and over again imagined to be possible. For example, we are talking here about the demolition or at least the transformation of that part of this city which sprang up and grew merely on the basis of the profit motive; we are talking about opening wide spaces for recreation and contact with nature; we are talking about restocking the libraries in Palermo which are so piously kept devoid of instruments for a real thorough endeavor; we are talking about schools that should be so equipped that they will not only be able to operate properly but that there will be opportunities for extracurricular activities; we are asking that knowledge, invention, and quality--not patronage--be promoted in every field of culture.

But Pertini cannot do anything about that. Something can be done by those people who so often laugh at ingenuity. Something can be done by the left if it basically does not accept the rules of the game which, as we know, can be extended in all directions.

## Hope Still Remains

Palermo L'ORA in Italian 9 Nov 79 p III

[Article by Angelo Faja, Musician]

[Text] Dear Mr President, as a citizen and as a musician, I am happy to see that your political commitment is also expressed by your physical

presence during cultural events. Precisely because you are such a profound and well-informed connoisseur of that which a certain of Italy manages to express, we keep wondering whether the lack of creating infrastructure facilities--where people could do something--is the result of failure to plan for these things on our island. We wonder whether there was a real research effort on the environment in order to provide a possibility of expression and of obtaining information for the fisherman and the pistachio nut picker. We wonder whether the allocation of regional funds, such as it is, is really equitable and whether it might not perhaps have stifled the initiatives of individual citizens, who, at great personal sacrifice and taking the place of those who should have been doing something, did indeed promote the interests of culture for many years. We wonder whether anybody realized that one conservatory and four musical academies are not enough to provide an adequate response to the demand coming from 5 million Sicilians. We wonder whether there was really any thinking aimed at a policy of converting the current forces so as to give to everybody that which now is held by just a few. We wonder whether the hope which you, Mr President, have taught us to have, is to be the last thing to die, in order to prevent us from having to follow the waves of emigration. Mr President, please see to it that people will say that we are not exporting only mafia and oranges.

#### Vital Decisions Made Elsewhere

Palermo L'ORA in Italian 9 Nov 79 p IV

[Article by Antonio Calabro]

[Text] There are, on this island, 300,000 unemployed Sicilians; there are 180,000 girls and boys who continue to place hope in those useless laws on youth employment--one national law and one regional law--which so far have given part-time employment only to 4 percent of the applicants. Worse than that, according to the predictions of the most pre-occupied economists, the entire next "labor generation" (that is to say, all of those who will be graduating from the schools early in the summer of 1980) will only serve to swell the ranks of the army of unemployed.

For the Sicilian economy, 1980 will once again be a black year. Nothing as a matter of fact has been resolved in the vast sea of old troubles. And for the new troubles we can see few remedies within easy reach. If anything...

The main points in that "three-year plan"--which last year already was branded as "anti-Southern" not only by the left and the Sicilian labor union but also by some members of the DC and the regional government--continued to be behind the decisions that are being made in Rome,

Turin, and Milan. FIAT is slowing down or downright blocking the promises to Termini Imerese and La Fin-Cantieri and more than one minister is boycotting the Palermo shipyard, having the vessels of the IRI [Industrial Reconstruction Institute] built elsewhere (while the city's biggest factory is filled with trouble and anger--and how long can that situation be kept under control within the already tough labor union struggle?).

And what do we get from Brussels and the EEC? From there, likewise, we get bad signals for the citrus fruit growers, for the fishermen of Mazara who--due to the lack of trade agreements--are still exposed to the patrol boats of Libya and Tunisia.

Some time ago, during the Sixties, big chemical and petrochemical plants were built in Sicily. Many people, in good faith, believed in this possibility of industrial growth. This produced the myths of Catania as the "Milan of the South" and of Syracuse and Gela as "development centers." Today, even the most optimistic people simply talk about a "mirage." And tens of thousands of persons live amid ecological discomfort and the fear of losing their jobs (thousands of workers are already drawing unemployment compensations at Augusta and as many are gathering outside the factory gates).

The state of the Sicilian economy, in other words, is very serious. But the situation is much more complicated and disquieting than it might appear if we look at the list of "major crisis points." We have to look at other statistics. For example, those 10 billions which the Sicilian Region has available for the next 3 years and which it has already decided, rather roughly to use for the "multiannual budget." Or we might look at the insistent requests for funds reaching the banks from the tourist operators, the farmers, and the manufacturers. Well, why not? This expresses the troubles of those business operators who want to develop their industries but cannot get any financing and cannot find any properly equipped industrial areas and skilled manpower.

This gives us the picture of an island on which we have not only a persistent desire for development (hindered by waste, patronage, corruption, and mismanagement) but also economic resources and capacities. We do of course have a welfare state here which seems to sap the strength of a large portion of the people on the island. But there are also dignified refusals and hardened commitments to battle, such as those of the workers at the factories of the regional ESPI who are tired of earning their living in establishments which only produce noisy losses.

This Sicily is no longer the "happiest island." It has not been that for a long time. But it is not a tired island; it is capable of rising again. And it realizes that it cannot do that by itself, without being able to count on a national policy which would respond to its problems.



### Three Indispensable Steps

Palermo L'ORA in Italian 9 Nov 79 p IV

[Article by Giuseppe Cantone, President, Sicindustria]

[Text] On the occasion of the very short visit of prime minister Consiglio to Palermo on 28 September, we summarized, in an article published in the press, the most significant problems which, in the opinion of the island's industrial worker categories, still constitute obstacles in a lasting and no temporary social-economic takeoff of Sicily. Since then, other factors that are cause for concern have been added to the picture of the general and local situation, thus making the economic future more uncertain and troubled.

The anti-inflationary credit transactions and the wage schedule and tax maneuvers now in progress will have repercussions on all existing production activities, slowing down the already slow pace of the Sicilian economy while not one of the most serious crisis points of the public and private sectors and groups has so far been adequately resolved.

At a time when economic policy directions emerge on a nationwide level, requiring ever greater resources for the indispensable maintenance of current conditions, dark shadows keep gathering over the future of the South and our region.

This is why we believe that the following are priority steps:

- (1) Public action in the Southern area must regain the aspects of specialty, incisiveness, completeness, and timeliness which they have substantially lost;
- (2) Preference must be given to the quality of action itself; which means that the various steps must be differentiated according to the objectives, according to the varying requirements of Southern regional conditions;
- (3) The complex of policies and measures to be adopted must in the end reduce if not eliminate those "real disadvantages" which are recognized by most people and which are indicated as constituting "negative incentives" (for example, credit and transportation) for any new undertaking involving production activities and for the existing economic structures.

Now that the community itself is becoming aware of these problems, the federal government and the region can no longer remain indifferent but



must become centers that will propose and implement action most conducive to the elimination of these development bottlenecks.

Particular attention will have to be paid to questions dealing with the "allocations and functional effectiveness of civilian infrastructures, especially transportation, and transportation costs which, for the maritime peripheral regions and therefore for the entire island of Sicily, constitute the most obvious "real disadvantage," certainly a factor which constitutes a penalization and an obstacle to the competitive capability of the economy which in turn causes civilian and social decline.

#### Development Loans Not Enough

Palermo L'ORA in Italian 9 Nov 79 p IV

[Article by Giannino Parravicini, President, Bank of Sicily]

[Text] As in other regions of the country, the relationship between bank loans and industrial initiatives in Sicily likewise depends on the general conditions of economic development. Credit, quite frankly, is an important and just about irreplaceable factor in this development but it is not the only component. Industry lives and prospers if, in a given environment, we have situations that are well-defined on the basis of the so-called external economies, including the functions of assistance and loan backing. But they must be supported by other elements, including transportation. The industrial climate, the vicinity of markets, skilled manpower, and all of the other conditions which must be present in the placement of industrial activities.

Some of these conditions have been insufficient in Sicily for quite some time, contrary to what happened in other regions.

This does not mean that credit assistance to industry in Sicily is lacking. For example, medium-term commitments to industry--in other words, those that permit the creation, expansion, and replacement of production facilities--on the island are about 5 percent of the total national figure.

In this connection, it is only proper to mention the Bank of Sicily which, through its industrial credit section, has for quite some time been playing a primary and outstanding role. More than two-thirds of its commitments as a matter of fact have been set aside for Sicilian industrial initiatives although these efforts will also extend to vast areas nationwide.

This activity will of course be pursued and stepped up, not only to assist and sustain industrial activities already in progress but also to facilitate the start and continued strengthening of new initiatives

especially in production sectors which present a possibility of processing the island's raw materials. The bank is moving in this direction and special care will be devoted to minor initiatives, in other words, those which make it possible to emphasize the local business spirit, to assist it and to strengthen it on the difficult role of industrial growth within the new patterns of international division of labor. But it must be kept in mind that the impetus for the further growth of the Sicilian economy must not come only from industry. The island as a matter of fact has considerable potential in many other sectors, including first of all tourism and agriculture.

#### EEC Punishes Sicilian Agriculture

Palermo L'ORA in Italian 9 Nov 79 p IV

[Article by Giuseppe Gioia, President, Farmers of Sicily]

[Text] Mr President, I am quite aware of the expectations and hopes which might be aroused by a trip—even though it may be a quick one--such as the one you are now preparing to make in Sicily whose problems are still many and unresolved. In cases of this kind, there is furthermore a strong temptation to consider a long and detailed list of sector problems, all of which are oppressing and important, out of a desire not to forget anything.

I deliberately refrain from doing that for obvious reasons. I will therefore confine myself to submitting to you one question which--although it is of vital importance to Southern agriculture and to Sicilian agriculture in particular--does not have a sector character only but involves the country as a whole. I am doing this in an attempt to contribute--in a general manner--to the discussion on the South which you will have an opportunity to develop in depth here in Sicily.

Sicily's farm workers--on all levels--with extreme interest followed the events connected with the expansion of the EC to the countries of the Mediterranean Area (Greece and Spain) and Portugal. This is an event of historical significance whose full meaning we understand in all of its various aspects; this involves countries which recently joined the democratic area and whom the EC cannot deny solidarity and indispensable economic and political support if we want to help those countries maintain their security.

On the other hand, however, it would be rather superficial to overlook the questions raised by such a step among us. We cannot fail to note that the entry of the countries mentioned--whose agriculture has structures and problems similar to ours--is accompanied by a broadening toward those countries (for example, Sweden, Norway, etc.) whose

economies, because of their complementary nature, could counterbalance the competitive effect with respect to us.

It has been said that those countries do not want to be a part of the European community; but can we be sure that all that has been done to promote the entry of Greece, Spain, Portugal, etc., will not at least be attempted also for countries on a high industrial level and, besides, with what commitment will this be attempted? To be more explicit, will the more industrialized areas be asked to make the same sacrifices (competition, further decline in prices, market difficulties, big investments) which are asked and obtained from the Southern farmers?

At this point, Mr President, is it not proper to suspect that, once again (and Italy's history is only a sad example of that), Europe's economically strongest areas will continue to make the weaker areas pay for their development, in particular, the Southern agricultural areas? Balanced and lasting growth not only for Italy but for the enlarged Community must be based on a fundamental concept: A more equitable distribution of the sacrifices and benefits which the community system--and, more generally, the free circulation of goods and services--permit.

Let me put it even more clearly: It appears at least contradictory when a broadly sought free circulation of agricultural products leads to accentuated competition, running into a more or less concealed protectionism for other, economically and politically stronger sectors.

I understand, Mr President, that a problem of this vast scope cannot be resolved in a short time.

#### Industrial Growth Problems

Palermo L'ORA in Italian 9 Nov 79 p IV

[Article by Benedetto De Caro, Worker, IMER-ESPI]

[Text] For the past 12 years of its existence, ESPI failed to play the role of industrial promotion and management which was assigned to it, having "transformed" its mandate, stripping it of any function of economic guidance. It is known, as a matter of fact, that this agency in the region has played a welfare-oriented patronage role, aimed at supporting the power policy of some parties which followed each other in running the region.

The consequences of this irresponsible policy today weigh "heavily and only" on the factory workers. There is as a matter of fact a risk right now that many factories might be closed after they have finally been brought to ruin; and that risk has been stated quite clearly by several ESPI leaders.

The workers at these factories over the past several years fought hard in order to defeat a line of economic management which was implemented by ESPI and which inevitably brought the factories to the current disastrous consequences.

Our objective was and still is to come up with regional economic structures and government agencies that will make it possible to create the proper conditions for the protection and development of the existing factories, the achievement of working unity between ESPI and the others.

The permanent refusal, evidenced always by the state participations, with regard to Sicily and those factories, has been the sad reality expressing a lack of commitment on the part of the government and its agencies (for example, the closing of the shipyard, the redimensioning of SIT-SIEMENS, the lack of commitment on the part of the EFIM [Manufacturing Industry Holding and Financial Company] in the railroad sector of the IMER-ESPI).

Taking the opportunity of your arrival on our island, Mr President, we workers believed that this was a good time to tell you what our situation is.

We are convinced that the region's economic-structural resources "by themselves" cannot sustain the burden of supporting those factories, nor can they "by themselves" make the necessary political effort in order to overcome the problems connected to the protection of jobs at this time.

3058  
CSO: 3104

## SOUTHERN PEASANTS PETITION PERTINI ON UNCULTIVATED LANDS

Naples IL MATTINO in Italian 10 Nov 79 p 11

[Article by Gianni Festa: "Now the Peasants Turn to Pertini"]

[Text] Popular petition initiative to reach president of the republic in full swing; 6,000 signatures already collected; mass meeting held at Borgo San Lazzaro.

Persano. "Easy promises will no longer be accepted. The time has come to follow words up with deeds. We want land so that we will not have to emigrate." These, in summary, are the statements of the members of the Persano fighting committee for the occupation of uncultivated public land, following the meeting on the regional level.

At the "Battipaglia" bar, which has become a kind of headquarters for the fighting peasants, comments on the latest events are charged with tension. "They promised us 300 hectares from the 'Biancaneve' estate; the same we had cultivated last year. In that way they could prevent our patience from turning into fury."

The peasants held a meeting at Borgo S. Lazzaro on Thursday evening after the demonstration at Salerno and the meeting at the regional seat in Naples. Vito Fragella, the spearhead of the Persano peasant movement, summarized the objectives of the fight, inviting the partners in the agricultural cooperatives to join a broader mobilization by 15 November, the date set for the meeting between the representatives from the ministry of defense and the regional board. Among the initiatives which will be taken during those days is the resumption of the popular petition addressed to President Pertini, submitted last year, after the occupation of the "Biancaneve" estate. So far, 6,000 signatures have been collected: the signature drive will be stepped up over the next several days. The peasants of Persano, Serre, Borgo S. Lazzaro, Campagna, and Eboli are asking President Pertini to intervene in favor of taking public land away from military control.

"On the other hand," says Sabato Mottola, "It was Pertini himself, in the message to the country, who reaffirmed the need for reviving agriculture, 'filling the empty granaries.' We believe that we will secure his authoritative intervention through this petition."

The "events" at Persano have produced a vast echo also in the course of the provincial labor union cadre aktiv meeting held yesterday at Salerno. The repressive maneuver underway against the worker movement and particularly the peasants--who, in the provincial economic setup, play a weak role--was denounced.

An initiative was also requested to ascertain whether it is true that a shepherds' cooperative obtained the use of pasture land at Persano for an amount of less than 10 millions while other cooperatives had asked for a public auction, offering 36 millions.

A second peasant meeting was held last night at Borgo San Lazzaro. It lasted well into the night and two basic guidelines emerged: Continue to guard the boundaries of the public land area in order to attract the attention of the government and the region and launch other initiatives to seek greater participation by the political forces.

These are two guidelines which have the same objective: Keep the protest alive in order to get specific responses. "We will not make the same mistake again, the mistake of blind trust. In April 1978," we were told by Vito Fragella, "The parliamentary committee of the defense ministry promised, after the official inspection at Persano, to see to the release and productive utilization of a strip of uncultivated land. The then undersecretary Caroli pledged to take care of that problem in part within a month. But then nothing happened. We had to occupy the land in order to be able to work it."

The fear is therefore justified. For the peasants of Persano, past history is almost an admonition for the future. This is how one can explain the mobilization of recent days, the launching of initiatives designed to ask for a solution to the problem. "For the time being, we want to get back those 300 hectares which we cultivated last year," we were told at Borgo S. Lazzaro last night. "But the basic problem is still unresolved: The long-term objective is to put to productive use the entire Persano plain with its 1,500 hectares and with its 80-100 percent fertility."

5958

CSO: 3104



## GOVERNMENT PROCLAIMS WAGE FREEZE

The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUKEAU in English 11 Jan 80 pp 1-3

[Text] Policy Reorientation

The Hague, January 10--Prime Minister Dries van Agt proclaimed a two-month wage freeze following the failure of employers and trade union leaders here today to agree on a voluntary pause.

Government, employers and trade union representatives met for three and a half hours of talks today without reaching an agreement on a moratorium on wages.

The Prime Minister said after the talks that the period of the freeze would be used to thoroughly readjust 1980 policies.

Social Affairs Minister Willem Albeda told a press conference the wage freeze would enter into force tomorrow (Friday) or even earlier, if possible.

He said the freeze included wage contracts concluded retroactively, like those in the meat processing and dairy industries.

But he said that the cost of living adjustment payable as from January 1 was not effected and would be paid.

FNV Trade Union Federation Chairman Wim Kok told the same press conference he had his doubts about the second cost of living adjustment round this year.

The semi-annual adjustments are made in the Netherlands on January 1 and July 1.

## Modal Worker Hit

Prime Minister Dries van Agt had further disappointing news for the nation saying that the worsening economic situation made it impossible for his government to maintain, as planned, the spending power of people earning up to 32,500 guilders a year--the so-called modal worker.

The Government's intervention in the process of the wage bargaining was condemned by the Socialist-Catholic FNV and Protest CNV Trade Union Federations as well as the Union for Intermediary and Senior Staff.

The employers delegation, headed by Mr Chris van Veen, Chairman of the Federation of Netherlands industries (VNO), was also unhappy about the measure, but would have accepted a voluntary moratorium on wages for two months, Mr van Veen said.

The Prime Minister noted that since the national income would show hardly any growth this year according to the Central Planning Agency's forecast, seven billion guilder less would probably be available for the national economy than the amount on which the 1980 budget was based.

He said that both the private and the public spending sectors would have to slave in this loss.

Finance Minister Frans Andriessen said public sector spending would have to be reduced by four billion guilders: at least three billion guilders in connection with the worsening economic prospects and one billion within the scope of the 'blueprint for 1981' economy programme.

The Government still had to consider the ways in which these economies should be realised. But it would take account of the fact that too drastic an approach, as a result of which spending would slow down, might also adversely the economic developments. [as published]

Social Affairs Minister Willem Albeda did not rule out the possibility of a central agreement between the employers and workers representatives by the end of the two-month freeze.

Another possibility was a new wage measure, but this would have to be more detailed, leaving scope for adaptation to the labour market, he said.

The minister said this was a reference to higher wages for dirty, heavy or unpleasant work which few people were willing to do.

Mr Albeda said that the wage measure would be accompanied by measures for prices and for other income brackets. The policy package now envisaged by the Government would also pay attention to problems on the labour market 'which call for early and effective measures.'

In addition the Cabinet was considering policy measures aimed at insuring that fewer people asked for social security payments.

#### 'Black Circuit'

The Social Affairs Minister stressed that the policy package would also include measures to tackle the so-called 'black circuit' of cash not declared for taxes.

FNV chairman Wim Kok commented on this plan that a moratorium on wages would in itself increase turnover within the 'black circuit.'

VNO chairman Chris van Veen described Mr Albeda's remarks on the possibility of a central wage agreement as 'theoretical speculation' which he left entirely for the account of the minister.

But he said he would welcome further talks between the employers and workers' representatives during the moratorium aimed at adjusting their demands.

Mr Kok shared the employers' chairman's view that a national agreement was only wanted by the Government.

Mr Van Veen said the employers had accepted the two-month freeze because they realised that the Cabinet needed time to adopt its policy.

Mr Kok said the wage freeze was an 'unwise' measure which would not solve any economic problems and which was bound to evoke social resistance, 'especially if the agreement reached in the dairy industry would be cancelled.'

#### Wage Differentials

He said the FNV realised that the economic situation was worsening. But it would be difficult to convince the workers of this as long as the burdens were not shared more fairly, he said.

He called for a drastic reduction of wage differentials and for skimming off the 'unbearably high' profits of the oil companies.

It was 'scandalous' that the oil companies had enriched themselves by two billion guilders last year due to their participation in the exploitation of natural gas, he said.

Mr Kok said the FNV council would meet next Monday to discuss the new situation and to consider what measures should be taken during the wage freeze.

He did not rule out the possibility that employers and workers representatives would use the wage pause to consider the possibilities in the various branches of trade and industry in order to speed up wage negotiations after the moratorium.

CSO: 3120

## STRENGTH OF TNF OPPOSITION SURPRISES LABOR PARTY LEADERS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Dec 79 p 5

[Article by Terje Svabø]

[Text] Almost sensational is how prominent spokesmen for the Labor Party describe the debate in the Executive Council of the Labor Party regarding NATO's plans for new weapons. The Council for the first time in many years showed no desire to listen to government and party leaders, and opposition to the weapons' plan was so great that the party chairman, Reiulf Steen, in his summation did not dare to propose a vote. On Monday evening nine leading members of the Labor Party held a strategy meeting, in which they agreed upon a "soft" line in the Executive Council. The prime minister, did not, however, follow the advice he was given.

The meeting took place Monday evening in the government's representation building on Park Street, and according to what ARBEIDERBLADET has learned, the following were present: Prime Minister Odvar Nordli, Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund, Defense Minister Thorvald Soltenberg, Party Chairman and Commerce Minister Reiulf Steen, Church and Education Minister Einar Førde, Parliamentary Leader Trygve Brattli, Vice Chairman Gro Harlem Brundtland, National Federation of Trade Unions' Chairman Tor Halvorsen, and the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Arvid Johansen.

The purpose of the meeting was to the strategy for the meeting or the Executive Council. According to information ARBEIDERBLADET has obtained, it was decided that Nordli should present a cautious position and not provoke the opponents of the modernization plans. Nordli chose not to take this advice to heart, and it came almost as a shock to some of the participants of the Park Street meeting when it became clear that Nordli had after all decided to take a hard line. Nordli worked out his presentation to the Executive Council in conjunction with Frydenlund and Soltenberg.

The leaders of the Labor Party were prepared for relatively strong opposition in the Executive Council but it proved to be of a magnitude that none of them had anticipated. That is why the meeting did not make a decision. The leadership did not dare to take a chance on a vote, for the danger of suffering a defeat was overwhelming.

The debate in the Executive Council revealed a number of surprises which will be weighed by the party strategists in the coming weeks. The prime minister himself suffered the humiliating experience of being obliged to speak several times in justifying the government's view without having any impact at all on the debate. In like manner Reulf Steen, Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund, Defense Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, Environment Minister Rolf Hansen, Minister of Industries Lars Skytøen and the former chairman of the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions, Tor Aspen-gren, strongly supported the modernization plans. It did not help. The meeting was a victory for the opponents of the modernization plans.

It has been noted in political circles that neither Gro Harlem Brundtland nor Tor Halvorsen participated in the debate.

Both, according to what we have good reason to believe, were over the line Nordli chose to follow at the meeting. Much points to Gro Harlem Brundtland's making himself the Labor Party's mediator and bridge-builder in this matter. She has retained her independence and freedom of action and can help to bring the parties closer to each other before the decisive ministerial meeting of NATO on 12 December.

The debate in the Executive Council as described to AFTENPOSTEN as the third surprise for the Labor Party in this matter. Previously negative news had been received from The Netherlands and Denmark, and it is being asked if the fourth surprise will occur in the congress of the West German Social Democrats in Berlin next week. The Labor Party is sending Gro Harlem Brundtland and Thorvald Stoltenberg to follow the atomic debate there. If the West German Social Democrats take an unexpected position, there will be a whole new ball game.

The next round in the atomic debate will take place on 15 December in the parliamentary delegation. The chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Arvid Johansen, opposed the government's line in the Executive Council meeting. Prominent spokesman have, to AFTENPOSTEN, described Johansen's behavior as unheard of. Johansen has aroused considerable irritation, and the consequence of his action may be that ordinary members of the parliamentary delegation may now more easily oppose the government's position.

6893

CSO: 3108

## CONSERVATIVE PARTY CHAIRMAN TO STEP DOWN AT MAY 1980 CONGRESS

## Norvik Says He Needs Rest

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 11 Dec 79 p 5

[Interview with Erling Norvik, chairman of the Conservative Party]

[Text] Erling Norvik says "no" to a new period as chairman of the Conservative Party. He announced it himself yesterday. The party chairman gave as his reason that his strength is insufficient for a new term as chairman. The decision was received with considerable regret by Norvik's closest colleagues and other spokesmen in the party. Norvik maintained, however, that his decision did not mean that he was through with Norwegian politics. He will continue with party work, but at a less demanding pace.

A clarification which was sent out from the party headquarters yesterday said, "Erling Norvik today informed the Conservative Party's nominating committee that he is not standing for reelection as chairman at the party congress in May 1980. In his letter to the nominating committee Norvik regretted that he did not feel strong enough for 2 more years with the responsibilities and the tasks that the chairmanship included. He maintained in his letter that his decision was therefore final.

In a conversation with AFTENPOSTEN Norvik emphasized that there were no political or personal conflicts behind his decision not to stand for reelection. One of his closest colleagues told AFTENPOSTEN that the period of Norvik's leadership of the party has been marked by unity and very few clashes. Several said it was one of the most harmonious periods in the history of the Conservative Party. When Erling Norvik retires as chairman in May he will have been chairman for 6 years.

The conservative parliamentary leader, Kare Willoch, said that it is very regrettable both for the party and for Norwegian politics as a whole that Norvik did not feel that he should accept reelection as chairman after 6 years of outstanding contributions as head of the party.



Kare Willoch said, "It is a special blow for all of us who worked close to him, not only during his chairmanship, but also during the much longer time that he has made his numerous exceptional contributions to the party. People have confidence in him because of his solid social understanding and his tireless work. For that reason, even if we have not succeeded in persuading him to continue as chairman, we will regard him as the central force in the party regardless of his being in some other role than chairman."

[Question] Erling Norvik, several of your party colleagues that we have spoken with today say that this is a sad day for the conservatives.

[Answer] Such a sympathetic statement is indeed heart-warming. It was not easy for me to make that decision.

[Question] Many consider that you are responsible for conservative success and that much depends on you if there is to be a middle-class victory in the 1980 election.

[Answer] That is a very strong exaggeration of one person's importance in affecting the advances and reverses of a party. I have no doubt that the progress that the Conservative Party has made in recent years is primarily built on a growing understanding of and agreement with the policies that the Conservative Party stands for.

[Question] Has a successor for the job of chairman been selected?

[Answer] No. I leave this matter to the nominating committee and the party congress.

[Question] Does your decision not to stand for reelection mean that you are through with Norwegian politics?

[Answer] Of course not. There are many other important jobs besides being chairman.

[Question] Many people believed that when you were reelected chairman in 1978 you would remain as chairman until after the parliamentary election in 1981.

[Answer] I make no secret of the fact that I wanted to remain until 1982. I must, however, acknowledge and accept the consequences of not having the strength for a new 2-year term.

In comments on Norvik's decision both the chairman of the Christian People's Party, Lars Kervald, and the chairman of the Center Party and parliamentary leader, Johan J. Jakobsen, said that it is much harder now to be a leading politician than it was previously. They pointed out that Norvik is not the

first politician in recent years to withdraw because of the pressure of work. Neither of them thought that Norvik's departure would affect nonsocialist cooperation.

#### Active Politician

Oslo NORGES HANDELS OG SJOFARTS TIDENDE in Norwegian 11 Dec 79 p 1

[Text] Erling Norvik is retiring as chairman of the Conservative Party. That was yesterday's political bombshell. He gave as his reason that a new term as chairman would be too hard. But he said that he would continue as an active politician.

There has been much speculation as to what Erling Norvik will do now. His name was in the forefront as candidate from the Conservative Party for prime minister as far back as 1977. By retiring now as chairman and standing for election in 1981 he would naturally be in position as his party's candidate in the event of a possible change of government. He is also believed to be more acceptable to the parties in the center than, for example, Kare Willoch.

#### Hard To Replace

Oslo NORGES HANDELS OG SJOFARTS TIDENDE in Norwegian 15 Dec 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Change in Leadership"]

[Text] The change in the chairmanship of the Conservative Party can have a considerable impact on future political developments. In the entire field there is no candidate who can fill Erling Norvik's place today. In his personality and in his background he has special qualifications for leading his party, as we have seen in today's more popular Conservative Party. The inroads made in Vestland are among his largest accomplishments. It will be exciting to see to what extent it is just a matter of borrowed votes, or whether someone else can continue to strengthen the conservative bastions.

Of the deputy chairman, Jo Benkow is the one on which the party is most likely to gamble. He has experience, is well known around the country, and he represents a moderate blend of conservatism, which will have its advantages in the competition for voters in the center. But he hardly has that direct appeal to some of the new voters who have come to the party. In addition, a shift to Benkow would mean that Norvik was removed and replaced by someone older. Also, it will be difficult to find another candidate who can compete with Benkow, when Willoch does not want to return to the double role.

Hakon Randal has ambitions but he does not have sufficient political weight today. Besides, he is unknown to most voters. It would be difficult to find one in ten ordinary conservative voters in Oslo who recognize his name. He also was defeated by Astrid Giertsen in the last deputy chairman election

at the party congress. As one of two new deputy chairmen, however, he should have good possibilities. It will be more difficult to find the woman--and she should come from the north--who can take Astrid Giertsen's place.

Kaci is hardly the one for several reasons. She comes from the same municipality as Benkow. Besides, as she has so often acted contrary to the party line it is reasonable to expect that she will have to wait for a while.

The likely prospect is therefore that Benkow will be chairman for a while. The Labor Party is not particularly pleased with this prospect, but it probably suits the Progressive Party. So the Conservative Party must now attend to building up popular approval for the shift in leaders which support from younger voters requires. Chairman material does not grow on trees in the Conservative Party either, today.

9287

CSO: 3106

## LIBERALS TO CONSIDER NORDLI'S OFFER OF COLLABORATION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 Nov 79 p 3

[Article: "Liberals Consider Nordli's Offer"]

[Text] The Liberal Party is a nonsocialist party, but the Liberals are firm in not wanting to participate in a coalition government in which the Conservative Party is dominant. On the other hand, they do not completely reject the Social Democrats' "proposal" for cooperation. "We must first discuss the matter within the party organs," said party Chairman Hans Hammond Rossbach at a press conference yesterday, "because the party must form an opinion concerning the initiative from the Social Democratic Party."

The chairman emphasized that the party did not accept the invitation at the national committee meeting that took place last weekend. He also asked for a clarification from the Social Democratic Party and from Prime Minister Odvar Nordli in particular on what they actually meant with their suggestion of possible cooperation with the Liberal Party.

The national committee adopted, among other things, a statement on the government's housing finance package. The Liberal Party regrets the casual manner with which the government has handled the housing question with respect to the economic plan for 1980, it was said, and the organization's vice chairman Torstein Slungard said the whole affair represented a drastic dismantling of the housing policy. However, the Liberal Party will gladly discuss an adjustment of the housing policy but does not agree that an adjustment should hit construction of smaller houses, as the government's package intends to do--according to the Liberals.

The party is also asking the government to name a commission composed of a wide range of members to draw up laws to guarantee the same rights to people working the land and the natural resources in the Lapp regions as those enjoyed by landowners elsewhere in the country.

The national committee also believes that the age limit for purchasing beer and wine should be the same as the legal age of majority and that beer .a tax class three should be eliminated. And Chairman Rossbach has also written to the prime minister and asked him to take the initiative in discussions between the government and the leaders in parliament concerning revenue policies as well as finance and credit policies for next year.

9336

CSO: 3108

## FIVE DUBIOUS ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR LIBERAL-LABOR COLLABORATION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 8 Nov 79 p 3

[Text] The Liberal Party has clearly stated that it does not wish to participate in a coalition government with the Conservative Party. The voters have not heard a similar announcement concerning a possible coalition with the Social Democratic Party. In this way, the Liberal Party is placing itself on the socialist side of Norwegian politics, Kaci Kullmann Five points out in a conversation with AFTENPOSTEN.

The former chairman of the Young Conservatives and deputy representative to parliament points out that the Liberal Party sees itself as the third alternative in Norwegian politics. She emphasizes that if the party becomes junior partner in a government dominated by the Social Democratic Party, there will be little left of that third alternative.

"The combination of the Social Democratic and Liberal Parties will create great uncertainty concerning which political line such a government will stand for. Which defense policy will a coalition government follow? Will the Liberals' sceptical attitude toward NATO membership and measures that guarantee NATO's effectiveness be successful? What will happen in cultural and temperance politics? What environmental and energy policies can such a government agree on? In one question after the other the Liberals have strongly opposed the government's environmental policies.

Questions of energy and environment have been depicted as overshadowing all others for the Liberals. Thus, it seems improbable that the party will be interested in the Social Democrats' offer of cooperation. What guarantee do the Liberals have that it is their zero-growth policy and not the Social Democrats' "vigorous socialism" that will characterize the cooperation, Kaci Kullmann Five asks.

9336

CSO: 1108



## DEFENSE CHIEFS VERBAL 'SLIGHT OF HAND' CRITICIZED IN BUDGET DEBATE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Oct 79 p 2

[Commentary by Lt Col Anton Olstad]

[Text] The former Swedish defense chief stated clearly and publicly that he was in sharp disagreement with his government's defense budget. So far, the Norwegian defense chiefs have not done likewise. One gets the impression that it would not be in good taste, almost a breach of loyalty, if they were to publicly voice their dissatisfaction with the appropriation of defense money.

From this standpoint, the defense chiefs' statement that the defense budget has been done full justice is actually of little value or interest. Thus, it must be up to others to point out that our defense is suffering from important and troubling deficiencies.

This applies not only to the fact that our naval defense has been neglected--and will become even weaker--as a naval defense expert recently pointed out in two important articles in AFTENPOSTEN, but it applies perhaps primarily to our air defense. This has also been printed in AFTENPOSTEN. It must be a lack of desire to look the actual facts in the face that makes the public and politicians--with a few honest and courageous exceptions--pretend we really have our house in order.

It is all the more meritorious of AFTENPOSTEN to make the critical evaluations that the editorials on 10 and 15 October were. It seems as if we are postponing the solution to the really big problems by pretending that a possible war will primarily affect northern Norway. What if now, in a moment of brutal, sober recognition of reality, we admit that it is the capital and eastern Norway that are most squarely in the danger zone, since they are the country's leading political, economic, communications, and strategic center? And since southern Norway is closest to the Baltic Sea outlet and the continent.

The next question, then, is whether we could prevent an enemy from landing troops here, by sea and/or by air. No war goes like the previous one. But it is easier for the theoreticians to build on the experiences of the last war than to imagine the patterns of the next one.

The Swedish defense evaluation is based on the assumption that any future attack will primarily be directed against central Sweden.

With or without such an attack, with the insufficient air defense we have today, Norway will be terribly vulnerable to air attacks, especially in south central Norway.

But no, let us rather speak of the menace in the north as most dangerous. It is easier to master. Another thing we can use to push aside the problems is reorganization. It requires so much deep thought, time, pondering, and money that there is little left over for more important things. By spring, parliament will be invited to approve an arrangement with, among other things, combined regiments and an administrative buildup that failed to pass as early as in the 1950's. No one can say what this occupational therapy will cost and how long it will take the army before it can stand on its feet again afterward. The personnel reductions that are now to be undertaken are called a "controlled reduction of existing units and categories which will presumably not be included in the future structure."

They have a way with words, those who think it is unpleasant to tell people that defense is now actually being reduced rather than strengthened. Reorganization of the army's activating, administrating units may be interesting enough as a study. But right now it is a pure luxury. First we must get an air defense that is confidence-inspiring and strong enough and give the navy enough ships to guard our long, vulnerable coast. Then we will see if we can afford some kind of "restructuring of the army." Everything in its own time and in the proper sequence of priority.

9336

CSO: 3108

## CENTER PARTIES TO LAY OUT A MIDDLE ROAD IN ECONOMIC POLICY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 8 Nov 79 p 45

[Article: "No Increased Contact With Social Democrats"]

[Text] The Christian People's Party, the Center Party, and the Liberal Party are trying harder than ever to cast themselves as a third alternative in Norwegian economic policy. This is evident from yesterday's financial debate in parliament. But the Christian People's Party and the Center Party made it clear that this does not alter their relationship to the Conservative Party: they have not drifted away from it and, when the situations necessitates it, they are prepared to cooperate with the Conservative Party to form a government. There is, however, no evidence of closer cooperation between the Social Democratic Party and any of the center parties.

The Social Democrats' speakers tried to split the nonsocialist parties and the finance committee's spokesman Gunnar Berge (Social Democrat), Rogaland, declared that the nonsocialist parties did not stand for a common economic policy. There are wide gaps between their tax policies and in a number of other areas, he said. What is presented as alternatives from the various groups can hardly be called that and what is being presented are proposals for change that could weaken next year's plan in a number of areas.

Rolf Presthus (Conservative), Akershus, was of a different opinion. "What I like most about the nonsocialist cooperation this fall," he said, "is that the Christian People's Party and the Center Party have clearly stated that the Social Democrats' tax proposal is unacceptable because the graduated tax structure is too severe." The three parties also agree on the necessity of lessening the pressure of taxes and fees in labor and industry.

"If this year's financial report is compared to last year's, the attitudes of the three nonsocialist parties have moved closer together. The goal must be for this positive development to be reenforced when next year's budget is considered," the vice chairman of the Finance Committee emphasized.

The relationship between the Christian People's Party and Center Party on the one hand and the Conservative Party on the other was discussed by Sverre Helland (Center Party) from Hordaland:

"This year, too, the nonsocialist parties stand together against the government with respect to several key political areas for 1980. Primarily, there is reason to emphasize the fact that the Christian People's Party and the Center Party have come out strongly united with an almost unanimous approach. Still, the distance between us and the Conservative Party has not become greater than it was," Helland emphasized.

He was supported in this view by Kjell-Magne Bondevik (Christian People's Party), More and Romsdal, who added that for this reason the possibilities for cooperation between the center parties and the Conservative Party are the same as before. On the other hand, he noted that the Liberal Party, more often than previously, has given its support to ideas on the budget from the Christian People's Party and the Center Party. Bondevik called this "coordination of the centrist point of view."

Presthus also took note of this but he broadened the perspective somewhat:

"Before discussions on the budget, several of the ruling party's foremost spokesmen advocated closer cooperation between the Social Democratic Party and one of the so-called center parties. In the report there is not a trace of such a development!"

The Liberal Party's Odd Einar Dorum, Sor-Trondelag, stated that there have been several areas of practical politics that have united the three center parties.

9336

CSO: 3108

## SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC LEADER ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

LD210903 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 13 Jan 80 p 7 LD

[Unattributed, undated interview with Portuguese Social Democratic Party (PSD) National Political Committee Chairman Carlos Macedo: "Referendum Would Not Mean Institutional Breakdown"]

[Excerpts] DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: In your view, how is the government program debate progressing?

Carlos Macedo: First I would say that the prime minister's speech was rather short and incisive, which as far as I am concerned gives the opposition no reason for responding with a number of speeches which far exceed it in length.... That is to say, irrespective of what kind of speech the prime minister delivered, the ideas of a section of the opposition, namely the Socialist Party, were already well decided in accordance with the socialist deputies' strategy, irrespective of whatever statements the communist deputies might issue.

## Rejection Motions

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Should we infer from what you have just said that the Socialist Party adopted a more aggressive attitude to the government during this first session than the Communist Party itself?

Carlos Macedo: Yes, I regard the Socialist Party's stance, the conduct of its deputies as somewhat more aggressive than the Communist Party's stance was or could have been expected to be. And this aggressiveness was so marked that, most unusually for debates on government programs, the Socialist Party introduced a motion of rejection at the outset. I regard this as somewhat premature, since the government program was not debated, apart from a few questions directed to the prime minister. It was, therefore, entirely premature.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Could this mean that the Portuguese Communist Party [PCP] will adopt a "historical compromise"-type attitude, as is the case in Italy?

Carlos Macedo: No, I do not know that it will adopt precisely that line. But it is well known that it has adopted a very "Italian" stance in two or three statements since the opening of the Assembly of the Republic. But it is still a little early to venture to say whether they are considering this "historical compromise" hypothesis.

## "Italianization"

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: In the view of the Democratic Alliance and the PSD, would it be desirable for this to happen?

Carlos Macedo: I do not believe that it is a desirable solution. Judging from Italian experience, it seems to me that the "historical compromise" means political paralysis. And I would not like to see that in my country.

If you are talking about a compromise on certain specific aspects, including specifically the labor field and therefore with a greater or lesser involvement of the trade unions, then yes, there could be certain "arrangements." But I do not believe an Italian-style compromise is in Portugal's--still less the PSD's--interests. We want to conduct a perfectly clear policy with regard to what we and the communist party represent. Whatever variants the FCP may adopt, its line is too well known and is marked by an alinement with the Soviets, which would never yield any advantages to Portugal or to the clarification of Portuguese politics.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Do you believe that what has been called the possible "Italianization" of the Socialist Party is desirable?

Carlos Macedo: I do not believe so, and unfortunately we are perhaps witnessing a slow move toward a hypothesis of political convenience in accordance with an Italian model, mainly through the fault of the socialist party's conduct. I would be very pleased to see a revision of the Socialist Party's stances and activity, because the destruction of the Socialist Party, if it continues along this path, will be a reality, and Portuguese democracy can only suffer as a result.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Do you consider viable the line which, according to some press reports, has emerged in certain socialist sectors advocating a possible Socialist Party [PS]-PSD agreement?

Carlos Macedo: This possible understanding is now entirely in jeopardy. When it was possible and desirable about 3 years ago the Socialist Party, which at that time had an overconfident attitude, rejected it, and its subsequent conduct has progressively eroded this possibility.

Even with a change in the Socialist Party, this agreement, regarding specifically power-sharing at government level, would be harmful in the eyes of the Portuguese electorate. The electorate has not forgotten the ambiguity and incompetence shown by the Socialist Party; this would not apply on the other levels on which such an agreement could occur. And this would be the easiest way for us to strengthen Portuguese democracy and prevent our "Italianization." It is the Socialist Party's duty, more than our own, to effectively insure that the Italian model is not established in Portugal.



[LD210917] Members of Alliance

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Would you care to comment on the frequent references that have emerged in the press to the alleged lack of internal cohesion among the various components of the Democratic Alliance?

Carlos Macedo: Possible splits within the Democratic Alliance have been the subject of great speculation by sectors of the press not inimical toward us. What sometimes do occur are difficulties of adjustment in a group in its initial phase and therefore in a phase involving the start of an experiment new to all of us. And perhaps sectors of the press sympathetic to us have sometimes, paradoxically, played into the opposition's hands.

There is no point in dismissing the difficulties of adjustment in the functioning of the Democratic Alliance at its various levels, particularly in parliament. The alliance is composed of three forces, which are different, and the Democratic Alliance's strength is based on its plurality. Because of the bilateral agreement between the PSD and the reformists there is, I would say, one more component belonging to the Democratic Alliance. These then constitute four quite different political components; if they were not different, there would be no point in having three parties and a group, and there would, therefore, be no need to tackle certain problems regarding either the political language to be used or certain forms of machinery, which some regard as the right mode of functioning for the Democratic Alliance. The divergencies are being surmounted, but they do require a certain dialog. It is advisable for each component of the alliance to remember that the alliance now belongs to none of them but to the Portuguese people; and that in the 2 December elections people voted for the change which the Democratic Alliance represented and not specifically for one or other of the parties comprising that alliance. Most members and particularly leaders of the Democratic Alliance are well aware of this, but from time to time we still witness excessively partisan manifestations which complicate this scheme of things. The parties are not losing their autonomy. They must not and cannot lose their personality but must realize that there is something which transcends them, that there must be no major partisan differences within this platform of understanding. There is a joint program on government action and there are major political guidelines which must be shared, but this in no way implies eliminating the will and personality of each of the components. As we proceed with this Democratic Alliance experiment and maintain a full awareness of the responsibility conferred on us by the votes which gave us the parliamentary majority, we will resolve these minor dissensions.... As for minor problems such as the issue of a spokesman, it is time for us to set these petty problems aside and to really concentrate on Portugal's real problems, which are very specific and very clear-cut. We all know this, and those who voted for the Democratic Alliances in particular know it and expect us to resolve them.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: All these issues which have emerged in connection with various aspects, some formal and some personal, seem to reveal the existence within the Democratic Alliance of two trends: one aiming at the homogenization of the Democratic Alliance, at a single political force, and another aiming to preserve the autonomy of its various constituent parts. Do you agree with this interpretation?

Carlos Macedo: I do. The tendency within the Democratic Alliance toward a future merger is extremely small. The forces which constitute the Democratic Alliance, and specifically the lines of the two principal parties, are very clear in their assertions on this point. There will never be a merger. We will live in harmony and unity, but we do not envisage any kind of merger in the short, medium or long term. I believe that such a merger would destroy rather than strengthen the Democratic Alliance.

[LD210927] DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: To be more specific: Do you believe that the differences of an ideological nature and concerning the social composition of the alliance's various components will prevent its merger into a single whole?

Carlos Macedo: As far as I am concerned, these are inconceivable in a single party. There are marked differences of a sociological [word indistinct] among the Democratic Alliance's four components, which make it entirely inconceivable for them to unite beneath the same party banner in the future. It was no accident that various parties made a decision in 1974 and that for the past 5 years of our democracy this same differentiation has been very clearly marked. This does not mean that there is no convergence of interests on domestic and international issues among the Democratic Alliance's component forces. That is what gave them life and strength. We are concerned with altering the mode of coexistence and above all of democratic living, but for this to become a reality we must continue to provide the electorate with clear options through specific political outlooks, and we stated this, moreover, in the government elections program for resolving the specific problems which are hitting Portuguese society the hardest. This is basically what Portugal needs until 1984. Once this phase in Portuguese life and democracy has been concluded then, in 1984, we will be ready again to provide the electorate with more distinct options with a more party political flavor. Until then such a development is unlikely. Therefore, the Democratic Alliance is a force perfectly suited to the Portuguese people's needs within the democratic framework. In 1984 it may or may not continue. Perhaps it will not need to continue at that time, once the parties have acquired the capacity to provide answers and can present themselves to the electorate individually with a chance of winning and of forming a stable government to defend democracy in Portugal.

#### Differences Between PSD and Social Democratic Center Party

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: In sociological terms, what are the differences between the alliance's major components, the PSD and the CDS?

Carlos Macedo: The PSD essentially differs from the CDS in its much stronger trade union backing. The two parties' voters in certain areas of the country are fairly similar, but within the party cadres, particularly at an intermediate level, there is indeed a marked sociological difference between the PSD and the CDS. By that I do not mean that the PSD has a greater democratic content--to use the language to which we have unfortunately become accustomed since 25 April--than the CDS, but the sociological composition of intermediate PSD cadres is somewhat different

from the CDS. This can sometimes explain certain conflicts which emerge when the parties have to meet for discussions and particularly to find a joint solution. I also believe that it is part of democratic coexistence to pinpoint these social differences in order to find democratic solutions, irrespective of our own social makeup.

We should remember well--and I regard this as very important--that 25 April was more of a social and psychological option than a political option. The organization of forces or of individuals through the various political forces after 25 April took place essentially in accordance with these two aspects, which therefore gave each party methods of conduct much more closely connected with social and psychological aspects than sometimes with political conduct and entirely clear program options. Therefore, it is not difficult to see, if we look at the establishment of the various Portuguese parties--apart from the PCP--in relation to their pre-25 April membership, that as far as the other parties or the main parties are concerned, their options in one way or another often reflected aspects of various kinds but had very little to do with ideological or political options. This means that Portuguese democracy has existed for the past 5 years largely in an attempt to find itself, within a rotten and outdated society, and that therefore every one of us had to find a modernized social position and identity; this was achieved in the various parties partly in accordance with our existing political content and above all through the fears which, from the start of the 25 April revolution, options to the right of the socialist party inspired in many people. The Portuguese left demonstrated its inability to resolve the nation's problems and showed (more than one would have expected) its greed for social importance and its inability to provide political answers to the specific problems assailing the Portuguese people.

Therefore, we are moving toward a normalization of democratic life, which could be summed up as follows: whether one is rightwing or leftwing has nothing to do with being closer to or further away from the communist party. The options within the democratic framework, both to the right and to the left, are essential, because otherwise democracy has no *raison d'être*. These past 5 years have enabled us now to take decisions without complexes, though nevertheless there are still vestiges which emerge from time to time and which hinder relations among the various political forces and within the individual parties.

CSO: 3101

## POLITICS REVOLVING AROUND UPCOMING NUCLEAR REFERENDUM

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 9 Jan 80 p 10

[Article by Werner Adam: "Puzzling Swedish Questions; Politics in Stockholm Are Totally Under the Spell of the Imminent Nuclear Power Referendum"]

[Text] Stockholm, January--"But he has nothing on," the entire people finally cried. And that was taken to heart by the emperor, for it seemed to him that they might be right. But he thought: Now I must endure throughout the procession. And he held himself even more proudly and the chamberlains went and carried the train that wasn't even there." What the chamberlains thought and felt after the "emperors new clothes" had been found out is not revealed by Hans Christian Andersen. He also leaves the reader of the story unclear as to how much power and influence the state servants had already enjoyed at that time. To be sure, they must have been loyal: as loyal, probably, as ministry officials of our times. In Sweden at least they are presently also carrying a nonexistent train because there is apparently not even an emperor or, more precisely, a prime minister or a government. It exists in name, certainly: with government head Falldin at the top and supported by his agrarian Center Party in alliance with the Liberals and the Conservatives. In practice, however, it is scarcely visible or at least it is marking time, because Swedish politics -- without caring about confrontation by the superpowers or the threat to the oil supply -- are totally under the spell of a single theme: the referendum on the pros and cons of nuclear power, about which the people is to be consulted in March.

The Swedish citizen may not automatically sense it as disturbing when the government obstructs itself. He would also understand that the political parties finally want to get rid of a problem which has claimed nearly all of their and their country's attention for at least 4 years by now. But what are said citizens to think of representatives who do not even offer a ballot that follows the yes or no pattern but confronts them with alternatives and subalternatives? What about a coalition government which in the matter of nuclear energy offers a picture of total disagreement, has gone into a waiting position in the manner of Vogel-Strauss and, as is noted with biting irony in political circles in Stockholm, thinks it can apparently "play dead" until the day of the popular referendum?



The agrarian Center Party of declared nuclear power opponent Falldin, for example, on this issue makes common cause with the opposing Communists. On the other hand, the opposing Social Democrats advocate a "sensible" expansion of nuclear energy production but under no circumstances do they want to march in step with with the Conservative Party, although it, too, wants to retain nuclear power. Finally, this is also what the Liberal Party wants which, to be sure, also wants to maintain a distance to the Conservative partner and instead tags along after the Social Democrats. Furthermore, a splinter group has left this Liberal Party and joined up with the opposite camp. There, there is also not a united opinion, but reflections concerning an excessively categorical no have been voiced which originate from a few Center Party people.

Three government parties, three so-called nuclear power positions. Position one, represented by the Conservatives: Operation of a total of 12 nuclear power plants, the shutdown of which is not to be initiated until after 25 years. Position two, backed by Social Democrats and Liberals: Basically identical to position one, only that when further expanded the energy industry is to be nationalized. Finally, position three, with which the Center Party and the Communists identify: Dismantling of the six already operating nuclear power plants within the next 10 years and immediate mothballing of four reactors ready to start up. Social Democrats and Liberals have meanwhile come to the conclusion that on the basis of their different "traditions" it would be advisable to form two separate campaign committees: a liberal one and one by the Swedish "labor movement," the representatives of which the Social Democrats and the unions claim to be. To be sure, the Center Party and the Communists want to be satisfied with one committee (even if a fight has broken out about it in Falldin's party), but while the Center Party believes it could accept a potential yes to nuclear power, the Communists will in that event continue with their rejection campaign, according to their own statements.

So far the "official" referendum policy. In the meantime a splinter group from the Liberal Party is supporting an indirect "liberal energy alternative" aimed at rejection. A splinter group from the Center Party, on the other hand, considers dismantling within 10 years to be premature as a timetable and therefore calls for a "yo." The Conservatives advocate an unrestricted yes, of course. Even they must naturally renounce their intended election leader, because he is simultaneously secretary-general of the Swedish Red Cross and does not want to bring his organization in connection with the nuclear power campaign.

The Swedish citizen, necessarily just as weary of the issue as the majority of politicians, sees himself pulled into a perplexing party-strategic game. A profusion of serious and less serious reports, in which to some extent figures and technical data are being juggled in a dangerous way, has contributed even more to his growing confusion. Yes or no should have been the original question put in March. However, that has turned into cross questions, side issues and riddles.

11949

CSO: 3103

## BUDGET DEFICIT WILL JEOPARDIZE SOME SOCIAL PROGRAMS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 12 Jan 80 p 14

[Article by W. A.: "No More Money for Reforms; One Quarter of the New Budget Is Not Covered"]

[Text] Stockholm, 11 Jan--Sweden can no longer afford social reforms, because the public expenditures have grown beyond the country's control. This admission was made by the government on Thursday during presentation of the budget for the 1980/81 fiscal year beginning on 1 July. According to a statement by Finance Minister Mundebo the country has reached a point "where it is no longer possible to improve the financial situation through a higher tax burden." It is instead a matter of cutting back state expenditures and in particular finally urge the up to now excessively generous municipal regions to save. In view of the deteriorated balance of payments it is also important to limit imports through reduction of consumption and to stimulate the export industry.

With a volume which has increased by 30 billion crowns to 203 billion in comparison with the current year, the new budget proposal shows a deficit of 55 billion crowns. Four years ago the deficit was only 10 billion. The deficit expected for 1980/81 corresponds rather exactly to the planned social expenditures which make up the largest single item with 53.2 billion and accounts for 26 percent of the total amount. On the other hand, only 8 percent (16.3 billion) are to be used for defense, whereby the government is at best willing to allow the armed forces compensation for inflation based on the current year. The contribution of 306 billion crowns for energy research has also turned out to be conspicuously small, since Sweden's dependence on oil imports is described as one of the greatest difficulties. To be sure, the government characterizes it as alarming that for years public expenditures have grown "considerably more rapidly" than the gross social product. A total growth rate of 4.1 percent is expected for 1979/80, which, however, ought to slow down to 3.6 percent in 1980/81, according to the finance minister.

Of concern is on the one hand foreign trade, the 5.5 billion crown surplus of which for 1978 has meanwhile turned into a 3 billion deficit and which in



1980 will reach a deficit of 4.5 billion crowns, according to the prognoses of the government. Furthermore, this development may result in a 12 billion crown balance of payments deficit for 1980/81. Third, finally, one must reckon with further indebtedness by the state which by the end of 1979 alone had taken up foreign loans in the amount of 20 billion crowns.

Against this background the government wants to try to limit public expenditure growth in the new fiscal year to 2.7 percent (after 4.5 percent). At the same time a decline in gross investments from 6.6 to 4.7 percent is assumed.

11949

CSC: 3103

## NSP ORGAN RAPS JP FOR ITS STAND ON AFGHAN INVASION

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 31 Dec 79 p 1,11

[Material cited in single sentences capitalized in original]

[Text] For a long time, the JP's "liberal" mentality has frightened the nation with the bogeyman of communism and made it the slave of America and the West. They have convinced the nation more by setting forth the horrors which communism would bring than by demonstrating their own talents.

/This is an old Zionist plan./

On the other hand, the leftists, terrifying the nation with the oppression of capitalism, have recruited crusaders for communism. Naturally, in the end, whether one fears capitalism and ends up with communism, or whether one fears communism and has capitalism foisted on one, the result is no different: one is still deceived by the plot of Zionism. Fifty years have passed, all within the operation of this strategem. Our nation has finally begun to see the reality. And what frightens the centers of Zionism is the fact that this reality has begun to be understood. It is actually this fact which lies behind the most recent events in Turkey and in the rest of the world. This consciousness, reviving once again in the Muslim year 1400 -- the beginning of the 15th century of the Muslim calendar -- is now showing itself to be the most powerful movement capable of giving direction to the world of the future. From this standpoint, the Muslim year 1400 and the years that follow it will be filled with events that will develop in this direction.

This plot, which has continued for so long, is no longer working. Now the nation is finally putting forth a great many questions. What? How? Why? The nation wants to know these things. Now, the nation is asking the JP administration: "You were the foes of communism; now why have you swallowed your tongues when faced with the aggression which has befallen Afghanistan?"

The JP, of course, has no answer to this. A number of newspapers, which serve as the JP's official mouthpieces, are busy seeking an answer to this question. Just as in the proverb about the Jew, who, when boasting of his courage, inadvertently admits his theft [thus evidencing his defects when attempting to prove his good qualities], when the topic of Afghanistan comes up, they find the blame for the present state of affairs in [former Afghan king] Zaher Shah's not having joined CENTO. And they can find nothing else. But actually, when all their heads have been conditioned to slavery, this is the way people think. In fact, the slavery of these people is actually worse than the slavery portrayed in "hoots", for at least the slaves [in the television series] had in their hearts the seeds of revolt against slavery. These people [the JP] are virtually composing eulogies to slavery. In a way, they are saying the following about the Afghan people:

"They didn't join CENTO and become slaves to the Americans, so the natural result had to be this: they drew close to the Soviets and became slaves to them." What we are calling for, however, is not slavery but a sense of character, of integrity... These well known thinkers are unable to conceive of any sort of solution other than becoming the slaves of either the U.S. or the Soviets... It is just this issue which the world is now taking up... These people [the JP] are such anachronisms, they are creatures which put their heads into the sand...

And where are you, champions of communism? Why don't you scream and shout? But it won't work, this time, with your sham statements. And using this affair as an opportunity and making speeches as America's mouthpiece won't work either... It is in no way an appropriate time to say that this situation is an opportunity to defend the U.S. and write eulogies to America; if the nation under assault were some other place, not a Muslim nation, our illustrious ones would long before have gone into action... But when it's Afghanistan that's attacked, they remain silent. Why has the current government so far given not a single penny in aid to the Afghans, who helped us in our struggle for independence? While even the Christians have increased their assistance to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, what have our officials done?... Committees wanting to collect aid money for Afghanistan are left waiting at the doors for official permission. This won't work, gentlemen, it won't work. Don't try to deceive the nation.

Actually, there are few left who could be taken in by you again anyway. After all, there you are, with your past actions, your ideas, your present state, all clearly visible. Your allegiance is visible, too: Bravo IMF! Bravo USA! Bravo NATO!.. And that's all you have, because finally there's no one left in this country to believe in you...

We don't believe in a single one of you...

Off with you... to some other door... as if there were anyplace else for you to go, anyway... May God give you some understanding at last...

## PRO-NAP GROUP RELATES ITS VIEW OF 'SOCIAL CHANGE'

Istanbul HARGUN in Turkish 28 Dec 79 p 2

[Column by S. Ahmet Arvasi]

[Text] As Turkish-Islamic Idealists, we can summarize our views on the topic of "social change" as follows:

Societies are never "static", but rather have a dynamic nature. There are a number of things which impel societies into such dynamism, and consequently toward "social change". Unlike the Marxists, however, we do not explain social change merely by economic factors. In our view, economics is but one of the factors which cause social life to change. Our observations have shown us that demographic factors, geographical factors, factors of social interaction, psychological and biological factors, factors of culture and education, and advances in science and technology all play roles in social change which cannot be ignored.

Also, in our view, there is no universal model of "social change". "Social change" comes about in different ways in accordance with the conditions of various nations. That is, social change itself has many forms. The "prophecy" that societies would show a development away from the capitalist economic structure toward the socialist economic structure, in accord with the Marxist model, has not proven to be true. The Western world has not, as Marx expected, moved toward communist revolution; on the contrary, it has undergone positive developments that render communist revolution inconceivable. Now, nations dedicated to the liberal-capitalist economic system, without violating "the classical freedoms" and, in fact, even guaranteeing these freedoms, have developed institutions of "social justice" and "social security" which amaze even the socialists. Now, the world is prepared to listen to "our message".

We, the Turkish-Islamic Idealists, do not deal with "production" and "education" within the preconceived framework of "infrastructure" and

"superstructure". In our view, these two activities are really very much interconnected. We conceive of "production" as man's efforts to transform and cultivate the world of nature for his own benefit, and "education" as his efforts to cultivate himself and render himself more productive. "Physical social goods" contribute to the exploitation of nature, while "immaterial social goods" contribute to man's self-development. As we accept the individual as the basic element of all social, cultural, economic, and political life, we have special respect for the "immaterial goods" which make man what he is. We have a great regard for science, art, and religion because they serve to exalt man, rather than the natural world, and to develop him and make him productive. In our view, the purpose of economics itself, even, is to provide happiness for mankind. Economics does not exist for the sake of the economy, but for the sake of man. For this reason, we evaluate "social change" upon the basis of what it does for people.

Certainly, it cannot be denied that our nation is currently in "the transition from an agricultural social structure to the structure of an industrial society." This situation renders it necessary that our society be reorganized. It is thus obvious that the Turkish Nation must reorganize its state in accord with the new conditions and requirements, and that it must put its social, cultural, economic, and political life once again into order. No intelligent statesman can possibly be unaware of this national need. While society is greatly agitated by these new requirements and conditions, the state cannot just maintain the status quo. Every institution must renew itself, going along with the mode of change of society. But we must not forget that "to be renewed" and "to change" do not mean "to be alienated from one's origin", or "to degenerate and to lose one's basic character." Above all, it does not, as some have supposed, mean abandoning one's national, holy identity, or giving up one's own culture and civilization and taking after foreigners. On the contrary, it means that a society along with its religion, its language, its system of laws, its art, and its thought, reconstitutes itself in accord with new conditions, but without losing its original character.

In such a situation, we, the Turkish-Islamic Idealists, as we re-establish a "contemporary Turkish Islamic Civilization", will, besides adapting to the "course of social change", be alert against the tricks and plots of those circles who are inimical to our culture and our civilization.

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## 'AYDINLIK' CHARGES NAP WITH PLANNING SUNNI-ALEVI CLASH

Istanbul AYDINLIK in Turkish 16 Dec 79 pp 1,7

[Text] Ankara: Turkish Workers and Peasants Party General Chairman Dogu Perincek has stated that information which he has received from various places around the country shows that the NAP is hatching plots to create a clash between Alevi and Sunni Muslims which would increase the tension throughout the nation. His statement charges that "The NAP finds the most suitable ground for its nationwide design in the regions where both Alevis and Sunnis live in close proximity to one another, and it is concentrating its aggressive forces in these areas. As for certain groups which have arisen as 'leftist' organizations, they are being used as tools for the plot which the NAP is working to arrange by inciting sectarian differences and provocations."

Later in the statement, the following information is provided with regard to the various provinces:

"In the streets of Tokat, gangs of NAP adherents brought in from outside are circulating and trying to provoke incidents. Stocks of weapons are being built up in various villages around Tokat.

"In Pazarcik, both the NAP and Apoist gangs are provoking a Sunni-Alevi clash from opposite directions. A 20-man Apoist group descended upon the Pazarcik village of Pulyanli, then collected the inhabitants together and threatened them. The Apoists fled when the people resisted them.

"In Kirikhan, the NAP has stepped up its provocations in order to incite a Sunni-Alevi conflict. A family of eight members, who had fled the Maras massacre last year and settled in Kirikhan, has been burned alive.

"The NAP has provoked 'test' incidents in Kayseri, Zile, and Tasova; citizens have been killed and shops have been plundered.

"In Maras, both NAP adherents and Apoists have made a number of preparations in conjunction with the anniversary of the Maras massacre, and they are spreading the word that they are going to create a new Maras incident."



The final section of the statement contains the following:

"Our party had warned both the government and the public with a number of statements before the Maras massacre of last year. Tragically, these warnings of ours were not heeded.

"This time also, just as before the Maras incident, the plan is to say that 'I am coming'.

"We are now warning the Demirel government. After things explode, and after the blood of the people has been shed, it will be too late to intervene. The murderer oiling his weapon must be captured before he causes any more suffering; the incidents must be prevented. In order to frustrate the NAP's design, a nationwide campaign must be initiated to strengthen the fraternal relations between Alevis and Sunnis."

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## TURK-IS, DISK UNIONS DECIDE ON JOINT ACTION

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 28 Dec 79 p 7

[Text] Tez Buro-Is [Turkish Trade, Bank, Insurance, Cooperative, and Education Counter and Office Workers Union], affiliated with Turk-Is [Turkish Federation of Labor], and Sosyal-Is [Social Workers Union] and Bank-Sen [Bank Workers Union], both of which are affiliated with DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Unions], announced in a joint statement made yesterday that they will form a joint coordination committee in order to implement decisions which will be arrived at in concert.

Participants in the press conference were Sosyal-Is General Chairman Ozcan Kesgec, Tez Buro-Is General Chairman Ugur Batmaz, and, for Bank-Sen, General Secretary Yucel Cubukcu, standing in for General Chairman Metin Denizmen, who is currently under legal custody.

Tez Buro-Is General Chairman Ugur Batmaz, reading the joint statement, said that "As labor unions active in the 21st and 22nd branches of industry, we consider it essential to wage a common struggle for the interests of tens of thousands of working people against anti-democratic attacks arising from the new MC [National Front government] or from other reactionary political administrations, against new oppressive laws, against murder, and against the bank monopolies, who are preparing for a broad new offensive within our branch of industry."

The joint statement called for the use against workers of the anti-democratic articles 13, 17, and 24 of the labor law to be prevented; for attention to be paid to their demands for net increases in social aid; for them [the unions] to be given a say in the hiring of workers in all workplaces; and for employers to continue to pay wages in the event of workers' being arrested or convicted for political reasons or for union-related reasons.

The joint statement also included the following:

"Henceforth, our unions will follow a common policy of collective bargaining along the lines of the above-mentioned concrete demands. Our unions will review the contract dates and act in concert in the preparation and administration of contracts beginning at the same time; in particular, we will initiate joint sessions to draw up contract proposals for workplaces belonging to the same employer; in addition, contract discussions will be engaged in jointly, and, when necessary, job actions and strikes will be carried out in concert.

"From now on, our unions will jointly convene their regional and divisional organizations whenever necessary, thus ensuring that joint decisions are made."

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## TKP'S NEW MAN IN MADEN-IS: KEMAL DAYSAL

Istanbul AYDINLIK in Turkish 17 Dec 79 p 4

[Text] Kemal Daysal, who was appointed to the administration of the Maden-Is Union [Turkish Mine, Metal, Metal works, and Machine Industry workers Union] in 1976, has become a "strong man" who in the past three years has taken hold of all the reins of power within the union, which is about to convene its 23rd General Assembly on the 19th of December. The fact that Daysal, who has never been a worker, has gained so much power within Maden-Is in such a short time is attributed to his being the "main man" of the spurious Turkish Communist Party [TKP].

## From Contractor to Labor Leader

It is stated that there are a number of interesting aspects to Daysal's career as a labor leader -- Daysal, who has climbed to the very top of Maden-Is in just three years. A technician and graduate of a technical school, Daysal has never worked in a factory, except during a month-long obligatory internship. It is known that, following this internship, Daysal launched himself into the working world and was in business as a contractor for a period.

Obtaining the contract for the Dalaman Paper Factory's steam pipes after 1970, Daysal began to work as a contractor during this period. Forming a partnership with a number of friends, Daysal was also in business as a contractor during the years 1974 and 1975, when he served as Chairman of TUTAD, the Universal Technical Workers Organization.

## Flight to Bulgaria

At the same time, contractor Daysal was also gaining prominence as one of the sham TKP's main men in Turkey. Active in the TIP [Turkish Labor Party] Eminonu District organization before 1970, and also in the opposition movement known as "Partisan" in conjunction with Veysi Sarisozen and Sitki Coskun, who were later to join the TKP, Kemal Daysal fled to

Bulgaria in the period following the Twelfth of March [1971]. Following training received during the two years that he spent in Bulgaria, he began to propound the ideas of the sham TKP. Later, he returned to Turkey.

#### Labor Leader Appointed from Above

Daysal's return to Turkey occurred during the period when the spurious TKP was gaining strength with Maden-Is and DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions]. In 1976, after the TKP adherents had occupied all the positions of power within Maden-Is, Daysal, who at one time had served as Chairman of TUTAD, was appointed Assistant General Secretary by Mehmet Erturk, the strongman at the time. In order to give Daysal a post within the union, Erturk created the position of Assistant General Secretary, which had not existed in Maden-Is until that time.

#### Climb Begins

Forming a clique within the union in conjunction with Erturk and Aydin Meric, Daysal, after remaining for a time at Headquarters as Assistant General Secretary, was appointed to be Bursa's 13th Region Representative, for TIP-supporter Selim Mahmutoglu was at that time serving as the representative to Bursa, and he could not be permitted to organize for the TIP at the expense of Maden-Is.

Since the bogus TKP had no great strength in Bursa, Daysal's first task was to endeavor to organize [for his party] in Bursa. In order to accomplish this, he brought IGD [Progressive Youth Association] members from Istanbul and put them into the factories. He made them stewards and chief stewards. For example, it is known that the chief steward at Mako [expansion unknown], Hasan Sarica, was a member of the Eminonu IGD Executive Board. Alhas Korkmaz, Mehmet Icin, and some 30 other IGD adherents stayed at hotels in Bursa on Maden-Is money and worked at organizing for the TKP, subject to Daysal.

#### Bursa TKP Provincial Committee Formed

Meanwhile, Sitki Coskun, one of DISK's "experts" at that time, was sent to Bursa as the DISK Regional Representative. In February of 1977, Daysal, Sitki Coskun, and Aydin Meric held a series of meetings at Uludag. Before long, ISCININ SESI [WORKERS' VOICE], the journal of the spurious TKP, which is published in England, announced that a Bursa TKP Provincial Committee had been established.

In the same period, the IGD and the IKD [Progressive Women's Organization] began activities in the same building wherein the DISK Bursa representative's office was located. Workers, who dropped by the DISK representative's office after work in the evenings, would encounter young people, both male and female, trying to accompany the words and music of Russian-language records and tape cassettes.

### Daysal: Anything Permissible to Reach Goal

Daysal is known for considering any and all means as being permissible in order to reach his goal. He is the main individual responsible for the fact that, since 1976, hundreds of workers have been turned out of a number of factories, merely because they would not yield to oppression and did not accept the TKP's ideology. It is known that, after he had been unable to gain control over the TIP representatives fired in Bursa after their resistance to DGM's [State Security Courts], this incident was exploited as a handy opportunity to eliminate the TIP from Bursa.

Daysal had Salih Taner Serim, the chief steward at Profilo [expansion unknown] in Istanbul expelled from his job because he was not a TKP adherent; when Serim was returned to his job by decision of the Provincial Board of Arbitration, Daysal first removed him from his position as chief steward and then secured his dismissal from his job for the second time. To those who noted that Serim was a TSIP [Turkish Socialist Workers Party] adherent, Daysal said that "Any and all means are permissible in order to reach the goal."

Forming a network of informers in order to strengthen his position within the union, Daysal was able to participate in the union's 22nd General Assembly only as a delegate from the General Administrative Board contingent, yet he was named to Maden-Is's top executive body. Thus, after a land and real-estate commission agent, a contractor, as well, gained a place in Maden-Is's top administration.

Making ample use during the past two years of the great possibilities offered by his positions as a member of the General Administrative Board and as Chairman of the Collective Bargaining, Wage, and Economy, Politics, and Research Departments, Daysal has been consolidating his position.

As he goes into Maden-Is's 23rd General Assembly, which will begin in two days, Daysal is accusing Mehmet Erturk, who originally brought him into Maden-Is, of having "betrayed the cause", and is approaching the General Assembly as the "strongest man" in the union.

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## GENDARME OFFICERS SEIZE LARGE HAUL OF BULLETS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 17 Dec 79 pp 1,7

[Text] Afyon (HURRIYET NEWS AGENCY): During the course of checks carried out by gendarmes on the road to the village of Karacahalilli, attached to the Dinar district, 13,500 rounds of 9mm pistol cartridges were seized in an automobile with license number 07 DT 659, driven by one Ahmet Gedik.

In a statement on the bullets seized by Dinar District Gendarmerie Command teams during spot checks that they carried out, Afyon Governor Ihsan Dede spoke as follows:

"In a search carried out by district gendarmerie teams, who became suspicious of the auto's owner, Ahmet Gedik, and his brother Hasan Gedik during a control check, 13,500 rounds of pistol ammunition were found within 540 boxes which had been placed in special compartments in the car. The Gedik brothers have been taken into custody as suspects in the ammunition smuggling unearthed as a result of the diligence of the security forces. Investigations are continuing in order to determine the origin and destination of the cartridges."

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## EDITORIAL COMMENTARIES ON DCA NOTED

## Comment on DCA

NC140851 Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 12 Jan 80 p 9 NC

["The Cornerstone" column by Ergun Goze: "Turning the Corner"]

[Excerpts] The defense and economic cooperation agreement between the United States and Turkey was initialed in Ankara the other day. We all know the difference between initialing and signing. But no matter what happens, this positive step during these troubled days is a development that has brought relief both to Turkey and to the area.

The agreement contains satisfactory provisions regarding the supply of most modern planes, Leopard tanks and spare parts so urgently needed by our armed forces. This means that the dialog between the army and the government has yielded positive results. Moreover, another of the provisions of this agreement is financial aid which will bring relief to Turkey. In return, the bases will be opened under the command of a Turkish commander and only within the framework of the NATO alliance, and on condition that they will not be used against such Muslim countries as Iran and Afghanistan.

Our information may be inadequate and our comments untimely. But even this much is enough to make us view the agreement positively. However, in our country, where there are organizations which are not ashamed of supporting Babrak Karmal, there will be people who will express opposition to this agreement.

In the meantime, it would be useful to remember that the internal as well as the external enemies of Turkey must not remain idle. This agreement is valid for 5 years. During this period, all the necessary legal, financial, cultural and administrative measures should be taken to uproot international communism, which has trained many Babrak Karmals who have spread throughout Turkey and infiltrated state departments since 27 May [revolution in 1960]. Now a coalition with the Republican People's Party--if it is still in favor of it--can be discussed. In

reality coalition with the Republican People's Party is possible on one simple condition. Let this party announce that the most serious danger facing Turkey is communism. Let it condemn organizations that applaud Babrak Karmal. Let it offer to sever relations with them and purge them from among its ranks in the Grand National Assembly. Then the coalition will have been formed. It is not so much the Republican People's Party as Turkey as a whole that should turn the corner.

#### Opposition to Agreement Criticized

NC140935 Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 12 Jan 80 p 3 NC

[Editorial by Oktay Eksi: "Litmus Paper"]

[Excerpts] Recent events have been very useful. Like Litmus-paper dipped into acid, peoples' preferences have become clearly known. We now know better who is on the side of the army, on the side of the parliament, on the side of Washington, or on the side of Moscow. We also know who is on Ankara's side.

But to tell the truth, we never thought that the U.S.-Turkish defense and economic cooperation agreement, initialed the other day, would infuriate circles--topped by 51 Republican People's Party deputies--to the extent of "demanding a parliamentary inquiry of Prime Minister Demirel--on the allegation that the government has permitted the use of American bases and installations in Turkey in a manner detrimental to our national interests."

It is possible that they acted in this manner because that is how they feel about Turkey's interests. But to be sincere, this clamor against government policy before seeing the text of the agreement, that is, without seeing the official statement as to how and under what conditions the bases in Turkey are to be used, proves that these people are not concerned with investigating the matter. Nor are they concerned with Turkey's efforts to insure its security and independence or to achieve contemporary civilization within the family of the Western world. They are only concerned with ways, means, and intrigues that will enable them to put Turkey into the orbit of their own beliefs. As a matter of fact, this is, I suppose, where our ways part.

Those opposing this agreement plan to isolate Turkey from the rest of the world and, under the pretext of "rendering independent," to attach it to any "bloc" they like.

Those who wish to push Turkey into this direction have gained strength in recent years. Having become cleverly organized, they can now make their voice heard. In reality, the rules of a freedom-loving democratic system require us to view their voices with respect, provided they do not go beyond the limits of legitimacy. However, the nature of the predicament in which they wish to hurl Turkey can clearly be seen in Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic.

## UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS FOR AUGUST RELEASED

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 21 Dec 79 p 2

[Text] During the month of August, 40,553 people -- 28,353 men and 12,200 women -- registered with the Labor and Employment Organization Directorate General in order to find jobs.

The number of applicants during the previous month was 48,714, consisting of 33,125 men and 15,589 women.

The number of applicants in August of the preceding year was 63,786, made up of 46,539 men and 17,247 women.

Thus the number of applicants to the Organization showed a 16.8 percent decrease from July 1979 to August 1979, and a 36.4 percent decrease from August 1978 to August 1979.

#### Open Jobs Reported by Workplaces

The number of jobs reported open in August 1979 was 17,723, consisting of 9,422 jobs for men and 8,301 jobs for women.

During the previous month of July, 17,985 positions -- 9,204 for men and 8,781 for women -- were listed as open.

In August of the preceding year, the number of open jobs totalled 27,292, consisting of 15,654 jobs for men and 11,638 jobs for women.

Thus the number of open positions reported to the Organization in August 1979 showed a 1.5 percent decrease in comparison with July 1979 and a 35.1 percent decrease in comparison with August 1978.

#### Workers Placed in Jobs

In August 1979, 6,425 men and 7,977 women -- a total of 14,402 people -- were placed in jobs by the Organization.

In the preceding month, 7,318 men and 8,504 women -- a total of 15,822 -- were placed by the Organization.

The number of workers placed by the Organization in August of the preceding year totalled 26,261, including 15,141 men and 11,120 women.

According to these figures, the number of workers placed in jobs by the Organization during August 1979 exhibited a 9 percent decrease in comparison with July 1979 and a decrease of 45 percent over the number placed in August 1978.

#### Unemployed

The number of unemployed registered with the Organization as of August 1979 totalled 151,625, consisting of 126,857 males and 24,768 females.

The number of unemployed registered in the previous month was 163,881, including 138,524 men and 25,357 women.

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## INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS' SHARE OF TOTAL EXPORTS INCREASES

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 15 Dec 79 p 11

[Text] Ankara (ANKARA NEWS AGENCY): The share of Turkey's total exports represented by exports of industrial products is steadily increasing. Thus the share of total exports held by industrial goods exports, which stood at 26.9 percent during the period January-to-October 1978, rose to 35 percent during the equivalent period of 1979.

Calculations made with export figures current as of the end of October indicate that, in addition to the increase in exports of industrial products, a 54 percent increase in exports of processed agricultural goods had occurred in respect to the first 10 months of 1978, this figure having risen to 121.6 million dollars. Thus the total exports of the industrial sector, which reached a level of 444.1 million dollars during the period January-to-October 1978, rose to 640.5 million dollars in the corresponding period of 1979.

While, in the exports of industrial products, the high rates of increase in the cement, textile, and motor vehicle industries attracted attention, it was determined that, among the traditional export products of the agricultural sector, exports of wheat and cotton showed decreases of 51.5 percent and 31.5 percent, respectively, in comparison with the first 10 months of 1978. Thus, while 167.7 million dollars worth of wheat and 281.8 million dollars worth of cotton were exported up until the end of October 1978, wheat exports declined to 81.4 million dollars and cotton exports to 193.2 million dollars during the corresponding period of 1979.

During the first 10 months of 1979, Turkey's imports of crude oil stood at the level of 743.2 million dollars. In relation to the 863.3 million dollars of crude oil imports during the same period of 1978, a decrease of 13.9 percent was registered.

As opposed to the decrease in crude oil imports, however, purchases of petroleum products showed a significant increase in 1979; while they stood at the 241.55 million dollar level during the first 10 months of 1978,



they rose to 594.1 million dollars during the same period of 1979. While imports of fuel-oil, in particular, rose to 158.3 million dollars, an increase of 249 percent over the period January-to-October 1978, imports of other petroleum products, including motor oil, rose to 365.9 million dollars, an increase of 162 percent.

In the distribution of imports and exports according to commodity groups, attention is drawn to the 17-fold increase in exports, with a 35.5 percent decrease in imports, of motor vehicles and related parts and materials, all of which are included in the "industrial products" group.

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## GUN SMUGGLING LINKED TO HEROIN TRAFFICKING

Istanbul AYDINLIK in Turkish 21 Dec 79 pp 1,7

[Text] Following the arrest of Security Director Zahit Avcibasioglu with 13 kilos of pure heroin, worth a billion lira, the theory that drug smuggling and arms smuggling are intricately wound up in one another has begun to gain strength. Maintaining that Turkey plays the role of a bridge in the midpoint of the Europe-Asia traffic with regard to both types of smuggling, officials claim that the same smuggling networks arrange both the export of heroin and the import of weapons.

## Poppy Fields

The frontier region between Turkey and Iran is known as the area of the world which produces the finest poppies. The poppies obtained here are first converted into morphine base in processing plants in our eastern provinces and then made into heroin. The smuggling networks, which have their centers in Istanbul and Ankara, collect the heroin from a great many processors in the east and arrange ways out of the country for it. Generally, foreign citizens are utilized, and the heroin sent to Europe is handed over to Turkish, German, Italian, and French underworld organizations.

## Two-Way Trade

The Turkey-based smuggling networks, which earn high profits since heroin is found in Europe only on the black market as a much sought-after illegal narcotic, make contact with weapons factories and arms merchants in both Eastern Europe and in the West. The networks bring the weapons, which they buy at wholesale prices in Europe and which cost little since they are sold freely on the market, to Turkey by both land and sea, then offer some of them on the domestic market, sending the rest to Middle Eastern countries.

## High Profits

The fact that weapons prices reached extremely high levels with the increase in both searches and incidents of violence due to the declaration of Martial Law has provided the smugglers with an astronomical profit potential. In this situation, Russian-made Kalashnikov machine pistols, which can be sold for up to 250,000 lira in Turkey, cost the smugglers only 3 grams of heroin apiece. The smuggling is generally divided into two branches, known as "clean" and "dirty" business. While some of the smugglers deal with such things as heroin and weapons, others do not become involved with these, confining their activities to the transport of electronic instruments, raw industrial materials, coffee, cigarettes, various currencies, cosmetics, and similar goods. Some smugglers, having made astronomical sums in a short time from "dirty" business, are beginning to deal in "clean" business; in fact, some, having passed through even this stage and begun to make legal investments, are becoming influential and respected businessmen.

## Protection

It is known that weapons- and heroin-smugglers make arrangements with customs posts, certain officials in the security forces, and certain key officials in various ministries, and that they have influential friends in Parliament. In this way, smuggling can usually be carried out as a comfortable business. And this situation works to the benefit of those forces which, in order to exacerbate the anarchic situation in Turkey, desire that the number of deadly weapons in our country increase.

It is said that "King" Sami, a well-known arms smuggler, has an influential circle of friends in Parliament. The fact that, after "King" Sami and one of his two brothers were arrested following an attack on a nightclub in Ordu, they were set free due to the intervention of influential circles, is a well-known example of this. In addition, the fact that the lawyer who defended "King" Sami in this case was a man who had resigned while serving as felony court judge in Gaziantep attracted attention from the standpoint of cooperation with smuggling rings.

A National Assembly member from Ordu is pointed out as an important friend of Sami's. It is reported that this individual, who has gained renown for his interest in weapons, has had conferences with Sami, who owns a large hotel in Ankara, and that the "King" has had a role in various transfers.

Under a previous administration, "King" Sami had a close relationship with one of the independent National Assembly members. This individual is known for his extreme rightist views, and for the two million lira in credit that he received in an irregular manner. Among those who have protected Sami, there is also an RPP Senator who aided him when he fell into difficulties with the local security organization.

Sami, known as a man from Ordu, is actually from the Alucra district of Giresun province. It is stated that Sami, who was captured in an armed clash a few years ago while transporting weapons in Thrace's Istranca Mountains, and whose picture was then published in a number of newspapers, has made significant progress since those days.

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